

# 猜猜看誰把醃肉帶回家了： 補助款利益在縣市分配的分析\*

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本研究以分配理論分析 77 至 84 會計年度台灣省政府補助款在縣市的分配情形，藉以觀察民意機構、行政機構與政策利益分配之間的關係，並同時檢證分配理論所提出的假設。我們利用匯集橫斷面與時間序列分析模型依序分析第 8 屆省議會、第 9 屆省議會與 77 至 84 會計年度（第 8 屆與第 9 屆的匯集）期間的省府補助款分配。

研究結果充分支持分配理論當中的議員平均資深假設以及選戰競爭假設。而縣市長黨籍假設與多數黨議員比例的假設隨著分析期間不同而出現不同的支持程度。不過本文的研究結果並不支持委員會席次假設以及委員會資深的假設。另外，除了政黨在縣市執政權更易的假設與補助款撥發機關首長的更易之外，其他有關於結構改變的假設也沒有獲得充分的支持，甚至於我們預期國民黨籍省議員比例增加的縣市可獲得更多補助款的假設得到相反的分析結果。歸納這些研究發現，我們認為省府補助款分配的結果與「議員資深程度」以及「政黨屬性」相關因素（縣市長黨籍、多數黨議員比例、多數黨議員比例的變動以及政黨在縣市執政權更易）的關係最為密切。未來台灣地區分配政策的研究應該著重於補助款分配過程中政黨結構運作相關因素以及民意代表資深意涵的探索與驗證。

**關鍵詞：**分配政策、分配理論、美國國會、補助款、台灣省政府、台灣省議會

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\* 本文承蒙行政院國科會專題研究計畫（NSC87-2414-H-032-004）補助，作者同時感謝兩位匿名審查人的指正以及寶貴的改進意見，在此一併致謝。

收稿日期：88 年 9 月 14 日；接受刊登日期：89 年 1 月 18 日

# **Guess Who Brings Home the Bacon: The Geographic Distribution of Taiwan Provincial Grants**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The present study tests hypotheses of distributive theory by looking at the distribution of grants among 21 counties and cities from FY1988 to FY1995, allocated by the Taiwan Provincial Government. Panel models are employed to analyze the expenditure distribution in the time periods of the 8<sup>th</sup> Taiwan Provincial Assembly, the 9<sup>th</sup> Taiwan Provincial Assembly, and from FY1988 to FY1995 (combine the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> TPA), respectively.

First of all, the findings show that seniority and electoral competition of provincial legislators have significantly positive effects on the distribution of provincial grants during the whole time period we observe. Second, the party affiliation of provincial legislators has positive effects in the 8<sup>th</sup> TPA, while the party affiliation of county in chief or city mayor has positive effects on the distribution of provincial grants in the 9<sup>th</sup> TPA. Third, the committee membership and committee seniority of provincial legislators in the TPA show insignificant impact on the distribution of grants. Fourth, for the effects of structural change, we do find that the change of ruling party in counties or cities leads to change on the distribution of grants. Moreover, the change of chairman in Taiwan Provincial Government makes differences on the amounts of grants that counties and cities receive.

In summary, the distributive politics in Taiwan can be characterized as party-centered or seniority-centered. It does not follow the pattern of standing committee-centered like the U.S. does. Further distributive

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studies in Taiwan should aim at exploring the operation of party structures and seniority in the distributing process of policy benefits.

**Key Words:** Distributive Policies, Distributive Theory, Congress, Taiwan Provincial Assembly, Taiwan Provincial Government, Grant