A Kantian View on Cosmopolitanism, Democracy, and Nationalism

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We are witnessing the resurgence of nationalism, the renewed interest in cosmopolitanism, and the attempt to universalize democracy. Through explicating Immanuel Kant’s passage on “cosmopolitanismus” or “cosmopolitan society,” this paper tries to obtain those Kantian thoughts about cosmopolitanism, democracy, and nationalism that are relevant for us today.

Kant’s passage to be explicated appears in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, where he characterizes cosmopolitan society as follows:

Taken collectively (the human race as one whole)… they [persons as members of such one whole, not as members of this or that nation-state] feel [fühlten] destined to develop … into cosmopolitan society [weltbürgerliche Gesellschaft] (cosmopolitanismus)… [which] is an unattainable Idea, but not a constitutive principle (the principle of anticipating lasting peace amid the most vigorous actions and reactions of human beings). Rather, it is only a regulative principle: to pursue this diligently as the vocation of the human race… (Kant, 2006, pp. 236-7; emphasis in original).

I read the passage together with Kant’s critical philosophy. This is because the passage indicates that there is a similar logical structure between Kant’s argument for cosmopolitanism and his critical philosophy especially the Critique of Pure Reason. The “regulative-constitutive” distinction emphasized in the passage has do with the use of what Kant calls Ideas of reason, in this case, the Idea of cosmopolitan society. This distinction and Ideas of reason are among the conceptual components with which Kant analyzes human reason in his critical philosophy. Accordingly, in the passage Kant should have his critical philosophy and its logic in mind. To be sure, we should not expect a perfect correspondence between Kant’s discussion of cosmopolitanism and his critical philosophy, because these two deal with different problems. Still, we should think that a similar logic organizes both. We will try to detect and develop this logic as far as possible, in order to extract those Kantian thoughts on cosmopolitanism, democracy, and nationalism that are relevant for us today.

To begin with, terminological remarks are in order. Ideas of reason, according to the Critique of Pure Reason, concern something unconditioned, absolute, complete, etc. This something, though unreachable in experience, would give ultimate grounds for our making coherent sense of our activity, experience, and existence, and the world as a whole. This something is supposed to give the “Because” to every “Why” so that “any further why” cannot and need not be asked (Kant, 1998, A584-85/B612-13; henceforth only A and/or B pagination is shown). This something is supposed to give our existence “a necessary first” or “ultimate ground” (A616-7/B644-5), a “resting-place” (A584/B612), “firm footing” (A796/B824), “comfort,” “contentment,” “peace or rest,” and “a fixed point” (A467/B495; Kant, 1950, pp. 100-102). Among the Ideas of reason are: the immortality of the soul; the highest good; the purpose of history or of a thing; perpetual peace as the highest political good; cosmopolitan society; and many others.¹

¹ Kant enumerates so many diverse Ideas that they look like a “rather numerous and motley crowd” (Ewing, 1967, p. 256). It is hard to see, at least about some of them, in what sense they are strictly concerned with the unconditioned. I do not go into this issue.
Such something cannot be achieved in experience. Nor can it be an object of knowledge. Nevertheless human reason, Kant insists, has a natural, inextinguishable drive to long for such something, i.e., the metaphysical drive of reason. Kant repeatedly draws attention to its existence within ourselves (e.g., Ax, Bxxxi, B21, B22; Kant, 1950, pp. 5, 102, 116, 130). While reason produces Ideas to cope with its metaphysical impulse in a rightful manner, this ineradicable drive is so powerful that reason cannot help but struggle to fulfill entirely this urge in a wrong way. The rightful and wrong ways are named the regulative principle or use of (the Idea of) reason and the constitutive principle or use, respectively. The regulative principle contributes to the guidance of reason both by ordering, judging, evaluating, and making coherent our experience and by giving general orientations to, and constraints on, our actions. Taking the regulative for the constitutive amounts to attempting in vain to gain knowledge of and realize the Idea here and now. Kant also uses the term “transcendent” in the same sense as with “constitutive” when designating the illegitimate principle in the wrong use of Ideas of reason (A296/B352-3, A327/B383, A509/B557, A643-44/B671-72, A666/B694, A689/B717; Kant, 1950, pp. 76, 98). So this paper focuses on the transcendent principles too.

Why does Kant distinguish constitutive from regulative in proposing the Idea of the cosmopolitan society? Of the purpose of the distinction Kant (A509/B537) writes: “I have tried to show by this distinction that there is no such constitutive principle, and so to prevent what otherwise, through a transcendental subreption, inevitably takes place, namely, the ascribing of objective reality to an idea that serves merely as a rule.” I will discuss the issue of subreption later. The constitutive use of the Idea generates the most serious error and disaster for human reason. But this is natural and (almost) unavoidable because it is based on the very nature of human reason, that is, because reason tries to fulfill its metaphysical drive of reason this way (e.g., A297/B353-54, A642/B670, A797/B825). Kant tries to prevent the otherwise unavoidable constitutive use of the Idea of the cosmopolitan society, considering political disasters such use will bring about. Kant has in mind a political equivalent of the error described in the first Critique of taking the regulative for the constitutive.

Via the constitutive principle reason wrongly strives to realize and hypostatize Ideas of reason that are generated “by the very nature of reason itself” (A669/B697; A323/B380, A327/B384). Correspondingly, there must be something that is a manifestation of reason or of “the very nature of reason” and which wrongly strives to realize the Idea of the cosmopolitan society. What is this something? Kant’s answer in his cosmopolitanism is the democratic nation-state. The democratic nation-state in Kant’s cosmopolitanism occupies the same logical position as that reason occupies in the first Critique. Indeed, in the first Critique Kant repeatedly characterizes the activity of reason in state-related political metaphors such as a “state of nature,” “war,” “peace,” “armistice,” “anarchy,” “despotism,” “nomad,” “civil unity,” “legitimate domain,” “boundary,” “legislation,” “administration,” “free citizens and their agreement,” and so on. As I argued elsewhere (Saji, 2006), Kant’s attempt to vindicate the authority of reason in the first Critique is also his attempt to justify the

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2 For instance, by assuming some sort of teleology in human history (the regulative principle), we can make sense of human history that would otherwise be more or less a “planless aggregate of human actions,” a “senseless course of human events,” and “an aimless random process” (Kant, 1991, pp. 42, 52). This does not at all mean, however, that there is such a purpose in human history. Thinking that there is amounts to taking the regulative for the constitutive, bringing about disaster (e.g., the alleged knowledge of the telos of human history/humankind, whether freedom, emancipation, communism, etc. and the attempt to realize that telos here and now).
There is a systematic, substantial linkage between reason and the democratic nation-state. There is a systematic, substantial linkage between reason and the democratic nation-state in Kant. Here we find Kant’s “political concept of reason” (Goetschel, 1994, p. 120). Moreover, Kant argues that the metaphysical drive of reason manifests itself under different forms in different historical contexts. Given such a political notion of reason, the metaphysical urge of reason should appear collectively and politically in Kant’s historical context. Both Kant’s text and context indicate that it is in nationalism or the concept of the nation that such an urge would strive to find its fulfillment. Kant offers his cosmopolitanism in this context.5

Led to read Kant’s cosmopolitanism and his critical philosophy together, we find components forming the systematic linkage between the two: (1) Kant’s political concept of reason; (2) an abyss [Abgrund] along with original violence; (3) the metaphysical drive of reason; (4) Ideas of reason; (5) perpetual peace; (6) immortality; (7) fanaticism (Schwärmerei) and delusion (Wahn); (8) feeling (Gefühl); (9) radical evil; (10) transcendental illusion; (11) the sublime and subreption.6

1. I leave it out because, as noted, I discussed it elsewhere (Saji, 2006).
2. Kant discovers an abyss along with elemental violence at the basis and

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3 Kant (1996a, p. 482) also refers to a democratic nation-state (in his term a republic) as a “moral person,” i.e., a person in whom the authority of reason is fully established.

4 In Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Kant says: “That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world; nay, everyone… will have it and… will shape it for himself after his own pattern. …this pressing need [i.e. the metaphysical drive of reason]… is something more than mere thirst for knowledge” (1950, p. 116; my emphasis). The Critique of Pure Reason warns us: “We will always return to metaphysics as to a beloved from whom we have been estranged” (A850/B878). It is the human condition for one to breathe air or to seek someone to love (deeply enough to want to go back to that person). What kind of air (one comes to want) to breathe or which person (one comes to want) to love, however, hinges on the historical situation (time, place, culture, etc.) into which one is placed. Let me give three more examples from the first Critique (my emphasis): “there has always been some metaphysics or other to be met in the world, and there will always continue to be one” (Bxxxi); “a certain sort of metaphysics has actually been present in all human beings... and it will also always remain there” (B21); and “some sort of metaphysics (whatever it might be) always grows” from the “natural predisposition to metaphysics” in “reason” (B22). See also Kant (Avii-xii, A474/B502; 1950, p. 130; 1996b, p. 221). The first Critique denies that we can gain knowledge of Ideas of reason. Yovel (1980; 1989) argues that the metaphysical drive of reason, denied its fulfillment in the field of knowledge, is transported and redirected to the moral-historical-political process. Neiman (2002) adopts a similar perspective to Yovel’s, although Neiman’s is not restricted to the case of Kant alone. The metaphysical drive of reason, Neiman argues, has its ethical, political dimension. She proposes to look at modern philosophy since the 18th century with the problem of evil as its central, organizing thread. The problem of evil, according to Neiman, is essentially a “problem of the intelligibility of the world as a whole” and “belong[s] neither to ethics nor to metaphysics but forms a link between the two” (2002, pp. 7-8). By this approach, with respect to the case of Kant, Neiman intends to answer “Kant’s question: what drives pure reason to efforts that seem to have neither end nor result?” (p. 7), namely, the problem of the metaphysical drive of reason.

5 The claim that we should look at Kant’s cosmopolitan vision in the context of growing nationalism is not new. For nationalism and Kant’s cosmopolitanism, see McCarthy (1999); Shell (1996, p. 189 and p. 383, n.1); Cavallar (1999); and Fine and Cohen (2002). My argument differs from these authors. McCarthy argues that Kant, most notably in his Perpetual Peace, tried and failed to reconcile cosmopolitanism with nationalism. Shell asserts that Kant takes nationalism’s claims very seriously, but she does not elaborate on it.

6 This paper adds to Kant scholarship by showing the systematic linkage that has been under-researched, enriching Kant’s political thought through this linkage, and indicating that Kant’s critical philosophy has more resources for political philosophy than has been thought.
origin of both reason’s operation and the democratic nation-state. Such an abyss has to be hidden because it undermines and destroys reason and the emergent democratic nation-state at their foundation.

3, 4, and 5. Reason has an ineradicable metaphysical drive for something complete, absolute, unconditioned, etc. Due to this drive reason generates Ideas of reason. One such Idea is the immortality of the soul. Another is the Idea of cosmopolitan society as the destiny of humankind. Yet this drive is a source of serious errors and disasters. Diagnosing such disasters, Kant’s critical philosophy aims at perpetual peace in reason. Similarly, identifying such disasters in politics, his cosmopolitanism aims at perpetual peace in the real world.

6. Kant’s critical philosophy postulates the immortality of the soul so as to regulate our actions as if our destiny reached infinitely beyond this present life. Kant’s cosmopolitanism assumes the immortality of humankind as a species so as to regulate our actions toward the destiny of humankind as an infinite approximation to perpetual peace and cosmopolitan society.

7. The metaphysical urge of reason may wrongly materialize as fanaticism (Schwärmer) and delusion (Wahn). Characterizing excessive nationalism as Schwärmer and Wahn, Kant detects such a drive lurking in nationalism: one finds a sense of immortality guaranteed and satisfied in the nation one belongs to. Pieces of contextual evidence will be provided. In any case Kant’s critical philosophy aims at preventing Schwärmer and Wahn, his cosmopolitanism at restraining excessive nationalism as Schwärmer and Wahn epitomized in politics.

8. While discussing national feeling (Nationalgefühl), Kant emphasizes that as a citizen of the world one may develop the feeling toward cosmopolitanism.

9. Kant’s critical philosophy tries to prevent radical evil, while his cosmopolitanism tries to restrain the most violent and undisguised manifestation of radical evil in politics, or radical evil with a national face.

10. Transcendental illusions, such as the conviction that the immortality of the soul is guaranteed and the final end of humankind is realized, find their political and secular equivalents in nationalism’s alleged claim that both a sense of one’s immortality and the final end will be attained and guaranteed in and by the nation one belongs to. The aforesaid abyss would be covered over in an imaginary way by the concept of the nation and the transcendental illusion of nationalism.

11. While considering the Idea of cosmopolitanism sublime, Kant also finds sublimity in war. Kant argues that the sublimity in war makes the way of thinking of a nation (“die Denkungsart des Volks”) sublime and makes one consider one’s life small. Thereby one finds a sense of immortality guaranteed in the nation. Ascribing sublimity to war and a nation’s way of thinking is carried out by the procedure of what Kant calls subreption, just as taking the regulative for the constitutive is performed by a “transcendental subreption,” as quoted earlier.

Let me elaborate. I treat the topic (2) very briefly because I discussed it elsewhere (Saji, 2006). For Kant, reason’s principle requires that it must vindicate its authority without resting upon anything other than itself (religion, tradition, etc.). Kant uses the metaphor of an abyss to represent the failure of reason’s self-vindication. What is at issue here is the shift from non-democracy to democracy, in Kant’s context, above all the French Revolution.7 There are three ways in which

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7 Kant recognized the analogy his contemporaries made between a philosophical revolution that his critical philosophy brought about and the French Revolution. Kant knew as well that such an analogy constituted the self-understanding of the Revolutionaries themselves, including Abbé Sieyès. See Saji (2006, p. 693 and references in notes 18 and 19 on p. 701).
reason fails to vindicate its authority. First, reason (the democratic nation-state) fails to start its operation/establish itself unless it violates its own principle. Kant says that the claim of reason is “never anything more than the agreement of free citizens” (A738/766). But how did people become free citizens in the first place? Their existence should not be presupposed but be explained, because they did not exist in the past and because Kant likens the shift from the lack of critique to critique in the activity of reason to the shift from a Hobbesian state of nature to a democratic nation-state. They have to, but cannot, become free citizens by the claim of reason because their agreement at this stage, even if possible at all, is not yet that of free citizens. The emergence of free citizens is a result of some external process or force other than reason. If it is to be authorized by reason, then the result has to become its cause. That is impossible. Rousseau formulates this difficulty as the paradox that “the effect would have to become the cause” (Rousseau, 1997, pp. 67-71). Second, suppose that they are free citizens. Strangely, they have already agreed what counts as a legitimate form of agreement, i.e. a majority rule (e.g., Kant, 1991, p. 79). How did they reach this agreement? They have to decide what should count as a legitimate form of agreement. They cannot reach this agreement via a majority decision because what is at issue is precisely whether a majority decision is a (or the) legitimate form of agreement to begin with. The legitimacy of majority decision cannot be given via a majority decision. A majority decision emerges or is imposed as a legitimate form of agreement by something other than a majority decision. Third, even if it is granted that these citizens have arrived at majority rule and that the result of majority vote is seen as the expression of their will: what kind of majority rule is to be adopted, a referendum, proportional representation, a single-member district system, a multiple-seat electoral system, etc.? The legitimacy of one type of majority vote cannot be authorized by this very type of majority vote because what is at issue is precisely whether this type is the legitimate form of majority vote in the first place. It is imposed by something other than itself. Thus, in short, Kant finds that reason (reason in politics = the democratic nation-state) cannot start, establish, and legitimize its operation without resting upon something external to itself. This is something that is necessary for reason to start its operation, which reason cannot justify in its own right, and which imposes itself on reason. In political language, democracy cannot establish and justify itself democratically. Something undemocratic or democratically unjustifiable is imposed upon or presupposed in democracy. This something can be said to involve elemental violence. Some elemental violence lies at the basis and origin of reason’s operation/the democratic nation-state. The metaphor of an abyss is meant to represent all this failure of reason in its self-vindication and authorization.

This abyss has to be hidden in order for reason to operate normally. Indeed, Kant recognized and evaded this abyss (Saji, 2006). In Kant’s context, the abyss was covered over by the concept of the nation. In his What is the Third Estate? of 1789 Abbé Sieyès, Kant’s contemporary, was faced with the same failure as that described above (Sieyès, 1964, pp. 125-30). Hannah Arendt formulates it as follows: “Sieyès’ vicious circle: those who get together to constitute a new government are themselves unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority to do what they have set out to

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8 Indeed it is not obvious why majority rule alone is to count as the agreement of free citizens. Lefort (1988, pp. 18-9) notes that in the 19th century the institution of universal suffrage (necessary if we are to refer meaningfully to the existence of free citizens) was long time resisted by socialists, conservatives, and bourgeois liberals. Lefort sees the main reason for this resistance in the fact that through universal suffrage “number replaces substance”: the singularity of a person is erased in a vote and through the act of voting.
achieve” (Arendt, 1965, pp. 183-84; also pp. 162-164). Sieyès is explicit: “the nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything . . . If its [the nation’s] becoming a nation had happened upon a positive act, it never would have existed. The nation owes its existence to natural law alone . . . Not only is the nation not subject to a constitution, but it cannot be and it must not be . . .” (Sieyès, 1964, pp. 124-8; emphasis in original). Thus, it is not surprising to find Sieyès saying about how the will of the nation is to be represented: “The manner in which a nation exercises its will does not matter; the point is that it does exercise it; any procedure is adequate, and its will is always the supreme law” (p. 128). Sieyès says so even though different representative systems express, represent, or exercise the will of people (or a people) differently. Here we can see the concept of the nation playing a crucial role of covering over the abyss and original violence at the basis of the operation of reason (the democratic nation-state). The nation appears as some mythical entity that overcomes and transcends the failure discussed above (represented by the image of an abyss). As we will see, the nation plays another crucial role of guaranteeing an individual a sense of immortality, thereby satisfying the metaphysical drive of reason.

The immortality of the soul is one of Ideas of reason. It is something for which the metaphysical drive of reason compels us to long in vain. That is, one cannot help but concern oneself with one’s life, its meaning, death, and afterlife (if there is anything like that at all). Human reason in its speculative use refuses to answer epistemologically the question about what exists beyond death or this life. This Idea, however, has a role to play in the practical use of reason. Reason in its practical employment “determine[s] us to regulate our actions as if our destiny reached infinitely far beyond experience, and therefore far beyond this present life” (B421).

A political equivalent of this argument is offered concerning humankind whose destiny it is to go toward cosmopolitan society (which is a regulative Idea of reason, as we have seen):

If the human species signifies the totality of a series of generations which runs on into infinity... and if it is assumed that this series constantly approximates to the line of its destiny which runs alongside with it, it is not a contradiction to say that the series in all its parts is asymptotic to this line yet coincides with it as a whole. In other words, no single member of all generations of the human race, but only the species, attains its destiny completely... the destiny of the human race as a whole is incessant progress, and [that] its fulfillment is merely an Idea... of the goal to which we have to direct our endeavors. (Kant 1991, p. 220)

Here Kant introduces the notion of the immortality of the human species (“the totality of a series of generations which runs on into infinity”). We must hope and assume, Kant (1991, pp. 42, 44) asserts, that the use of reason could develop itself to the fullest degree not in the individual, not in the nation, but only in the human race. A “universal cosmopolitan condition [weltbürgerlicher Zustand],” which is the “highest purpose of nature,” is the matrix within which all the capabilities of human beings, especially “their rational nature [vernünftige Natur],” may fully advance (Kant, 1991, pp. 45, 51). The destiny of humankind as a whole is incessant progress toward cosmopolitismus or the universal cosmopolitan condition. This is the way or one way in which we make sense of the human world, which would otherwise appear to be a “planless aggregate of human actions,” a “senseless course of human events,” and “an aimless random process” (Kant, 1991, pp. 42, 52).

Claiming that each individual should contribute to the continuous progress of the human race described above, Kant points out what seems disconcerting about this
claim. First, the earlier generations seem to perform their hard work only for the later ones. Second, only the later generations can receive the results of their ancestry’s toil whereas the latter cannot enjoy what they produce. To this Kant (1991, p. 44) replies:

But no matter how puzzling this may be, it will appear as necessary as it is puzzling if we simply assume that one animal species was intended to have reason, and that, as a class of rational beings who are mortal as individuals but immortal as a species, it was still meant to develop its capacities completely.

We encounter the same line of thought in the first Critique: the contingency of conception... opportunity...nourishment... government, ...its modes and caprices...even vices, presents a great difficulty for the opinion of the eternal duration of a creature whose life has first begun under circumstance so trivial and so entirely dependent on our liberty. As far as the duration of the entire species (here on earth) is concerned, this difficulty amounts to little, since the contingency in the individual is nonetheless subjected to a rule in the whole; but with regard to each individual it certainly seems questionable to expect such a powerful effect from such inconsequential causes (A779/B807).

Marx, also considering humans immortal as a species and mortal as individuals, would say in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: “Death seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the definite individual and to contradict their unity. But the determinate individual is only a determinate species being, and as such mortal” (1978, p. 86).9

Kant holds that we should direct our endeavors as if our destiny reached infinitely far beyond our own generation, and therefore far beyond our present life, toward the destiny of the human race which is immortal. This is not an answer. Reason refuses to provide an epistemological answer to the inquiry beyond the present life and instead demands us to act as if our destiny reached infinitely beyond this existent life. Similarly, Kant asserts that we should assume the immortality of the human race as a species and act as if the immortality of an individual would be maintained in that of humankind as a species. Instead of trying to solve “a great difficulty” for the individual’s sense of immortality, Kant adds merely that this difficulty matters little for the entire human species. If, however, one can’t help but concern oneself with one’s life, its meaning, death, and afterlife, is one satisfied with Kant’s (and Marx’s) claim? If one is not, and yet if the metaphysical drive of reason manifests itself in different ways in different historical conditions, does one not strive to find some sense of immortality in a different way? Indeed, Kant (1996b, p. 221) says that the drive for some sense of immortality “must… be woven in a wondrous way into universal human reason, because it is encountered among all reasoning peoples at all times, clothed in one way or another” (see also note 4). In Kant’s context, the nation was emerging as what would grant people a sense of immortality. Marxism in the Second International would give in to nationalism in World War 1.

A few words about the term nationalism and Kant’s historical context should be made first. While Kant does not use the term “nationalism” or “Nationalismus,” the former already appears in Johann Gottlieb Herder’s 1774 piece (Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit. Beytrag zu vielen Beytragen des Jahrhunderts) and the latter in 1798’s Christliche Schriften. Herder’s usage of the term does not seem very far from the modern usage (Dann, 1988, p. 3; Godechot, 1988, p. 16; and Hont, 1995, pp. 213-17). In his abovementioned 1774 opus Herder

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9 Wood (1999, pp. 244-49) discusses Kant’s historical materialism, stressing its remarkable similarity to Marx’s materialist notion of history.
talks about “prejudices! popular agitation! [Pöbelei], narrow-minded nationalism!” (quoted in Hont, 1995, p. 213). Hont says: “When nations come into contact with one another, Herder pointed out ironically, one is indeed bound to find the sort of ‘prejudices! popular agitation! [Pöbelei], narrow-minded nationalism!’” Herder does not support such “narrow-minded nationalism.”

In Germany, concepts associated with an ethnic notion of the nation (Volk) such as Volkskunst, Volksstum, Volksmusik, Volksliteratur, Volkskultur, Volkstheater, Volksgeist, and Volkskunde appeared during the last third of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century (Will, 1998). The latter half of the eighteenth century witnessed writings that expressed national pride and cultural or even political nationalism (Beiser, 1992, p. 21). “Literary nationalism” (Segeberg, 1988) or “popular nationalism” (Levinger, 2000b) constituted an active element among the bourgeoisie or middle-class literate people in German prior to 1789 (Segeberg, 1988; Levinger, 2000b). Herder stressed the separate cultural identity of nations and the individual’s belonging to a nation (Volk). Herder thinks that one can fully realize one’s own capacities in the nation one belongs to.\textsuperscript{10}

Kant’s contemporary German Enlightenment thinkers were worried about an emerging German nationalism. Kleingeld (1999, p. 506) points out that in Germany during 1780-1800, nationhood, patriotism, and cosmopolitanism were issues of wide and intensive dispute until nationalism became the overriding force around the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{11} In the 1780’s Christoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813), one of the leading and influential figures of the German Enlightenment, already argued for moral cosmopolitanism against “the old forces of despotism and superstition and the new forces of an emerging German nationalism” (Kleingeld, 1999, p. 506). Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811), the “spokesman of the Aufklärung,” found German nationalism a “political monstrosity” (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 314). According to Zammito (1992, pp. 1-14), Kant’s commitment to the Enlightenment, too, was the struggle against the Sturm und Drang, the emergent (cultural) nationalism in it, and the national identity building in eighteenth century Germany.

Kant uses the terms fanaticism (Schwärmerei) and delusion (Wahn) to characterize the ills and excesses of nationalism, indicating that excessive nationalism is an expression of the metaphysical drive of reason. The status of excessive nationalism is that of what Kant calls transcendental illusion in politics. Fanaticism (Schwärmerei) is a name Kant assigns to our attempt to fulfill wrongly the metaphysical drive of reason (to take the regulative for the constitutive) accompanied by a passion. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant (1996a, p. 209) defines “fanaticism [Schwärmerei] in the most general sense” as “an overstepping of the bounds of human reason undertaken on principles.” In the Critique of Judgment Kant distinguishes between fanaticism and enthusiasm. Connecting Schwärmerei with Wahn, Kant characterizes “fanaticism [Schwärmerei]” as “the delusion [Wahn] of wanting to see something beyond all bounds of sensibility, i.e., of dreaming according to principles (raving with reason)” with “a deep-seated and brooding passion

\textsuperscript{10} For the Kant-Herder relationship, see Zammito (1992; 2002). For Herder’s political thought, see Berlin (1976); Beiser (1992); Ergang (1931); Barnard (1965; 1969); Larmore (1987, pp. 93-99); Linker (2000); and Fox (2003).

\textsuperscript{11} Levinger (2000b, p. 123) also argues: “throughout the German states, popular [Romantic] nationalism [which purported to represent the will of the entire Volk] was an overwhelmingly urban phenomenon [among the literate bourgeoisie, including students, professors, journalists, and freelance writers]. They were relatively few in number and possessed little socioeconomic power, but they exercised a disproportionate influence on the political debate of this era.”
[Leidenschaft],” which is a “disease.” “Enthusiasm” is just “an affect [Affect]” and “a passing accident” (Kant, 1987, pp. 135-6). What Kant means by “principles” in these two statements is transcendent or constitutive principles, which “take[s] away these limits [of experience]… indeed bid[s] us to overstep them” (A296/B353).

In a manuscript for the Anthropology we read: “Metaphysics makes the fanatic [schwärmer] because it cannot indicate its own source and boundaries” (XV, p. 810). In Prolegomena Kant (1950, p. 130) argues that we fall into “Schwärmerei” due to an “inextinguishable affection” of reason, that is, the metaphysical urge of reason. This is because, while “mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc. [selbst Moral, usw.]” do not entirely satisfy reason, we have to allay the “troublesome voice of reason” even if deceivingly, even though according to Kant morality is supposed to satisfy reason. This amounts to saying that virtually the metaphysical drive of reason will never be entirely satisfied. As we will see, in the End of All Things Kant describes one’s tendency to strive to seize and realize the final end of humankind here and now as Schwärmerei. Preventing Schwärmerei (fanaticism) constitutes an important part of Kant’s project of enlightenment (1991, p. 249) or of critique (Bxxxiv; 1950, p. 130). Kant regards Schwärmerei as an expression of the metaphysical drive of reason.

In his Observation of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime Kant (2007, p. 58) distinguishes “fanaticism [Schwärmerei]” from enthusiasm and explicitly connects fanaticism with the “excesses” and ills of the “national sentiment [or feeling; Nationalgefühl]” that was at least in the past mostly found in “Germany.” An example of enthusiasm Kant gives is the mind inflamed by patriotic virtue. Fanaticism designates something more excessive about the national sentiment than patriotism, for Kant considers fanaticism far more dangerous than enthusiasm.  

What Kant fears about Schwärmerei, as Neiman (1994, p. 169) argues, is that the propensity of people to impose benevolently and passionately their self-assured beliefs (of the welfare, highest good, or final end of humankind, of their moral mission, etc.) on others is intensified in Schwärmerei. The word “Schwärmerei” seemed to have political connotations. La Vopa (2001, p. 106) shows that “From the verb “to swarm,” Schwärmerei evoked the image of a blind mob or, to shift to a more neutral phrase, a mass mobilization.” In an essay written in 1776 yet not published until 1795, Lessing makes a connection between Schwärmer and to “make a swarm” in the way La Vopa describes (La Vopa, 1998, p. 95). Excessive nationalism can be said to be a political form of Schwärmerei, in which the abovementioned propensity of people would bring about disastrous consequences. At the same time, in Germany the term Schwärmerei was considered to be “assuming especially virulent forms in the rhetoric of radical intellectuals and in the frenzy of violent mobs [both supporting the French Revolution, i.e., the democratic popular sovereignty]” (La Vopa, 1998, p. 103). Here the attempt to universalize, and to attack those who oppose, the democratic

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12 Here Kant speaks of “dreaming” in the sense of a transcendental illusion or of the error of taking the regulative for the constitutive. See for instance Kant (A666/B694; 2006, p. 114).

13 One might argue that, since the Observation is a piece of 1764, it would be inappropriate to read it together with other pieces of Kant’s work after his “critical” period. This is not necessarily the case, however. For example, in the Observation Kant distinguishes between fanaticism and enthusiasm in the same way as in the Critique of Judgment. Also in both the Religion and the Observation, Kant (1996b, pp. 193-94; 2007, p. 58) gives the same description to religious fanaticism (Schwärmerei). Moreover, as Butts (1984) shows in detail, Kant has a life-long interest in and devotes himself to a career-long study of Schwärmerei in its multiple forms (metaphysical, moral, religious, mental illness, etc.).
popular sovereignty would take a political form of Schwärmerei, bringing about disastrous consequences.¹⁴ These two forms are compatible with each other.¹⁵

Kant also uses the term “Wahn” to refer to what may be called nationalism. “National delusion [Nationalwahn].” Kant insists, must be eradicated and replaced with patriotism and cosmopolitanism [“cosmopolitan”] (XV, pp. 590-91).¹⁶ Wahn (translated as delusion or illusion), in Kant’s glossary, is the deception of taking the mere representation of a thing for the thing itself, what is subjective for what is objective, or the mood of the inner sense for knowledge of the thing itself. Wahn thereby makes people excited and satisfied and thus gives rise to the most powerful and enduring passion (Kant 1996b, p. 188; 2006, pp. 175-76). In fact, “transcendental illusion,” which satisfies the metaphysical drive of reason by taking the regulative for the constitutive, is “a natural and unavoidable illusion which itself rests upon subjective principles and passes them off as objective” (A298/B354). Recall that in the third Critique Kant portrays Schwärmerei as Wahn that involves a deep-rooted passion.¹⁷ It is as if by “national delusion [Nationalwahn]” Kant gives an apt picture of nationalism (or of how its fictional or imaginary elements are made naturalized). Moreover, discussing Wahn as one sort of passion (Leidenschaft), Kant (2006, pp. 165-66) contends that passions “take root and can even coexist with reasoning

¹⁴ As mentioned in note 7, Kant’s critical philosophy was considered a German counterpart of the French Revolution. La Vopa writes: “In December 1790, Friedrich Gentz spoke for many German observers when he hailed the French Revolution as “the first practical triumph of philosophy, the first example in the history of the world of the construction of government upon the principles of an orderly, rational system.” Over the next several years, this vision of a brave new world acceded to a politically charged perception that the Revolution had unleashed Schwärmerei with a vengeance. It became a commonplace of German antirevolutionary discourse that philosophical Schwärmerei was assuming especially virulent forms in the rhetoric of radical intellectuals and in the frenzy of violent mobs” (1998, p. 104); and “German critics of the Revolution … two images—the one of systematic reasoning as a dehumanizing form of power, and the other of mass politics as religious fanaticism in a new guise—fused into the trope of popular revolution as an outbreak of Schwärmerei” (1998, p. 103). La Vopa (1998, p. 91) carefully says: “Kant’s Critical Philosophy offered the discourse of Schwärmerei a new kind of clinical precision; but it also confirmed a growing suspicion that philosophical antidotes were really new forms of the disease.”

¹⁵ This was already seen in France in the period of the French Revolution. The triad of liberty, equality, and fraternity was considered to form the principles of the emerging democratic political community (the nation-state). It is Robespierre that invented the triad, which appeared first in a speech he gave on December 5, 1790 (Gauthier, 1988, p. 28). Robespierre, Gauthier (1988, pp. 28, 33-36) argues, intended “fraternity” to be “concerned with the relations between peoples… the exercise of popular sovereignty, and… the universal character of citizenship…. By asserting the universality of mankind and of citizenship, Robespierre emphasized another kind of bond between men. Fraternity created a duty of mutual assistance among men and people, so that they could work together for their liberation, on a basis…of self-government… fraternity was interpreted by Robespierre as implying the reciprocal recognition of popular sovereignty as between peoples.” However, the tide changed with Lazare Carnot’s speech on February 14, 1793, in which “we see the birth of a new political theory, that of national interest and autonomous national sovereignty… The national interest as he [Carnot] conceived it amounted to the interest of a particular nation which was going to dominate other peoples.” See also Emsley (1988) for nationalistic rhetoric and sentiment in France during this revolutionary period.

¹⁶ For the compatibility in Kant’s thought of cosmopolitanism and civic patriotism, see Kleingeld (2000; 2003). Drawing on Kant’s unpublished corpus, Kleingeld (2003) shows that in a few passages Kant also attempts to defend what Kleingeld calls “nationalistic patriotism” based on the notion of a common national ancestry even though this form of patriotism is incompatible with Kant’s cosmopolitanism.

¹⁷ Kant explicitly connects Schwärmerei to Wahn elsewhere too, for instance, in the Religion (1996b, pp. 193-94) and in another place in the Critique of Judgment (1987, p. 351).
“Passion is…always connected with [one’s] reason.” Explicitly calling transcendental illusion “Wahn” (e.g., A486/B514), Kant cautions that in the process of his critique “many prized and beloved delusions [Wahn] have to be destroyed” (Axxiii). While these old “delusions” or transcendental illusions may be destroyed, Kant thinks, as we have seen, that “mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc.” do not entirely satisfy reason and yet we have to allay the “troublesome voice of reason” even if deceivingly. Inseparable from reason and its metaphysical urge, both Schwärmerei and Wahn may appear with a national face. Here a new political form of transcendental illusion can emerge: nationalism. It has to be constantly curbed because transcendental illusion “irremediably attaches to human reason, so that even after we have exposed the mirage it will still not cease to lead our reason on with false hopes, continually propelling it into momentary aberrations that always need to be removed” (A298/B354-55). Even after we have exposed the nation as an “imagined community,” nationalism remains powerful accompanied by “aberrations that always need to be removed.”

Kant thus seems to think that the excesses and ills of nationalism epitomize Schwärmerei and Wahn in their communal, political form and thus express the metaphysical drive of reason in a collective, political arena. This thought has two implications. One concerns the issue of immortality. The other concerns what Benedict Anderson (1998, p. 360) calls the notion of a “transcendental Right or Good” that is supposed to be embodied in a nation one belongs to. Let us look at the former first. We have seen that the notion of immortality is one component of the systematic parallel between Kant’s critical philosophy and his cosmopolitan argument. Nationalism or the concept of the nation guarantees a secular sense of the immortality of the individual belonging to a nation. In that sense, too, nationalism can be said to be both a manifestation of the metaphysical urge of reason and people’s communal effort to fulfill it.

According to some eminent theorists on nationalism, the primary function of the idea of the nation is: to give meaning to the overpowering burden of individual suffering; to transform, if secularly, the contingency, arbitrariness, and fatality of life into necessity and continuity; and to provide a powerful sense of community of history and destiny, a community where people may find some assurance of a sense of immortality through their absorption in the nation, namely, in and through the chain of generations, national regeneration, and their posterity (Anderson 1991; Smith 1991; 1996). Arguing that in general nations or national groups endeavor to utilize their history and culture for national reproduction, Walzer (1997, p. 25) says: “what justifies their enterprise is the human passion for survival over time.” In treating Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation that was out only a few years after the death of Kant, Kohn (1949, p. 338) writes: “in a secularized age, nationalism fulfilled the individual’s longing for immortality.” “Identification with the ‘nation’ in a secular era,” Smith (1991, pp. 160-61) maintains, “is the surest way to surmount the finality

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18 This is not a new claim. Zizek (1993, pp. 221-22) argues that “the status of nationalism is ultimately that of the transcendental illusion…; as such, it epitomizes the principle of fanaticism [Schwärmerei] in politics.” Réé (1996/97, pp. 170-71, 173) also says: “In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant distinguishes three different kinds of illusion that our cognitive apparatus is liable to…. empirical illusions…conceptual illusions… dialectical [i.e., transcendental] illusions… The dialectical illusion [of the nation] is the idea that our life is nothing apart from our nation, and that if our nation were to perish then we might as well be dead too. [This illusion] binds people to each other… by making them think of themselves as members of one of another within the transcendent unity of their nation. … [T]hey somehow manage to identify its life with their own.”
of death and ensure a measure of personal immortality.” Certainly, such identification should not be considered limited to the case of a national community. Still, this capacity to satisfy the metaphysical desire for immortality renders the concept of nation and nationalism powerful and predominant in the modern world.

People came to perceive a sense of immortality in nationness because religious worldviews, by which people hitherto had been endowed with a sense of immortality of the soul, declined in the West in the eighteenth century due to the gradual dominance of the Enlightenment and rationalistic modes of thought. As we have seen, Kant, a contemporary of this period, was well aware that various contingencies of life pose a “great difficulty” for the belief and sense of the immortality of the individual. So-called The Oldest Systematic Programme in 1796/97 claims, using the term “Idea” in its technical Kantian sense, that free beings “may not seek God or immortality outside themselves” and that “we must have a new mythology… a mythology of reason” (Beiser, 1996, pp. 4-5, original emphasis). “A new mythology,” according to Sturma (2000), means “a mythology that can do for modernity what traditional mythology did for ancient cultures” (p. 224) and which “provide[s] historical meaning and value to human life” (p. 229). Sturma argues that around the turn of the century (1800) in Germany, that is, in the shift from early to late Romanticism, the notion of the nation became a new mythology in this sense. The notion of the nation gradually became, in place of religion or traditional metaphysics, the means by which people could gain historical meaning and satisfy the quest for immortality within themselves. In a chapter entitled “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source

19 Such identification may be seen as one form that the relation of the community to immortality takes. Quoting a passage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics about the possibility of mortals being immortal, Arendt (1958, p. 56) says: “[T]he polis was for the Greeks, as the res publica was for the Romans, first of all their guarantee against the futility of individual life, the space protected against this futility and reserved for the relative permanence, if not immortality, of mortals.” Citing Arendt’s passage, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1997, p. 130) contend: “it is this immortality [immortality in this world] which reappeared, albeit in a totally different way, first of all from Fichte to Heidegger in the element of the Volk, then in the communist Humanity beyond the Völker.”

20 With respect to America, where it is hard to find such a sense of the immortality of the individual in the nation, Arendt (1965, pp. 230-31) argues: “What was true for modern, pre-revolutionary political thought and for the founders of the colonies became even truer for the revolutions and the Founding Fathers. It was the modern ‘preoccupation with the perpetual state,’ so evident in [James] Harrington’s writings [‘a Commonwealth rightly ordered, may for any internal causes be as immortal or long-lived as the World’, quoted in Arendt, 1965, pp. 229-30], which caused [John] Adams to call ‘divine’ the new political science which dealt with ‘institutions that last for many generations,’ and it was in Robespierre’s ‘Death is the beginning of immortality’ that the specifically modern emphasis on politics, evidenced in the revolutions, found its briefest and most grandiose definition… we find preoccupation with permanence and stability running like a red thread through the constitutional debates, with Hamilton and Jefferson standing at two opposite poles which still belong together—Hamilton holding that constitutions ‘must necessarily be permanent…”

21 Greenfeld (1992, p. 360) makes virtually the same point. Connected with German nationalism, Romanticism was transformed into “an unshakable belief that the infinite ---the Kingdom of God--- was within easy reach,” and “spurred the believers on to a frenzied activity to help in its realization. The Romantic spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was revolutionary in a way very different from that of the eighteenth: it was determined to be fulfilled in this world.” Drawing on Roland Barthes, Levinger (2000a, p. 275) makes a similar argument. About the power of myths in history, Barthes (1972, p. 143) writes: “Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them… it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact. … In
of Nationalism,” which attempts to locate Kant between Herder and Fichte in terms of nationalism, Berlin (1997, pp. 232-48) too suggests that the nation emerged as something of a metaphysical character by which one’s desire for one’s immortality and perfection could be fulfilled.22 This shift in the concept of the nation seems to find its equivalent in France during the same period.23 It can thus be said that for Kant

passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences.” Levinger says that during 1806-1815 the notion of the nation became a myth in Barthes’ sense of the term. Levinger (2000b, p. 123) also maintains that “these romantic nationalists [especially after 1806] viewed the nation as an object of quasi-religious devotion, a communion of souls that accorded its citizens an earthly link to the eternal.” 22 Berlin argues that Kant’s great emphasis on autonomy, self-determination of one’s own moral conduct became, against Kant’s will, a source of nationalism for German political romanticism. While in Kant, Berlin asserts, the individual is the subject who makes the choice about his action, in Fichte the true self is the nation (Berlin states that Herder has, before Fichte, taken a similar view of the nation), which Fichte connects with the political state. The notion of the self thus expands into “some quasi-metaphysical super-personality” of which the individual and his life are merely “passing expressions” (p. 246). The most dominant figure of such “true subject” is the nation, which is conceived as “the deification of the stream of history” in which the individual is merely a passing moment. The notion of nation satisfies the individual’s cravings to get merged into a great communal whole and to maintain himself in a way his empirical self alone could have never done (presumably immortality in the nation). The nation is also seen as “the true source and perfect realization of social life” (p. 246). Fox (2003) discusses nicely the “metaphysics of national community” expressed in Herder’s thoughts especially on language. Hobsbawm (1992, p. 57) makes a similar point.

23 Joseph de Maistre wrote in 1796: “There is no such thing as man in the world. In my lifetime, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians. Thanks to Montesquieu, I even know that one can be Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never in my life met him; if he exists, he is unknown to me.” (Quoted in Finkielkraut, 1995, p. 15). After dealing with Herder and German romantics, Finkielkraut (1995, pp. 16-8) gives the following description:

Traditionalists embraced it [the democratic principle of popular sovereignty] enthusiastically, but in doing so they placed the nation below the individual. … [They thought] Human subjects did not consciously create the community in which they lived; they were formed, on the contrary, by the community itself, without their ever having been aware of it. It was the nation itself that imposed its will on those who belonged to it. … [P]eople were the work of their nation… Here de Maistre joined Herder in saying “Nations have a general overriding soul or character and a true moral unity which makes them what they are. This unity is first and foremost determined by language.” … If human beings were merely tied to already constituted nations, then the Creator could take credit for the appearance and flourishing of national identities. … Since languages and societies had not identifiable human creators, traditionalists believed they had proved irrefutably that God existed. … But this God occupied a different place and defined Himself in an entirely new way. … What they [counter-revolutionaries] called God was no longer the Supreme Being, but collective reason. … God no longer spoke to man in a universal tongue; He now spoke from within him, in the language of his nation. … De Maistre and Bonald, like the German romantics, sought to establish an innate order. Behind the appearance of a simple return to the past, the counterrevolution abolished all transcendental values, divine as well as human. The abstract individual and the superterrestrial God were subsumed at the same time into the soul of the nation, its culture. (Original emphasis)

This is not very different from Sturma’s portrayal of the New Mythology above. In either case, people came to find in the notion of the nation an answer to the questions that used to be satisfied metaphysically and religiously. We see here metaphysics and religion internalized, as it were, in the notion of the nation. But cf. Lefort (1988, pp. 256-282).
(or from a Kantian viewpoint) the metaphysical drive of human reason lurks in nationalism or the notion of the nation.

Kant’s thought that the excesses and ills of nationalism epitomize Schwärmerei and Wahn in their communal, political form and thus express the metaphysical drive of reason in a collective, political arena has another implication. It concerns what Anderson (1998, p. 360) calls the notion of a “transcendental Right or Good” that is supposed to be embodied in a nation one belongs to. This national Goodness or Rightness for those nationals who are alive, Anderson maintains, has its source in and is guaranteed by the secular sense of the immortality of the individual in a nation: “the national dead and the national unborn, in their uncountable billions, mirror each other, and provide the best sureties of the ineradicable Goodness of the nation” for the national living (p. 364).

In The End of All Things Kant (1996b, pp. 227-28) writes:

Even assuming a person’s moral-physical state here in life at its best—namely as a constant progression and approach to the highest good… he still…cannot combine it with the prospect of satisfaction in an eternally enduring alteration of his state (the moral as well as the physical). For the state in which he now is will always remain an ill compared with a better one which he always stands ready to enter; and the representation of an infinite progression toward the final end is nevertheless at the same time a prospect on an infinite series of ills which…do not allow for the possibility of contentment; for he can think that only by supposing that the final end will at sometimes be attained. (original emphasis)

As we have seen, Kant has required us to accept this just as our condition, but here he admits that it is hard to retain this view constantly. One must never permit oneself to be persuaded that one can lay hold of the ultimate purpose, much less to handle it as if one had seized hold of it. Unable to bear this situation, however, one endeavors to seize and realize the final end here and now (p. 228). Indeed, as mentioned before, Kant characterizes such an attempt as Schwärmerei affected by transcendent or constitutive principles. Kant (A474/B502) also says that common people are impelled by their “apprehensions” and “hopes” to assume and believe Ideas of reason and to think that they have insight into and knowledge of Ideas.

Kant is thus aware that people (or perhaps a people or nation) cannot help but long for a way to realize, sometime in their generation, what Anderson calls a “transcendental Goodness or Rightness.” But it is very dangerous and detestable, Kant (1963, pp. 136-7) warns, that wrongly convinced of one’s moral perfection and goodness, one strives to “promote the welfare of the world by empty wishes and romantic ideas.” Herder too recognized the danger of the political manifestation of what Kant considers the metaphysical drive of reason. Linker (2000, pp. 274-78, 285-86, 290) argues nicely that Herder was aware that people’s “despair and resentment” about “the fact that they must make sacrifices for the sake of a future state of happiness that they themselves will never live to see… might even come to manifest itself in an anxious, apocalyptic desire to find a way to bring the end of history into existence at the present moment” (p. 286). The notion of the German mission along with their “ethical greatness” would find its clear expression in Schiller in 1797.  

In his uncompleted poem of 1797 “Deutsche Grösse” Schiller writes: “Sundered from politics, the German has founded a value of his own, and even if the Empire should perish, this German dignity will abide unchallenged. It is an ethical greatness, it dwells in the culture and character of the nation, which are independent of any political destiny… The German is chosen by the world spirit to work, amid the struggles of time, on the eternal building of man’s education; not to glitter
few years after the death of Kant, Fichte’s *Addresses to the German Nation* would give the fullest philosophical and political expression to this line of thought combined with an individual’s sense of immortality guaranteed in the nation (Fichte, 2009).

Kant refers to radical evil (wickedness) as another component in his critical philosophy and cosmopolitanism. Kant repeatedly expresses his basic view in his political writings (he uses “Staat” and “Volk” interchangeably):

Although it is largely concealed by governmental constraints in law-governed civil society, the depravity of human nature is displayed without disguise in the unrestricted relations which obtain between the various nations. (1991, p. 103).

It might be doubted whether any inherent wickedness rooted in human nature influences men who live together within a single state… But in the external relationships between states, this wickedness is quite undisguisedly and irrefutably apparent. Within each individual state, it is concealed by the coercion embodied in the civil law… (1991, pp. 120-21).

Nowhere does human nature appear less admirable than in the relationships which exist between peoples. … The will to subjugate the others or to grow at their expense is always present (1991, pp. 91).

Note that Kant is talking about a modern democratic nation-state (“law-governed civil society” and the “state” governed by the “civil law”).

In the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant (1996b, p. 75) discusses, as the most violent of all vices, the vices of animosity among civilized nations, of culture, or of hostility to all others “whom we consider alien to us.” “Us” are likely to be members of a nation. Calling wickedness “radical evil,” Kant offers the same example as above:

So long as a state has a neighboring one which it can hope to subdue, it strives to aggrandize itself by subjugating it. It thus strives for a universal monarchy, a state constitution in which all freedom would necessarily expire, and, together with it, virtue, taste, and science (which follow upon freedom).

Kant (1996b, p. 153) gives the same example yet again. In his treatment of wickedness among nations in the *Perpetual Peace*, Kant (1991, pp. 103, 124) mentions the existence of “the evil principle” within ourselves.

As noted at the beginning, drawing the regulative-constitutive (immanent-transcendent) distinction about the Idea of cosmopolitan society, Kant tries to prevent its constitutive (transcendent) use. We can illustrate what such a use would be like when we consider both Kant’s discussion of radical evil and the linkage between reason and the democratic nation-state. Of the purpose of the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant (1996a, p. 148) writes:

It is therefore incumbent upon the *Critique of Practical Reason* as such to prevent empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the will. If it is proved that there is pure reason, its use is alone immanent; the empirically conditioned use, which lays claim to absolute rule, is on the contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands and commands that go quite beyond its sphere…

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant (1996a, p. 59) names this same
confusion of immanent and transcendent a “natural dialectic” and characterizes it as a “propensity.” As Allison (1990, pp. 151-2) argues, this “natural dialectic” and “propensity” are precisely what Kant calls “radical evil” in the Religion. Kant makes it clear that one aim of the second Critique is to prevent radical evil. If we replace reason with the democratic nation-state, we can paraphrase radical evil mentioned above in the second Critique into political terms: the nation-state, which “lays claim to absolute rule,” “expresses itself in demands and commands that go quite beyond its sphere.” This, as we have seen, is precisely what in both the Religion and political writings Kant says of wickedness and radical evil displayed through or even inherent in the nation-state.

To shed further light on what the constitutive/transcendent use of the Idea of cosmopolitanism would be like, let us look at how Kant formulates the constitutive or transcendent principle. The first Critique tells us that human reason unavoidably endeavors to overstep the rightful boundaries of its own domain, thereby causing disastrous consequences. This occurs when reason is propelled by its metaphysical drive to appeal to transcendent or constitutive principles. By these principles Kant (A296/B352) means:

principles that actually incite us to tear down all those boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognizes no demarcations anywhere.

Or a few lines later Kant (A296/B353) writes:

a principle that takes away these limits, which indeed commands us to overstep them, is called transcendent.

Recall that it is precisely such transcendent principles that Kant refers to when in the second and third Critiques he portrays Schwärmerei (fanaticism) as “an overstepping of the bounds of human reason undertaken on principles” or as “dreaming according to principles (raving with reason).” Schwärmerei, Kant is afraid, would take a communal political form: excessive nationalism. This and the reason/nation-state analogy in Kant allow us to rephrase the transcendent principle in political terms: the nation-state by its principle “incites” or “commands” itself (or “us” belonging to a nation) to “take away,” “tear down,” and “overstep” its “limits” and “boundaries posts” and to “lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognizes no demarcations anywhere,” that is, the whole world.25 Schwärmerei can be paraphrased as an “overstepping of the bounds of the nation-state undertaken on [constitutive or transcendent] principles” or as people (or a Volk) “raving with the nation-state.” All this is in line with what is described in those Kant’s statements in his political writings and the Religion that we cited. This also corresponds to the aforementioned paraphrase in political terms of the passage about radical evil in the second Critique. This is that political equivalent of the constitutive (transcendent) principle which Kant has in mind when in the passage cited at the beginning of this paper Kant cautions that the Idea of cosmopolitan society is not a constitutive but a regulative principle.

25 Through a careful reading of political metaphors in the first Critique, Goestschel (1994, p. 135) says that Kant’s narrative is a “story of the emerging capitalist universe [that] involves expansion and annexation.” We will see Kant’s view on capitalism. Goestschel (1994, p. 136) further argues: “Colonization, Kant’s narrative illustrates, takes place the moment our epistemological subject acts, that is, produces knowledge. Knowledge is a kind of colonization. Knowledge presupposes colonization as its model. … [T]he scientific and philosophical production of knowledge can only operate within the limits of an epistemic model that, in turn, takes as its model the colonization of the world (of experience).” It is suggested that the expansion of knowledge (reason) is inseparable from that of the nation-state, i.e., colonialism. That is exactly what would happen in the 19th and the 20th centuries (comparative linguistics, anthropology, etc.).
We can also see why Kant says that cosmopolitanism is “not a constitutive principle (the principle of anticipating lasting peace amid the most vigorous actions and reactions of human beings).” Here Kant connects eagerness for peace with “a constitutive principle” that he resolutely rejects. Why? Because, as Kant says in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, “perpetual peace, the ultimate goal of the whole right of nations” or “the highest political good” is “indeed an unachievable idea,” although “continual approximation to it” should be possible (Kant, 1996a, pp. 487, 492; also pp. 491; 1991, pp. 108, 130), just as Kant (A298/B354-55) suggests that perpetual peace in human reason is also an Idea that is not perfectly achievable. An attempt to realize perpetual peace here and now (the constitutive use) leads to a disaster.

In his *Perpetual Peace* Kant (1991, p. 113) writes:

In the light of the idea of reason, this state [the separate existence of many independent adjoining states] is still to be preferred to an amalgamation of the separate nations under a single power which has overruled the rest and created a universal monarchy.

Making a similar argument in the *Religion*, Kant states that “war is not so incurably evil as the grave of universal despotism” (1996b, p. 81).

The key is the phrase “in the light of the idea of reason.” Reason (the democratic nation-state) unavoidably struggles to realize the Idea of reason (such as perpetual peace and cosmopolitan society) even though it is a regulative Idea. Kant (1991, pp. 91, 103, 120-21), as we have seen, argues that radical evil or wickedness is displayed without disguise among the relationships among nation-states. This would most drastically manifest itself when a nation-state struggles to realize perpetual peace and cosmopolitan society. “It is nonetheless the desire of every state… to achieve lasting peace by thus dominating the whole world” (Kant, 1991, p. 113). Such an endeavor by a nation-state to realize perpetual peace and cosmopolitanism by governing the whole world results in “a soulless despotism [ein seelenloser Despotism],” in which the laws gradually will decrease their force and which will “finally lapse into anarchy” (Kant, p. 1991, 113). (This is the same as what Kant calls “the grave of universal despotism,” in comparison with which war is not so incurably evil.) This is what Kant has in mind as the outcome of the constitutive principle in its political form when he characterizes perpetual peace and cosmopolitan society as regulative principles and warns that they are not constitutive principles.

To illustrate what a “soulless despotism” would be like, we need to consider Kant’s view on money. The expansive and aggressive drive of the nation-state may be neither identical to nationalism nor a necessary feature of it. Nor may nationalism be inevitably the source of such expansiveness. Emerging global capitalism also contributes to such aggressiveness, expansiveness, and exhaustion of nation-states. Kant observes that “all [nation-states] are so closely linked by trade” that an upheaval in any nation-state causes significant effects on all the other nation-states (1991, p. 51). This is “without precedent in the past.” If a nation-state accumulated too much wealth, other nation-states would see this as a threat or even as a “military threat,” planning or carrying out “preventive attacks” (p. 95). Still, “the spirit of commerce” and the “power of money” would eventually help to abolish war and to bring peoples into peaceful, harmonious relationships with one another (pp. 51, 95, 106-7, 111, 114). Kant thinks that such relationships would be composed primarily, if not exclusively, of commodity exchange relationships because through money and

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26 Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (1997, p. 3) and Muthu (2003, p. 189) argue that we can see this aspect of Kant’s thought as an early attempt to grapple with the ongoing process of globalization.
exchange individuals would be reduced to and treated as exchangeable, substitutable, replaceable, and disposable things. More and more commodified, human existence would lose its distinctiveness accordingly.

Kant expresses this thought in a section in his Anthropology entitled “On Character as a Way of Thinking.” Kant (2006, p. 192) says that, except for the human being’s moral character which has an “inner worth… beyond all price,”

all other good and useful properties of the human being have a price that allows them to be exchanged with other things that have just as much use; talent has a market price…; temperament has an affective price [Affektionspreis] (emphasis in original; translation slightly modified).

The same thought appears in the Groundwork: “what is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price,” “what has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent,” “that which, even without presupposing a need, conforms with a certain taste,…. has an affective price [Affektionspreis],” and moral law alone is “above all price” and has an “inner worth, that is, dignity [Würde]” (Kant, 1996a, p. 84; original emphasis). Actually, however, Kant’s moral law backfires because, supposed to be universal and the same to everyone, it disregards his/her singularity. Indeed, Kant uses the metaphor of “genuine gold,” money and medium of exchange par excellence, to represent the case in which one tries to act solely on moral grounds and solely from duty (2006, p. 44). 27 Also note that Kant even anticipates so-called emotional labor (“affective price”).

We can illustrate what “soulless despotism” would be like. “Soulless” means lacking individuality, lacking human qualities, and being tedious and uninspiring. “Soulless despotism” can be the despotism of money. Money predominates so that everything gets commodified. Reduced to and treated as things exchangeable, replaceable, substitutable, and disposable (lacking human qualities), individuals lose their individuality (lacking individuality). They find the same commodities everywhere (tedious and uninspiring) while they express themselves through such commodities (lacking individuality). “Soulless despotism” can be the despotism of number in politics. Under the flag of universality, simply procedural democracy is

27 Eagleton (1990, p. 83) says: “the qualities of the Kantian moral law are those of the commodity form. Abstract, universal and rigorously self-identical, the law of Reason is a mechanism which, like the commodity, effects formally equal exchanges between isolated individual subjects, erasing the difference of their needs and desires in its homogenizing injunctions.” Tracing the “credit and debt” metaphor in Kant’s works, Marc Shell (1993) also argues: “numerical mathematization informs the Categorical Imperative of his [Kant’s] later works on morality” (p. 135; see pp. 131-35). Adorno make a similar point when he says: “What shows up faithfully in the doctrine of the transcendental subject [of Kant] is the priority of the relations—abstractly rational ones. Detached from the human individuals and their relationships—that have their model in exchange” (1978, p. 501). Alluding to Kant in Kantian vocabulary, Marx (1970, pp. 152-53) says in his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: “As money develops into international money, so the commodity-owner becomes a cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan relations of men to one another originally comprise only their relations as commodity-owners. Commodities as such are indifferent to all religious, political, national and linguistic barriers. Their universal language is price and their common bond is money. But together with the development of international money as against national coins, there develops the commodity-owner’s cosmopolitanism, a cult of practical reason, in opposition to the traditional religious, national and other prejudices which impede the metabolic process of mankind. The commodity-owner realizes that nationality “is but the guinea’s stamp”, since the same amount of gold that arrives in England in the shape of American eagles is turned into sovereigns, three days later circulates as napoleons in Paris and may be encountered as ducats in Venice a few weeks later. The sublime idea in which for him the whole world merges is that of a market, the world market.” See also note 25 above.
introduced in or imposed on a country without its particularities being considered. One’s singularity is numerically reduced to and treated as mere one anonymous vote under the despotism of number embodied in majority rule (see note 8 above). These two forms of soulless despotism are compatible. Democratic nation-states would try to dominate the world through the power of money and the universality of democracy, thereby attaining democratic peace under a soulless despotism.

If so, does one not tend to desire something irreplaceable, extraordinary, and distinctive? Thus, it is not surprising that Kant claims in the Critique of Judgment: Even war has something sublime about it if it is carried on in an orderly way and with respect for the sanctity of the citizens’ rights…. it makes the way of thinking of a people [die Denkungsart des Volks] that carries it on in this way all the more sublime in proportion to the number of dangers in face of which it courageously stood its ground. A prolonged peace [langer Frieden]…tends to make prevalent a mere[ly] commercial spirit [Handelsgeist], and along with it base selfishness, cowardice, and softness, and to debase the way of thinking of that people. (1987, p. 122)28

Here Kant is speaking of the democratic nation-state. “Volk” means a “unit” of people constituted through common language, common culture, and even “the unity of their descent [die Einheit ihrer Abstammung]” or “originally distinct stock [ursprünglich verschiedenen Stämme].” They are also “citizens” and the “sanctity” of their “rights” is granted. “United in a region,” a “Volk” which “recognizes itself as united into a civil whole [bürgerlichen Ganzen] through common ancestry [gemeinschaftliche Abstammung] is called a nation [Nation].” (2006, pp. 213; 1991, p. 111). Kant indicates what would happen to a Volk in the democratic nation-state under peace where a “mere commercial spirit” is predominant, everything is commodified, and one’s singularity is erased. “Money” predominates because it “contains a power that… replaces the lack of every other power,” so that “it has secured the name of a faculty [Vermögen] purely and simply” (Kant, 2006, p. 174; emphasis in original).

The “mere commercial spirit” would induce in a Volk “base selfishness” (e.g., in money-and-profit-making), “cowardice” (e.g., in obeying the power of money), and “softness” (e.g., in adjusting one’s performance easily and subtly according to the requirement of capital). All this would lead to “debase” the way of thinking of a Volk. E.g., they would treat one another as commodities, value money over ethics, exploit one another, and commit various kinds of fraud. This is peace with a soulless despotism. Kant says that under such peace war has something sublime about it and makes the “way of thinking of a Volk” all the more sublime. Kant is emphasizing the sublime importance of war in sustaining the social, national, psychological, and affective bond, cohesion, and health of a Volk in a democratic nation-state. War would thus bring to or evoke in a Volk something irreplaceable, extraordinary, and distinctive. That is why Kant sees war as not so incurably evil as soulless despotism. How does war make the way of thinking of a Volk sublime? Kant says that “the sublime must always have reference to our way of thinking [Denkungsart],” explaining such a sublime way of thinking in two manners (1987, pp. 132-35; original emphasis). First, it involves “every affect of the vigorous kind” as long as such an affect makes us conscious of forces within ourselves to “overcome any resistance” (emphasis in original). “Anger,” “indignant desperation,” and “enthusiasm” accompanying the Idea of reason are among such affects. Kant asserts that there is

28 Hegel (1991, pp. 361-62) would later express a similar idea when criticizing Kant’s thought of perpetual peace.
something “noble [edel]” about the way of thinking accompanied by these affects (p. 133). War can be judged sublime, Kant (pp. 121, 317-21) wants to argue, as long as it contributes to our vocation, i.e., cosmopolitanismus. The sublime feeling linked with such a vocation awakens “strength” within us to overcome or “regard as small [klein] the objects of our natural concerns: property, health, and life [Güter, Gesundheit und Leben]” (p. 121). To see even life as minor, one must be assured of some sense of immortality as a member of a Volk. The Volk appears as taking on something noble, immortal, and sublime. The Volk strives to realize the vocation of humankind (cosmopolitan society) by way of war.

Second, however, the way of thinking of a Volk “being without affects” is also sublime and again “noble” if it “vigorously” follows the principles of reason (Kant, 1987, pp. 132-33). How does war enter this second picture of the sublime way of thinking of a Volk? In the Perpetual Peace Kant (1996a, p. 334) writes:

War itself…needs no special motive but seems to be engrafted onto human nature and even to hold as something noble [Edles], to which the human being is impelled by the drive to honor [Ehrtrieb] without self-seeking incentives [eigennützige Triebfedern] … hence an inner dignity [Würde] is put in war itself… (original emphasis)

On the one hand, Kant underlines that he is treating the human being and war from the standpoint of nature. On the other hand, as Kant (1996a, pp. 545, 581) says in the Metaphysics of Morals, the concepts of “noble,” “inner dignity,” and “honor (without self-seeking incentives)” belong to the moral vocabulary to describe the human from a moral viewpoint. It is as though Kant ascribes moral value to war (which belongs to the realm of nature) rather than to the human.

We can understand Kant’s attribution of moral value to war if we think that he considers war sublime without calling it so. This is because to see an “inner dignity” as intrinsic to war is to perform what in the Critique of Judgment Kant (1987, p. 114) calls the procedure of “subreption,” which is the hallmark of our sublime feeling. Kant says: “the feeling of the sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation. But by a certain subreption (in which respect for the object is substituted for respect for the idea of humanity within ourselves…) this respect is accorded an object of nature…”29 Here we find “subreption” as another component of the linkage between Kant’s critical philosophy and his cosmopolitanism. Recall that Kant characterizes transcendental illusion with the notion of “transcendental subreption,” which amounts to taking the subjective for the objective in the form of taking the regulative for the constitutive (A509/B537, A583/B611, A619/B647, A643/B671). As we have seen, Kant uses this distinction to characterize the Idea of cosmopolitanism, while the status of nationalism is that of transcendental illusion. In the passage cited above of the Perpetual Peace war could have been depicted as sublime. The noble and sublime way of thinking of a Volk could have been characterized as having an inner dignity. The way of thinking of a Volk turns out to have an “inner worth beyond all price.”30 Kant is trying to establish the link, with the sublime at its center, among war,

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29 Yovel (1980, p. 131) says: “Kant’s analysis of the sublime contains the basic elements of the notions of false self-consciousness and alienation, as developed later in Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx.”

30 In Perpetual Peace Kant (1991, p. 101) says that people in the democratic nation-state would not agree to embark on war because they consider the “costs” and “debt” they incur. People desire something irreplaceable, extraordinary, and distinctive (exemplified in the sublimity of war and the sublime way of thinking of a Volk), however, precisely because they get sick of the dominance of money displayed in the way of thinking in terms of “costs” and benefits, “debt” and profit, etc.
the way of thinking of a *Volk*, their attempt to realize the vocation of humankind here and now, their social and affective bond, and something beyond death (some sense of immortality). Something dangerous far beyond sound patriotism is incited so that a national, political community can mobilize the motivational support of its members to sustain and strengthen its cohesion. Kant seems to try to incite rather than curb the metaphysical drive of reason toward nationalism.³¹ In any case, “soulless despotism” would “finally lapse into anarchy” as it dissatisfies some nation-states.³²

Let me say a few words about what image Kant has of cosmopolitan society and related issues (for more, see Saji, 2009). Cosmopolitan society for Kant is the sum of networks and processes of interaction and communication among citizens of the world (“*Weltbürger*” or “*Erdbürger*” in Kant’s words) affecting and affected by state and market. Cosmopolitan right (“*Weltbürgerrecht,* “*das Recht des Erdbürgers,*” and “*ius cosmopoliticum*” in Kant’s words) is intended to facilitate such interaction and communication.³³ It is often argued or presupposed that the nation and certain nationalism are necessary for a healthy, well-functioning democracy so that the latter is virtually inseparable from the former.³⁴ When we consider ourselves citizens of the world, we would not act as citizens of this or that nation-state. Instead, we would take action and make decisions about whatever affects our life in order to determine our life by ourselves. If we think that we should be able to govern our life by ourselves and should be able to participate meaningfully in decision-making about whatever problems that affect our life, and if we call this the democratic principle (self-determination or political autonomy), then citizens of the world are those who try to exercise the democratic principle at all levels (local, regional, national, global, etc., depending on issues to be decided). Kant suggests an institutionalization of cosmopolitan society when he refers to a “progressive organization of citizens of the earth [*Erbürger*] into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united [*kosmopolitisch verbunden*]” (2006, p. 238). In this process reason would stop taking the democratic nation-state as a model of its operation. Instead, as a “member of cosmopolitan society [*Weltbürgergesellschaft,*]” one would try to make the “public

³¹ Cf. note 16 above. About the democratic nation-state (in his term, the republic) Kant (1996a, p. 482) says: “As natives of a country, those who constitute a nation [*Volk*] can be looked upon analogously to descendants of the same ancestors (congeniti) even though they are not. Yet … from the perspective of rights, since they are born of the same mother [*gemeinschaftlichen Mutter*] (the republic) they constitute as it were one family [*Familie*] (*gens*, *nation*)…” (emphasis in original). In either way, Kant’s view of the democratic nation-state invites the notion of those who have the same descent or ancestry, i.e., the notion of an ethnic nation. Elsewhere, referring to the same mother-family way of thinking, Kant (1991, p. 74) positively calls it “the patriotic [*Patriotisch*] way of thinking [*Denkungsart,*].” There is nothing in Kant’s view that prevents the “patriotic way of thinking” from falling into the sublime way of thinking of a *Volk* we examined.

³² Cf. Archibugi (2008, p. 33) gives the data showing that the number of democratic countries has significantly decreased since 2003.

³³ In the *Perpetual Peace* and in *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant offers the triad of the right of citizens of a state, the right of nations (states), and cosmopolitan right. The right of citizens of a state concerns the individuals in a state in relation to one another. The right of nations (states) concerns “not only the relation of one state toward another as a whole, but also the relation of individual persons of one state toward the individuals of another, as well as toward another state as a whole” (Kant, 1996a, 322, 482). What is left for cosmopolitan right? It concerns individuals who act not as citizens of a particular state but as citizens of the world affecting and affected by state and market. The use a citizen of the world makes of his/her own reason does not adopt the nation-state as its model. See also note 35 below.

³⁴ See Machin (2014, pp. 117-143) for a discussion of various theorists on this issue such as David Miller, Roger Scruton, and Craig Calhoun.
use of one’s reason in all matters” (Kant, 1991, pp. 55-56). Such a “cosmopolitically united” system may be said to be similar to cosmopolitan democracy as described by Archibugi (2008), i.e., the situation in which the democratic principle spreads and functions at all levels. We should also remember, however, that “to opt for a democratic management” of problems is a “partisan choice” that “we cannot expect all to share” (Archibugi, 2008, pp. 86, 87; see also note 32).

While seeing something sublime in the nation-state and its war, Kant also claims: “To consider oneself, according to internal civil law, as an associate member of a cosmopolitan society [Weltbürgergesellschaft] is the most sublime Idea [die erhabenste Idee] a man can have of his destination. One cannot think of it without enthusiasm” (XIX, p. 609; cited in Hassner, 1987, pp. 285-86). While being anxious about excessive national feelings, Kant also stresses the importance of “feeling” we can have for cosmopolitanism in order to come closer to it (1991, p. 51; 1996a, pp. 330, 464, 489, 588; 2006, p. 236). Through the aforementioned interaction and communication people may become increasingly civic-minded and cultivate the feeling toward cosmopolitanism. This feeling may serve to curb or restrain excessive national feelings (Saji, 2009). There is, however, no guarantee that cosmopolitan sublime feelings will not mobilize people to universalize and realize cosmopolitan democracy here and now. Perhaps we would have to bear being torn, and control ourselves, in the loop of: being strongly tempted to entirely fulfill the metaphysical drive of reason (whether in nationalism, in an attempt to realize perpetual peace here and now, in an attempt to universalize democracy, etc.); acknowledging that such an attempt would turn out to be disastrous; thus giving it up; and yet returning to the temptation under a different guise.

Last but not least, Kant warns that, if we could ever take a first step of entering a league of nation-states, that would be after “so many sad experiences” that are unbearable, “after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their [nation- states’] powers,” and even after a “war of extermination” (1991, p. 47; 1996a, p. 320). Kant was right. Since then human beings have suffered a series of unbearable atrocities. The League of Nations, the United Nations, and human rights regime all emerged and developed in the way Kant foresaw they would if at all, that is, after and as a reaction to such atrocities. Now, a cosmopolitan condition is further away than these three from us. Kant (1996b, p. 81) was sure that his cosmopolitanism that “hopes for a state of perpetual peace” would be “universally derided as sheer fantasy.” And it was. Is it still? Will it be? Will Kant’s warning turn out to be wrong this time?

As we are witnessing the resurgence of nationalism, the renewed interest in cosmopolitanism, the attempt to universalize democracy, the omnipotence of money, and the dominance of commercial spirit, Kant’s work gives us food for thought.

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35 Contrasting “public” with “private,” Kant defines “the private use of reason” as “that in which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted” (1991, p. 55; original emphasis). Normally we call such a civil post or office a public position. Kant, however, sees one’s use of reason from the standpoint of the government (by which the nation-state is represented) as a private use. The “private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted” without much damage (1991, p. 55). Here reason does not take the democratic nation-state as a model of its operation.

36 In fact, perpetual peace for Kant can be “perpetual peace in the vast graveyard of the human race” that “covers all the horrors of violence along with their authors [human beings]” (Kant 1996a, pp. 320, 328; also p. 317).
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