

“Knowing Words” and “Nourishing Ch’i”: Mencius, Chu Hsi, and Later Interpreters

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This paper is broken into three sections: (a) what Mencius said in the central section of his conversation with Kung-sun Ch’ou (2A2) about “knowing (men by their) words” and “nourishing *ch’i*.” (b) what Chu Hsi said in his interpretations of Mencius, and (c) what later commentators said about Chu Hsi’s interpretation of Mencius.

It is suggested in this paper that if Chu Hsi had a dualistic axe to grind, later commentators also had one of their own to grind — a monistic metaphysics, for which they had to interpret the key terms in the *Mencius*. What distinguished one commentator from another were merely their individual ingenuities to adjust the meaning of Mencius’ terms to fit their monistic interpretations.

Mencius is peculiarly vibrant, especially in the central section of his conversation with Kung-sun Ch’ou (2A2) about “knowing (men by their) words” and “nourishing *ch’i*.” He is vibrant in what he said, in how he said it, and in unifying the what in the how — and the how in the what — into an organic architectonic. He is vibrant in that the development of the conversation with Kung-sun Ch’ou and the circumstances surrounding it elucidates the theme of the conversation.

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This vitality that is peculiarly Mencius' shall be further substantiated by contrasts both with Chu Hsi's interpretations of Mencius, and with later commentators' reactions against Chu Hsi. And so the paper is naturally broken into three sections: (a) what Mencius said, (b) what Chu Hsi said, and (c) what later commentators said.

A. First, we ask *what* Mencius said, and we are surprised to find no easy answer — not that there is no theme, but that there came about several interrelated themes, each reinforcing the other, each one unintelligible without the other, culminating in something to be sure, but we are at a loss as to what it is. We usually go by the themes that occurred later in the conversation, and also the ones that were discussed in detail. And so we usually say in this conversation two themes were discussed: knowing words and nourishing *ch'i*. These two themes, we must note, lead us to the crucial topic of the sage (*sh'eng jen*) with a peculiar stress on both an ongoing self-transcending elan of the world and a strong political atmosphere in which the conversation was carried out.

Torn from this concrete conversational context, with an eye on self-cultivation and political application, the themes of "knowing words" and "nourishing *ch'i*" are emaciated into unintelligible abstractions. They thereby fall easy prey to extraneous pilferings by system-builders, the greatest of whom happens to be, alas, Chu Hsi himself. But first we must see what Mencius' conversation with Kung-sun Ch'ou entails. We find three surprises in the conversation: true success in politics is measured by the accompanying inner peace; this inner peace is equal to martial imperturbability; to describe what its root is taken over by, a delineating of how to nourish it.

Ostensibly the conversation begins with a hypothetical fulfilment of Mencius' life-wishes — to serve the state, and to serve it in a most influential manner. Political glories immediately plunges us, however, into their basis

— the attitude of the sagely ruler. Would he, Mencius, be perturbed at heart?

Thus the external glories are pitted against the internal tranquility. Which comes first in importance — serving the people gloriously or cultivating oneself into imperturbability? Mencius seems to be implying that one cannot be established without the other — inner peace is in vain without its efficacy in pacifying the under-heaven, and public services are a mere vainglory without their strong basis in the dynamic inner peace. The whole conversation — about metaphysical *ch'i*, intellectual knowing of words, and ethical self-cultivation — takes place in a pervasively practical atmosphere. Yet this pragmatism is a deep ontological one. One's success in public office is measured not by how much one has visibly accomplished, but by how imperturbable one has been in one's office, how much one has withstood the assaults, as it were, of political glories — this is the first surprise in Mencius' conversation.

Then comes the description of this inner peace. This peace is put negatively, "not perturbed at heart," to highlight an almost militant resiliency that can never be distracted or disturbed. This serenity is in fact comparable to martial fortitude in the face of threats by the enemy. We see here a breath-taking crescendo, step by step, that describes what true courage is, that is, at the core of imperturbability.

And so this is another surprise, that Mencius compared sagely imperturbability to martial courage, as if to say that sageliness is martial mettle sublimated, even strengthened, to the highest.

The crescendo of description builds up our excitement. Po Kung-iu pours out his thunderous vengeance at the slightest provocation; Meng Shih-she, however, nonchalantly puts behind him the soldier's obsession to win, and thereby attains fearlessness; finally, Tseng Tzu attains his fortitude by reflective rectitude. Thus true public service is found to be based on inner fortitude, and inner fortitude based on reflective rectitude; true success

in public affairs starts at the inner depths of a person — that martial imperturbability. This is a breath-taking thesis to which only Plato's Dialogues can be equal.

The third surprise comes about when the conversation turns to Mencius himself. How would he compare his imperturbable spirit-and-mind-and-heart (*hsin*) to the *hsin* of Kao Tzu? Kao Tzu's is in the realm of judgment; Mencius' is in that of *ch'i*. And this is how we are brought face to face with the famous topic of "flood-like *ch'i*" (*hao-jan chih ch'i*). The topic is supposed to be mystical, metaphysical, cosmic, ethical, sagely, and so on, but apparently no one has noted the political, even martial, occasion that brings about the topic. This great flood-like *ch'i* is profoundly pragmatic. Failing to note this fact has sent many a commentator to exercises in intellectual conundrums.

First, this section on flood-like *ch'i* is preceded by a careful delineation of what our *hsin* comprises, the will, the *ch'i*; how the will commands over the *ch'i*; and where the will arrives, the *ch'i* stays; and how the one can move the other — therefore *ch'i* should not be abused (done violence to). This is to make an implicit reference to that "cultivation" of the "ch'i" until it becomes "flood-like." The flood-like-ness is thoroughly rooted in the common concrete *hsin*, the will, and the *ch'i*.

Then, when it finally comes to the description of that flood-like *Ch'i*, we note the barest eleven characters devoted to its description — "exceedingly vast, exceedingly unyielding . . . (it will) fill (all) between heaven and earth (Legge's translation; modified)." All the rest is about *how* to nourish it, how not to destroy it. We feel here that Mencius meticulously avoided talking *about* it; he is all too eager instead to tell us how to nourish and experience it — not to "assault" it with occasional good deeds (or "rightness"), not to forget it, not to "help" it grow (as a man of Sung "help" the seedlings grow by pulling them); otherwise, we will starve. A description

of what amounts to a showing of the how, and that in a negative manner; the concrete how filling the description of the what — this is our third surprise.

Thus it is that we have just had a rough rundown of what Mencius' passage of the conversation with Kung-sun Ch'ou entails. The whole thrust and sentiment has a vigorous synthetic vision that sweeps across politics, martial courage, inner fortitude, sagely insight and the strong elan (the flood-like *ch'i*) that is both vastly cosmic and radically existential. It is a spontaneous breath-taking description of what the sage is, profoundly efficacious in public affairs.

Unfortunately, however, the spontaneity of the description of sagely vigor that takes our breath away also presents problems, as soon as we ask what all this *means*. As we look closer, we become precise in the formulation of the problems and answers, and precision breeds a diversity in directions of the search, resulting in many sorts of ambiguities. Scholarship gives us precision, ambiguity, and thereby a loss of vigor. This general trend also describes the rise of Mencius scholasticism, of which, Chu Hsi proved to be the eye of the scholastic storm.

B. (1) To begin with, I do not suppose it unfair to say of Chu Hsi that he has an axe to grind; he has a system that explains everything in the universe, including Mencius. Chu Hsi said of Mencius:¹

"In my opinion, Mencius' thinking begins with exhausting *Li* (principles), collecting *I* (rightness), resulting in the power of imperturbability. For only in exhausting the *Li* can one "know words"; only in collecting the *I* can one "nourish the flood-like *Ch'i*." The *Li* having clear without any room for doubt, the *Ch'i* having become full without any room for fear, and then one can shoulder big responsibilities without

perturbation. One has only to consider the order of this Section to be clear about all this."

Here the spontaneous co-happening of the components of the self, their integration, and their mutual pervadings with the *ch'i* of the universe, are clearly turned into a complex ontological order, not to say a cognitive system.

(2) This "system" leads Chu Hsi to identify Mencius' "knowing words" with "exhausting *Li*-principles," the prior basic *sine qua non* for cosmic pervasiveness.²

All this misses Mencius' point. Mencius meant by "knowing words" to discern wherein a man is ensnared, strayed, at his wits' end, and so on, by seeing through his immoderate words, his heretical words, his evasive words, and the like. "Knowing words" is one's (sage's, Mencius') concrete ability to discern a man through his words (expressions) that are floating around in daily life. Knowing words is not (to be identified with) the grandiose metaphysical principle of exhausting the *Li*.

Besides, Mencius seems to have little intention of putting knowing words as logically (or ontologically) prior to nourishing the cosmic *ch'i*. For he first responds to the query about "wherein you, master, surpass (Kao Tzu)," by "I know (a man by his) words; I am good at nourishing my flood-like *ch'i*." Here Mencius puts knowing words before nourishing the *ch'i*. But then soon afterwards, he first described what "nourishing the *ch'i*" means before describing what "knowing words" means. Previously, knowing words, then nourishing *ch'i*; soon afterwards, nourishing *ch'i*, then knowing words — perhaps this oscillation of order was meant to imply that both of these qualities are equal in importance, two equal co-mingling elements in the makeup of a sage.

(3) Chu Hsi loves *Li*-principle as the basis of everything, and so he has to push it onto Mencius. Chu Hsi said that "to know words is to know *li*"³;

"to know words is to exhaust *li*."⁴ However, Mencius did not use the word *Li* here; he on the whole used the word sparingly (only seven times, on three occasions of 5B1, 6A7, 7B19).

Inevitably the question arises as to what the relation between *hsin* (heart, mind) and *li* (principle) is. First, *hsin* has *chih* (will) and *ch'i*, all of which seem to be subject to the spatiotemporal determinations. I say "seem" because Chu Hsi does not clearly say so, although in many passages he implies it.⁵ This clearly puts asunder the unity that should not be, the original unity between *hsin* and *li*, which is supposed to be beyond spatiotemporal determinations.

In order to salvage the unity, Chu Hsi has to appeal to *chih*-cognition as a mediating function in which the *hsin* has access to the *li*-principles in things and affairs; two heterogeneous elements of *hsin* and *li* come thus to be mutually involved.⁶ This is a complex situation indeed, foreign to Mencius' original text. Once spontaneity is thought about, complicated dialectical unity comes into being — the relation between *hsin* and *li*, which are "not separated, not confused."⁷

(4) What about notions surrounding the nourishing of *ch'i*? For Mencius the flood-like *ch'i* is not ecstasy that transcends intellect, will, and discernment, but that which strongly (even martially; cf. *chih kang*) enhances them, bringing them up to the cosmic pervasive scale. Chu Hsi completely missed this "*chih kang*," when, having said that it means "what cannot be bent" puts the whole flood-like *ch'i* onto a transcendental plane — "For the Normal *Ch'i* of Heaven and Earth which enables man to live is originally as it is."⁸

Then comes the conversion of all activities that nourish *ch'i* into those of ethical striving. To "match (or mate) (*p'ei*)" is taken as "to combine and help";⁹ this is to commit the folly of a man from Sung. To "collect (repeatedly to naturally practice) rightness (*chi i*)" is now to "accumulate good

behavior",¹⁰ meaning "in everything and every affair seek after what is 'yes'-and-'right' (*shih*) or 'fitting' (*ho i*), that is, the *li* that is in everything."¹¹

Chu Hsi's taking of *chi* to be seeking (*ch'iu*) and accumulating (*ho, chu*) may remind us of Aristotle's notion of habituation of good deeds (*hexis*) at the base of *Nicomachean Ethics* (cf. 1105b-11061, 1114b). But *if* Mencius refers to something like habituation, it is not just deeds but the entire spirit, the whole bent and vitality, that must be habituated into the *Ch'i* that is so flood-like as to finally fill the Heaven and Earth. Perhaps Chu Hsi was too much of an Aristotelian to capture Mencius' cosmo-holistic sentiment. And once the sentiment of spontaneity was missed, it could never be recovered again. We now go into this sad story.

C. What nature has joined man should not put asunder. The natural is the inner, the unified, the spontaneous; man's search is the outer, the complicated, the artificial. Unfortunately logic has to put asunder, and then put together, to "understand," and what we get is no longer what we originally wanted to understand. We must "clarify" to ourselves what we are and yet what we grasp is no longer what we are.

This is also what happened to commentators after Chu Hsi on Mencius — in revolt against Chu Hsi. They complained and tried to put together what Chu Hsi put asunder, and they got mystical-cognitive conundrums instead of Mencius. Chu Hsi has introduced a dualistic crack in the urn; gluing the two pieces back together leaves the seam eternally on the urn. The humpty-dumpty on the wall of spontaneity, once fallen to logical pieces, cannot be put together again, not even by noisy orthodoxies or latter-day geniuses. Once tampered with, Mencius' vital unity of spontaneity is gone forever. Now that Mencius' text has been "explained and interpreted," no one knows who really got back to Mencius's original intention. We shall now go into the details of this sad story. First, we begin with one of the highlights, the

salient point in the controversies — "*chi i*," an assemblage of ill-proper (experiences). Chu Hsi had an axe to grind, a dualistic metaphysics, his favorite framework with which to explain everything. Let me translate again what Chu Hsi told Kuo Chung-hui.¹²

I, Hsi think that all Mencius' learning starts with exhausting *li*-principles, assembling proper (deeds), and effectuates in (being) unmoved (in) mind. For only (in) exhausting *li*-principles can one know words; only (in) assembling properdeeds can one nourish the flood-like *ch'i*. *Li* be(com)ing clear(ed) and (we having) nothing (to) doubt, *ch'i* (coming to) fill (the self) and (we having) nothing (to) fear, (and) then (we) can shoulder up a great task and not (be) moved (in) mind. Considering the order (of thoughts in) this chapter enables one to see this.

That which "exhausts the *Li*-principles" is the mind; the *li* and the mind are thus the two pivotal points in Chu Hsi's metaphysics. They are two different ontological moments which at the same time mutually move each other.

This dualism made Chu Hsi turn "*chi*," (daily natural) assemblage, into "*chu*," (programmed) collecting, and "*ch'iu*," (assiduous) seeking; he also turned "*i*," proper (experiences), into the "*he i*" in every affair and thing, what is right and appropriate in things, the *li*-principle(s). Daily natural self-amassing of proper experiences is now turned into a constant strenuous seeking and gathering of the principles in things; this is precisely to do that against which Mencius warned — not to "help to grow." In doing so, Chu Hsi was only sowing seeds of contention for the commentators after him.

First, as to the revolt from an arduous adherent of Chu Hsi's turned his enemy, Wang Yang-ming.¹³ Wang brazens it out:¹⁴

"In its original substance the mind is not perturbed. The original substance of the mind is one's nature, and one's nature is principle. Both human nature and principle are originally unperturbed. The accumulation of righteousness means returning to the original substance of the mind."

To collect is no longer to collect (something appropriate) from outside; it is to *be* collected, to attain self-collectedness in *liang-chih* that is the original substance of the mind. The mind and the *li*-principle are one and the same in Wang.

Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) followed suit, and took "collection of the proper" to be an expansion of subjectivity to the full. For him, the proper (*i*) is the mind, whose collection is its free flowing everywhere (*liu hsing*) whenever it deals with affairs and things. One who comes back to this mind is best at one's free-flow as the water which feeds on its fountain, and best in one's free-growth as the tree which is firmly rooted.¹⁶

This results in Huang's most daring statement, "What fills the heaven and earth is all mind."¹⁷ Its pungency is compromised by a modern Chu Hsi scholar, Liu Shu-hsien, who took the mind here to mean where the subject and the object meet.¹⁸ The mind is what certifies all meaning structures, bringing out their significances. To "know words" is to know all the ups and downs of this mind.¹⁹ This is why "knowing of words" begins with "cultivating *ch'i*" which is none other than cultivating the mind, for the mind *is ch'i*.

In any case, all this is a far cry indeed from Chu Hsi's who took "collecting of the proper" to mean exhausting the *li*-principles of external things, and "knowing words" to mean "investigating things to attain knowledge."²¹ Huang in fact chided Chu Hsi for embracing *li-ch'i* dualism, and thereby falling into interpreting "mating (*p'e*) the proper and the *tao*"

to mean using *ch'i* to "help (*chu*) the tao-and-the-proper."²²

Similarly Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692), who was a contemporary of Huang Tsung-hsi's (1610-1695), attacked Chu Hsi for minimizing the importance of "knowing words." For Wang "knowing words" is "the apex of Mencius' (thoughts). Only through clearly manifesting-seeing the proper-rightness inside, being (burnt) into (it in the very core of one's) spirit, (can one) obtain knowing of words. Were one not to collect proper-rightness (this way), how can (one come to) see it inside (oneself)?"²³

Two Japanese sinologists of the Tokugawa period should be mentioned here, Ito Jinsai (1627-1705) and Nakai Liken (1732-1817).

Ito Jinsai's attacks on Chu Hsi also helped disintegrate the ideological basis of Tokugawa feudalism.²⁴ Ito said,²⁵

The essence of Mencius learning is keeping of the mind nourishing one's nature. Keeping the mind accomplishes knowing the words; nourishing one's nature accomplishes nourishing *ch'i*. Knowing the words, the mind is kept; the mind being kept, the intellect becomes perspicuous; then whatever is said, as to its truth or falsehood, right or wrong, one can judge naturally without delusion (and) doubt. This is why knowing words is what keeping the mind accomplishes.

"Knowing words" is no longer what Chu Hsi took to mean, a cognitive external search, but instead a moral activity of self reflective "keeping" and "nourishing." Ito said,²⁶

Every activity is centered on residing in benevolence (*jen*) and originating in rightness (*i*). But scholars have taken imperturbability of the mind as the ultimate (end) of learning — a view as vulgar (indeed) as Buddha's which took quiescence to be the tao.

For Itō the mind is that for the good (*liang hsin*). He said,²⁷

To get the mind is no other than getting benevolence and rightness (jen i). People neglect this point, taking keeping of the mind to be concentration of the spirit in desirelessness, seriousness, and quiet sitting. This confuses the teachings of the sages with theories of Buddhism and Taoism.

“Knowing words” is only an expansion to the full of one’s moral subjectivity, to cultivate oneself and expand one’s cultivation to others, through the family onto the entire empire.²⁸

Nakai Liken also criticized Chu Hsi for being diligent in artificial cultivation, and weak in natural expansion.²⁹ And he chided those commentators for being more difficult to understand than the original text; this is exactly the opposite of what should have happened.³⁰

On the whole, Nakai is opposed to the dualistic view-point-mind versus things, body versus uses, moral nature versus physical nature, etc. The ancients did not have such a standpoint, which does not agree with the view of Confucius and Mencius.³¹

Commenting on the famous saying, “Ten thousand things are already there (complete?) in me,” (7A4) Nakai said that “in me” means “in my responding to and dealing with things, that is, relationships such as that between the father and the son, and the manner of dealings such as love and righteousness.”³² In other words, things are so many manifolds of relations, which manifest themselves only through my being there dealing with them. It is in this manner that the subject takes in the objects, until all things are completely at one in the subject, without gaps or distinctions. “Mencius stressed on expansion, from which late scholars departed.”³³

Nakai criticized Chu Hsi for identifying “*yu shih*” (there are affairs [of practices] with “*chi i*” (collecting propriety/rightness). The former should

mean a constant nourishing of one's *ch'i* at every contact with things, not a deliberate collecting of external rightness as Chu Hsi took it to mean.³⁴

And so, in Nakais' opinion, nourishing of *ch'i* should come before knowing of words. He said.³⁵

Being clear (about) tao and rightness comes before knowing words; without being clear about *tao*, how can one know words? Matching tao and rightness *is* the practice of nourishing *ch'i*; how can the former be put after the nourishing of *ch'i*?

According to Nakai nourishing *ch'i* must mean pressing toward the transparency of inner subjectivity, which has no cognitive implications whatever. Nakai also discarded "everyone's way of striving to go back to the origin, the artificial striving," for Mencius' original intention of natural "expansion."³⁶

A Korean sinologist Chong Da-san similarly said that "to know words is to know the mind at the root of words."³⁷ "When the mind is without pitfalls but straightforward in keeping rightness, then the mind is without bias or immoderation."³⁸

Chong also sided with Lu Tzu-yueh against Chu Hsi on what "this" means in Mencius' statement, "Without this, it will starve."³⁹

Chu Hsi thinks that without flood-like *ch'i* our body will starve (or "collapse"); Lu thinks that without tao and rightness *ch'i* will starve . . . I once thought about it, and I realized that the starving of the body is not what the superior man is worried about. What he is ashamed about is to have *ch'i* sag and starve because of lack of practices at collecting rightness.

Mencius took collecting rightness to be the root of ch'i arising. Chu Hsi took nourishing ch'i to be a help to practicing rightness; this is to go against Mencius. For originally the flood-like ch'i cannot be brought forth at random or nourished with force . . . If one has an intention of nourishing one's ch'i one has no other avenue but to attend to one's ordinary [minute-by-minute] breathing; one can never grow seedlings with force. I do not know way Chu Hsi rejected Lu Tzu-yueh's theory.

To nourish *ch'i* is to collect rightness, which is to allow moral subjectivity to become transparently thorough, and for this to happen there should be no forcible cultivation.

All in all, if Chu Hsi had a dualistic axe to grind, later commentators also had one of their own to grind — a monistic metaphysics, for which they had to interpret the key terms in the *Mencius*. What distinguished one commentator from another were merely their individual ingenuities to adjust the meanings of Mencius' terms to fit their monistic interpretations.

Thus once Chu Hsi led the way into the arena of contentious scholasticism, full of "glorious" dualistic didactic and dialectic, the dialectic had to continue dualistically among the later commentators — this time the dualistic contentions of monism against dualism. It is this manifold againstness, all this contentiousness, that manifests the rift and the seam which wiped out forever the spontaneous unity of Mencius, that pristine unity beyond both dualism and monism.

Notes

1. Chu Hsi, "Yu Kuo Chung-hui" (A Letter to Kuo Chung-hui,) in *Chu Wen-kung Wen-chi* (Collection of Literary Works by Chu Hsi, hereafter as *Wen-chi*), (*Ssu-pu Ts'ung-k'an ts'u-pien so-pen* edition), Chuan 37, p.601,a — 602,b.
2. Chu Hsi, *Meng-tzu chi-chu* (Collected Commentaries on the Mencius, hereafter as *MTTC*), (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chu, 1982), Chuan 3, p.231, p.233; *Chu tzu yu lei* (Classified Conversations of Chu Hsi, hereafter as *Yu-lei*) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chu, 1986), chuan 52, p.1241, 1260, 1241, 1236, 1270; For more detailed discussion on this point, see my "Chu Tzu tui Meng Tzu chih-yen yang-ch'i shuo ti ch'uan-shih chi ch'i hui-hsiang," *Tsing-hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, 18:2 (Dec., 1988), pp.320-321.
3. *Yü-lei*, chuan 52, p.1241.
4. *Yü-lei*, chuan 52, p.1241.
5. *MTTC.*, chuan 3, p.233.; *Yü-lei*, chuan 52, p.1264.
6. *Yu-lei*, chuan 15, p.296, p.300; Chu Hsi, *Meng-tzu hou-wen* (Inquires on the Mencius, hereafter as *MTHW*), in *Chu Tzu i-shu* (Taipei: Yi-wen Publishing Company, n.d.), Chuan 13, p.1, a.
7. See my "Chu Tzu tui Meng Tzu chih-ven yang-ch'i shuo ti ch'uan-shih chi ch'i hui-hsiang," p.324.
8. *MTTC.*, chuan 3, p.231.
9. *MTTC.*, chuan 3, p.231.
10. *MTTC.*, chuan 3, p.232.
11. *Yü-lei*, chuan 52, p.1259.
12. Chu Hsi, *Wen Chi*, chuan 37, p.601, a — 602, b.
13. Wing-tsit Chan tr., *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming* (New York: Columbia

- University Press, 1963), Part “:”, #176, pp.163-4, hereafter as *Instructions*. For a discussion on Chu Hsi’s influence on Wang Yang-ming, see Wing-tsit Chan, “Ch’ing Chu Tzu wan-nien ting-lun k’an Yang-ming chih yu Chu Tzu,” in his *Chu hsüeh lun-chi* (Taipei: Hsu-sheng shu-chu, 1982), pp.353-383.
14. Wing-tsit Chan tr., *Instructions*, Part. “9”, #81, pp.53-54.
 15. Wing-tsit Chan tr., *Instructions*, Part. “:”, #187, pp.174-5; #152, p.132.
 16. Huang Tsung-hsi, *Meng tzu shih shuo* (*Master’s Saying on the Mencius*) in *Huang Tsung-hsi Ch’uan-chi* (*Complete Works of Huang Tsung-hsi*) (Han-chou: Cheching Ku-chi Chu-pan she, 1985), Vol. 1, p.62, Hereafter as *shih-shuo*.
 17. Huang Tsung-hsi, *Ming-ju hsüeh-an* (*The Records of Ming Scholars*) (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chu, 1985), Vol.1, p.9.
 18. See Liu Shu-hsien, *Huang Tsung-hsi hsün-hsueh ti t’ing-wei* (Taipei: Yun-ch’en Publishing Co., 1986), pp.97-103.
 19. Huang Tsung-hsi, *Shih-shuo*, pp.66-67.
 20. Huang Tsung-hsi, *Shih-shuo*, pp.60-64.
 21. Chu Hsi, *Yü-lei Chuan* 52, p.1260.
 22. Huang Tsung-hsi, *Shih-shuo*, chuan 2, p.65.
 23. Wang Fu-chih, *Tu Ssu-shu ta-ch’uan shuo* (*Discussions After Reading the Great Collection of Commentaries on the Four Books*) (Taipei: Holo Publishing Co. Photo-reproduction of the 1865 wood-block edition, 1974), chuan 8, p.26, a.
 24. Cf. Masao Maruyama tr. by Mikiso Hane, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
 25. Itō Jinsai, *Moshi Kō-qi* (*Classical Meanings of the Mencius*), in Seki Gii Chiro ed., *Nihon meika shisho chusaku zenshu* (*Complete Works of Commentaries on the Four Books Written by Japanese Renowned*

- Scholars*) (Tokyo: *Ho Shupan*, 1973), Vol. 9, p.56.
26. Ito Jinsai, *Moshi Kō-qi*, p.53.
 27. Ito Jinsai, *Moshi Kō-qi*, p.256.
 28. Ito Jinsai, *Gomon ji-qi* (*Meanings of Words in the Analects and the Mencius*), in Inoue Tetsujirō et. al., eds. *Nihon ronli kaihen* (*Collections of Japanese Ethical Works*) (Tokyo: Ikuseikai, 1901), Vol. 5, p.30; *Moshi kō-qi*, p.63.
 29. Nakai Likien, *Moshi Kō-gen*, in Seki Giichirō ed., *op. cit.*, vol. 10, pp.84-85, 87.
 30. *Ibid.*
 31. Nakai Likien, *Moshi Kō-gen*, p. 104, 319, 328.
 32. *Moshi Kō-gen*, p.390.
 33. *Moshi Kō-gen*, p.386.
 34. *Moshi Kō-gen*, p.90.
 35. *Moshi Kō-gen*, p.85.
 36. *Moshi Kō-gen*, p.84-85.
 37. Chong Da-san, *Mong-cha yueh-qi* (*Essentials of the Mencius*, hereafter as *MCYG*), in *Yu-yu t'ang chuan-shu* (Seoul: Compilation Committee for the Classics, 1973), ", Vol. 5, p.18, a.
 38. Chong Da-san, *MCYG*, p.20, a.
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「知言養氣」論：孟子、朱子及後代詮釋者

黃俊傑

摘要

本文以《孟子》的「知言養氣」論為核心，析論朱子對孟子「知言養氣」說的解釋，及其在近世東亞思想史上所引起的論辯。本文內容共分三部份：(一)析論孟子「知言養氣」說的基本內涵；(二)分析朱子對孟子（尤其是對「知言養氣」說）的解釋，本於理氣不離不雜之二元論，不免違失孟學大旨；(三)本文第三部份討論王陽明、黃宗羲、德川儒者伊藤仁齋、中井履軒及李朝鮮儒者丁茶山等人，對朱子的批判，以觀察自公元十六世紀以降東亞儒學思潮發展的新動向。