

康德《純粹理性批判》中 「主觀演繹」的論證過程與方法*

戴 華**

康德曾經在《純粹理性批判》第一版的序言中指出，他在「超驗演繹」一章中的研究可以劃分為兩個部分，也就是他所謂的「客觀演繹」與「主觀演繹」。「範疇超驗演繹」係隸屬「客觀演繹」之範圍。大多數研究康德的學者認為，儘管康德在「客觀演繹」中所從事的是一種「哲學研究」，他在「主觀演繹」中所從事的卻是性質全然不同的「心理研究」，而康德有關所謂的「綜合」認知活動的理論，就是此項「心理研究」的結果。

本文嘗試對於「主觀演繹」提出一套新的詮釋。作者認為，「主觀演繹」其實和「客觀演繹」一樣，也是一項「哲學研究」，因為正如後者為那些被康德稱做「範疇」的概念提供了一套「超驗演繹」，同樣的，前者也為我們對於「自我」（康德所謂「固定不變的我」）的概念提供了一套「超驗演繹」。對於康德而言，此一「自我」概念和「範疇」一樣，也是無法從經驗導引出來的先驗概念，因此也需要一套「超驗演繹」，俾使其「合法性」得到先驗的證明。本文作者依據《純粹理性批判》第一版中的相關段落，試圖重建此一隸屬「主觀演繹」的「超驗演繹」，並解析其中的論證步驟。為了凸顯「主觀演繹」所涉及之研究的「哲學」性質，作者特別嘗試證明兩點：第一、康德對於「綜合」認知活動的理論，並非來自任何「心理學的探討」，而是概念分析（一種哲學方法）的結果。第二、康德在「範疇超驗演繹」中明顯使用過的一種哲學性的導衍方法，其實也出現於「自我」概念之「超驗演繹」的論證過程之中。

- 一、從主、客演繹之爭談起
- 二、認知主體、表相與「時間意識」
- 三、透過休姆來看康德
- 四、第一階段：從「時間意識」到「三重綜合」
- 五、第二階段：「向內回想」與自我意識

*承蒙本集刊二位評審先生惠賜許多精闢、寶貴的意見，使作者在所建構之論證中發現幾個需要修正與補充之處。謹此向二位先生致謝。

**中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所副研究員

The Subjective Deduction in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*: An Analysis of Its Proof-Structure and Method

Hua Terence Tai

Abstract

In the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes his inquiry in the Deduction chapter as having two "sides," which he calls the objective and subjective deductions (OD and SD). According to most commentators, the OD is a philosophical inquiry which results in the transcendental deduction (TD) of the categories, whereas the SD is a psychological inquiry which results in Kant's theory of "synthesis."

This paper presents a new approach to the SD by arguing that the SD is as *philosophical* an inquiry as the OD in that, just as the OD contains a TD of the categories, the SD contains a TD of the concept of "I" (a Kantian "fixed and abiding self"). Both TD's are intended by Kant to yield a kind of *a priori* justification for our employment of certain concepts which he thinks cannot be derived from experience. In this paper, the TD of the concept of "I" is reconstructed step by step on the basis of some relevant passages from the first-edition *Critique*. In order to bring out the *philosophical* nature of Kant's inquiry in the SD, the author tries to show, first, that the theory of "synthesis" is the outcome of *conceptual analysis* (a kind of philosophical method) rather than some psychological investigation, and secondly, that the same inference-rule Kant explicitly employs in the TD of the categories is also employed in the TD of the concept of "I."