

## 多元談判賽局的均衡

施俊吉\*

本文以「策略性分析法」探討「多元談判賽局」的均衡。研究結果顯示：如果以折現法反應談判者的時間偏好，則談判均衡在極限之下會趨近 Nash 談判解。但是當以固定成本法反應談判者的時間偏好時，均衡在極限下不會趨近於 Nash 談判解。因此 Nash 談判解不能無條件的使用在所有的多元談判賽局上。此外，本文並以「關稅協商」、「雙佔勾結」與「勞資談判」等課題為例，簡介多元談判理論的應用方法。

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### 一、總論

本文之目的，在解答與下列狀況相類似的問題：

- (一)在一異質雙佔市場，廠商企圖勾結，並私下會商如何設定個別商品的價格和品質。試問，雙方能否達成協議？其內容為何？
- (二)兩國同意降低關稅，並展開諮商。試問，雙方所能達成的關稅減讓協定，其內容為何？
- (三)資方與工會就工時、工資與工作條件等事項進行談判，談判結果能否加以預測？

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\* 中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所副研究員。作者感謝蔡宗榮、林小嫻教授與本刊論文審查人所提供的改正意見。

# Perfect Equilibrium in a Multi-issue Bargaining Model

Jun-ji Shih

## Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework within which the outcomes of multi-issue bargaining can be described. The way to do this is to convert the multi-issue bargaining problem into a problem of bargaining about the division of utility between the bargainers, and then employing the method of iterated removal of dominated strategies to verify the existence of the unique perfect equilibrium of this game and characterize that equilibrium. We find that, as long as the costs of prolonged negotiations are modeled as the discounting of future outcomes, the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution. However, if the central motive to reach an agreement is instead provided by the fixed per-period bargaining costs, then the relations between the limit perfect equilibrium and the Nash solution would vanish.