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Freedom and *Akrasia*

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Abstract

There are free, weak-willed actions. It is an apparent fact that we sometimes act freely against our best judgments—we sometimes perform actions in our own free will, while judging that another possible action would have been, overall, a better one. However, a widely held skeptical view has it that one performs an action against one's own best judgment only if one does so unfreely; in other words, there can be no free weak-willed action. In this paper, three main arguments for this form of skepticism are examined. In order to defend the possibility of free weak-willed actions, I explain why all these arguments fail.

Outline

- I. The No Ability Argument
- II. Plato's Skepticism
- III. Pugmire's Skepticism
- IV. The Unexercisability Argument
- V. Watson's Skepticism (I)
- VI. Watson's Skepticism (II)
- VII. Concluding Remarks

自由與意志弱性

何志青

摘要

本文討論自由的意志弱性行爲。所謂意志弱性行爲是指行爲者的行動違反了行爲者本身的價值(最佳)判斷。我認爲很多的意志弱性行爲同時也是自由的行爲。很明顯地我們有時會自由地選擇違反我們的最佳判斷而行——雖然判斷某一行爲選項就整體而言是較好的，我們仍依自己的自由意志採取另一行爲。然而，有一廣泛流傳的懷疑論卻認爲，人只有在非自由的情況下才會作出違反最佳判斷的行爲；也就是說，根本不可能有所謂的自由的意志弱性行爲。此懷疑論的主要代表人物是柏拉圖及當代的波格麥爾和華森等人。在這篇論文中，我將檢視有關此懷疑論的三個最重要論證。爲了辯護自由的意志弱性行爲之可能性，我將證明此三論證均爲無效。