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## 解析「本質上可爭議的概念」： 三種權力觀的鼎立對峙\*

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\* 本文手稿承蒙鄧若玲小姐仔細閱讀、逐字斟酌、及惠示高見，特此敬申謝忱。

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## 摘要

近二十年來，一些學者逐漸深信，政治理論中某些核心概念的意義，「本質上」即具爭議性，從而導至各種包含相同核心概念但卻彼此對立的不同理論。S. Lukes對於三種權力觀的分析，就是最足以代表此一信念的重要論著，從而使得當代政治理論家面臨一項從未有過的強力挑戰，並引起十分激烈的爭論。在各色各樣的論戰項目中，本文摘取幾個較為根本的課題，進行澈底的解析，希望既能爬梳糾纏不清的爭論端緒，也能化除一些無謂爭執，又能指明一個解決爭端的努力方向。

## 大綱

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## On the Contestability of Political Concepts: Three Views on Power

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### Abstract

One of the more intractable problems of political theory is the highly contested nature of central concepts, such as power, justice, freedom, rights. The apparent lack of a principle for resolving these constestations has led many to espouse the notion that the concepts in question are essentially contested. But the notion of essential contestedness is by no means clear as to how it is being applied.

Steven Lukes' monograph *Power: A Radical View* defends the notion that the concept of power is essentially contested. His exploration presents a challenge to political theorists. It is a challenge that we have not met, but hope to have clarified. In this paper, I want to make a contribution to the wider methodological debate in power theory about essentially contested concepts.