Weber 區位模型一階段與二階段
分析之比較*

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摘　　要

　　一階段分析法與二階段分析法在廠商區位理論文獻中均曾被廣泛地採用，不過就我們所知，尚不曾有人討論過這兩種分析法下廠商最適區位之異同。本文利用 Weber 三角形模型發現當市場是雙佔且產品屬策略性替代時，規模報酬遞增 (遞減) 廠商在二階段分析法下之最適區位必然較一階段分析法接近 (遠離) 產品市場；如果產品屬策略性互補，則其結果正好相反。但是當廠商之生產函數為規模報酬不變時，不論兩產品為策略性互補或替代，此二分析法下之最適廠商區位是一致的。

關鍵詞：韋氏區位；雙佔均衡。

大　　綱

Comparison of Equilibrium Locations
under One-stage and Two-stage Games
in a Weberian Triangle Model
with Duopolistic Market

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Abstract

In the literature on industrial location, both one-stage and two-stage games have been widely used to derive plant location. But to our knowledge, a comparison of the two games has never been explored. In this paper, we set up a Weberian triangle model with duopolistic market to examine this issue. It is shown that if both firms regard their products as strategic substitutes, each firm's optimal location under the two-stage game as relative to the one-stage game is closer to (away from) the output market when its production function exhibits IRS (DRS). This result is reversed if the two products are strategic complements. Moreover, the equilibrium location under the two games are identical if each firm has a CRS production function. This outcome holds true regardless of whether the two products are strategic substitutes or complements.

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