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## 零和或雙贏?兩岸經貿交流新解\*

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雖然兩岸交流不斷持續擴大,但台海雙方對於交流所帶來的利弊得失,卻有極爲不同的評估與關注重點。在台灣方面,雖然肯定兩岸經貿合作所帶來的利益,但也擔憂其可能吞食的經濟及政治苦果。而北京方面也同樣對日趨緊密的兩岸經貿整合懷抱複雜的心態。正因爲台灣與大陸雙方在價值判斷與關心焦點上的重大差異,兩岸的經貿關係呈現一種雙贏與零和並存的特殊現象。爲了解釋此一重要但卻常遭忽略的互動面向,作者引入「相對獲利敏感度」此一變數,嘗試建構一個兩岸經貿互動的賽局模型。從此一模型中,我們導出數項有趣的命題,並以一九九四年至一九九七年間兩岸的經貿交流資料進行實證檢驗。結果大致支持我們的假說:「雙贏」的賽局可能因爲政治互信度的降低而突然零和化。我們的發現與部份現有研究相符,但同時也對一些傳統的論點與看法提出相當的挑戰。

關鍵詞:賽局理論,零和賽局,雙贏,兩岸關係,相對獲利,經濟互 賴,中國統一,台灣獨立,合作,衝突

## 壹、前言

回應李登輝總統的美國之旅,中共於一九九五年六月十六日片面宣佈推

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# Zero-sum or Win-win? A Reinterpretation of Cross-strait Economic Exchanges

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#### ABSTRACT

Despite continuing and expanding interactions across the Taiwan Strait, the two sides emphasize different concerns and have divergent perspectives on calculating the costs and benefits of these exchanges. While appreciating the benefits brought by cross-strait economic cooperation, Taipei has serious concerns for possible adverse effects on Taiwan's political and economic security. For its part, Beijing has also mixed feelings about the increasing economic integration between the two sides. The marked differences in their respective values and concerns contribute to a mixture of win-win and zero-sum situations in cross-strait economic relations, with the former type of situation advancing mutual cooperation while the latter impeding it. To account for this important but oft-neglected aspect of Taipei-Beijing interactions, we construct a two-player game-theoretic model by incorporating the variable of sensitivity to relative gains (SRG). Several interesting propositions are derived from the model and tested against the empirical data of cross-strait economic and trade exchanges between 1994 and 1997. Our hypotheses were largely verified. While supporting some existing observations, our findings also pose serious challenges to much conventional wisdom on Taipei-Beijing interactions.

Key Words: Game Theory, Zero-Sum Game, Win-Win,
Cross-Strait Relations, Relative-Gains,
Economic Interdependence, Chinese Reunification,
Taiwan Independence, Cooperation, Conflict