

# Gender Culture as Economic Determinant: Household Resource Allocation Strategies Among Ethnic Groups in Taiwan<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

It is commonly believed among people in Taiwan that patriarchal culture among the Taiwanese is stronger than that among the mainlanders. In this study, I examine whether such ethnically different patriarchal cultures exist from the angle of domestic resource allocation against two main theoretical perspective: (1) The altruistic parental behavior argued by new home economists; and (2) The patriarchal family system advocated by feminist scholars. To examine the above two views, material flows between parents and children are analyzed to see if reciprocal relationships exist between parents' investment on children and children's obligations to parents' old age support using empirical data from two large national social surveys. The parental investment on children is measured by educational investment and inheritance practices. The material flows from adult children to parents are measured by several indicators: daughters' age of starting working, daughters' control over own earnings, sons' and daughters' shares of parents' living costs, medical expenditures, and the living arrangements of the parents. Based on findings in this research, I argue that ethnic variations of gender inequalities in postwar Taiwan can be understood

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as the result of the interplay between economic rationality and patriarchal family culture. Patriarchal family systems operate within, and respond toward the encompassing economic world. The existing ethnic division of labor and other institutional factors provide structurally distinctive grounds for rational calculation. Based on these distinct calculi, different ethnic households reshape gender-biased resource allocation strategies to make the most out of their economic situations.

**Key Words:** intergenerational contract theory, household resource allocation, patriarchal culture, ethnic groups

## Introduction

There is a common saying among people in Taiwan: "If you look for a wife, find a Hakka woman; if you look for a husband, find a Mainlander man." In addition to the common perception that the patriarchal culture among the Taiwanese is stronger than that among the Mainlanders, Hakka women have earned themselves a reputation as being the most competent and hard-working housewives among women of all groups (Chang, 1995). It is difficult to judge to what extent these ethnic stereotypes reflect reality. However, if the ethnically different gender roles suggested by these social perceptions do exist, they have important economic implications on the well-being of men and women of different ethnic groups.

Different domestic roles of women could significantly affect their labor market behaviors and work returns. If members of different ethnic groups have distinct attitudes toward gender roles and domestic division of labor, the connection between a person's domestic role and paid work may actually suggest a variation of gender stratification among different ethnic groups in Taiwan. If different patriarchal cultures among ethnic groups mean different extents of favoring male over female members, women's distributive shares in domestic resources relative to men's may vary across ethnic groups as well.

Economic gaps between men and women are deeply rooted in the domestic life of individuals. Household plays a critical role in determining the economic differences by gender mainly by two ways: 1) as the major site of reproductive work; and 2) as an important device of resource distribution.

For the household as the major site of reproductive work, household members are assigned varied tasks and responsibilities, which in turn, affect their labor market decisions or restrict their work-related choices in different ways. For example, the availability of child care facilities, reproduction patterns, family sizes, and the kinship structure in terms of providing reciprocal child care services can be major determinants of women's employment decision; yet they are only minor considerations for men.

For the household as a device of resource distribution, domestic resource allocation takes various forms, such as food allotment and human capital investment among family members, and transmission of endowments and assets from parents to children. In turn, individuals' competitiveness in the labor market and their non-human capital assets and endowments differentiate. For instance, social conventions of gender-biased inheritance rights could suggest an economic gap between men and women that is actually greater than what is suggested by the earning gap between gender.

This study aims at exploring the household resource allocation strategy as an important way of shaping gender inequality. The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to examine the existence of the commonly believed different gender cultures among the three main ethnic groups, namely, the Mainlander, the Hakka and the Hokien, in post-war Taiwan; (2) to seek out the domestic origins of such an ethnic pattern of gender inequality in terms of household resource allocations and parental investment strategies; and (3) to examine two competing theoretical perspectives: the economic rationality model argued by the new home economists, and a feminist perspective represented by Susan Greenhalgh's intergenerational contract theory, with our findings. Due to data constraint, our discussion on ethnic stratification and ethnic variations in domestic life is restricted to the postwar years until the late 1980s.

## **Historical Background and Structural Factors**

In order to understand the ethnic differences in family resource allocation in postwar Taiwan, an examination of such issue in a large historical context is required. Chinese Mainlanders are incorporated into Taiwanese society around 1950. Since then, an ethnic division of labor among Mainlanders, Hakkas and Hokiens has been shaped by varied historical factors

in postwar Taiwan.<sup>2</sup> Among these factors, some have profound implications on differentiating economic opportunities for members of different ethnic groups, especially on ethnic variations of family resources allocation. They include: 1) the ethnic segregation in the public and private sectors and in different industrial sectors; 2) a state welfare system that provides generous subsidies to public employees and their family members; 3) the uneven geographical distribution of the three ethnic groups; 4) the state's industrial policies within a changing international division of labor.

First of all, since a large proportion of Mainlanders come to Taiwan as civil servants and soldiers of the retreating Chinese Nationalist government and the public sector is used as the major shelter for the newcomers, the share of public employees among Mainlander immigrants is disproportionately large. In contrast to the Mainlanders' concentration in the public sector and the service sector, Hokiens and Hakkas have been crowded into the private sector, concentrating in agricultural and manufacturing occupations, petty commodity production, and other service jobs. Besides, since the state's welfare system is made available mostly, if not exclusively, to public employees, the ethnic segregation in the public/private sectors also leads to an ethnically different pattern of shares on state's welfare benefits, including health insurance, pension, public dormitory, substantial subsidies for the children's tuition and other kinds of fringe benefits.

Geographical distribution of different ethnic groups further enhances the occupational segregation and differentiates the economic situations of the three ethnic groups. Mainlanders tend to concentrate in urban areas where more service jobs are available, while Hokiens and Hakkas tend to spread over rural areas of the island where the dominant employment opportunities are of agricultural and manufacturing production in nature.

Given this ethnic division of labor, the state's economic policies and industrial strategies affect the economic variations among these ethnic groups. The land reform carried out in the early 1950s replaces the big landlord class with a large number of small tillers. Later in the 1960s, in response to a new international division of labor, the state's development strategy changed from utilizing an import-substitution policy to an export-oriented policy. The policy changed from utilizing an agricultural sector to

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2 For a detailed analysis on the historical development of ethnic relationships and the formation of ethnic division of labor after 1945, see F. Wang, 1989, 1993; Johnson, 1990; M. Chang, 1993; H. Lin, 1995.

promoting industrial development facilitates a booming manufacturing sector at the cost of the worsening economic condition of agricultural households. Rapid industrialization in the 1960s and 70s gave rise to numerous flourishing private enterprises in the manufacturing sector, while concurrently leading to a shrinking agricultural sector.

These historically specific institutional factors function as major alignments for the economic stratification of the three ethnic groups in the post-war Taiwan. Although they have no direct implications on unequal resource distribution between sexes, I claim that families of different ethnic origins, in response to this ethnic division of labor and the structure of economic opportunity, develop different household strategies in raising sons and daughters and thus produce ethnically different patterns of gender inequality in domestic arena.

## Literature Review

The gender-biased household strategies and parental investment on children are often examined with two major perspectives: 1) the altruistic parental behavior argued by the new home economists; and 2) the patriarchal family system advocated by feminist scholars. The new home economists see the unequal household resources allocation among male and female offspring as more economic in maximizing the wealth of the entire family (Becker, 1993). People are selfish in the market, yet they are altruistic at home because altruism is a more effective way of allocating resources in families. The altruism in the family encourages domestic division of labor and an efficient allocation of resources. A household assigns its members to investments and activities that maximize the household output of commodities without regard to incentives (Becker, 1993:48). And the factors that determine the household resources allocation are basically the quality and quantity of children. Since marginal rates of return would be higher for abler children, parents will invest more in them in education and training.

By the same token, existing gender discriminating practices in the labor market will affect parents' expected marginal rates of returns from children's education thus, parents invest more in sons, which is particularly so when subject to family income constraints. Poorer families, with even tighter budget constraints, have to face the conflict between efficiency and equity more than do rich families.

Larger investments in sons do not imply that parents prefer sons, but

only indicate that rates of return are higher on investments in sons. Investments in sons are more profitable in poor countries than are investments in daughters. This explains the evident tendency of favoring sons over daughters in such areas (Becker, 1993:192-93). According to this view, such household resources allocation has nothing to do with intra-household power relationships. Becker's mathematical model of family altruism suggests that the "optimal reallocation" of family income can be reached through altruism and voluntary contributions, even when the household head does not have sovereign power.

If Becker's view has general implications for household resources allocation in different societies, the view of patriarchal tradition has a significant implication for developing societies like East Asian countries. Literature adopting such a view often focuses on the negative effects of economic development interwoven with patriarchy systems on women's share of household resources (Boserup, 1970; Nash and Fernández-Kelly, 1983; Greenhalgh, 1985; Cheng and Hsiung, 1993). Beginning in the 1960s, the manufacturing sectors of the developed countries have shifted rapidly to the less developed world due to lower labor costs and taxes, and lax regulations. To take advantage of this opportunity, both the capitalist state and the patriarchal family play active roles in the process of national development by placing women in the most disadvantaged, exploited position in the economic system.

Some theorists of this camp pay further attention to the intra-household power relations and unequal resources allocation between genders and generations (Benería and Roldán, 1987; Greenhalgh, 1985; Guyer and Peters, 1987; D. Wolf, 1990). Many empirical researches and field works on women's work in Taiwan also suggest a parental strategy at the household level which draws heavily upon a patriarchal family system (M. Wolf, 1972; Kung, 1983; Greenhalgh, 1985; Niehoff, 1987; Gates, 1987; D. Wolf, 1990). Among them, Greenhalgh's theory on intergenerational contracts in Taiwanese households provides a thorough theoretical framework on how the patriarchal family strategies function.

Greenhalgh's theory can be summarized as follows: Parents apply different child-raising strategies to sons and daughters so as to maximize their own benefits. These strategies and the relationship between parents and children can be seen as sets of implicit contracts about expected flows of material and non-material goods. Unlike new home economists who emphasize the relatively low rates of return from females as the core of parents'

calculus, Greenhalgh bases her argument on the different family memberships of sons and daughters. The parent-child contracts vary by gender and favor sons over daughters in investment because sons are life-long members of the family, while daughters are temporary members whose contracts last only until their marriage. Thus, the contracts between parents and daughters resemble a balanced exchange in which one thing is exchanged for another of equivalent value with little delay. By contrast, contracts between parents and sons resemble a generalized exchange in which transactions, although appearing to be altruistic, generate counter-obligations. The repayment need not be equivalent in value and may take place in a much longer time frame.

Because their long-term well-being and old-age support depend on their sons, parents invest as much as they can in their sons' education, skills, and the like. By contrast, daughters are only short-term members of the family. In addition to helping around the house, daughters are only educated to the degree necessary to get a paying job outside the home so that parents can extract more from them in a shorter time. With only a few years to repay the debt for their upbringing and marriage, daughters are expected to begin repayment early. For parents with limited resources, a strategy for greater investment in sons' education is to educate the daughters a little and send them out to work and use their incomes to pay for higher education for the sons (Greenhalgh, 1985). The patriarchal kinship system and daughters' situation in it, as described by Greenhalgh, are well acknowledged in other studies on women in Taiwan (M. Wolf, 1972; Kung, 1983; Gates, 1987).

At the empirical level, William Parish and Robert Willis use the LCW survey data to examine different models of parental investment in the education of sons and daughters in Taiwan (1993). Their findings generally support the altruistic perspective of the new home economics and disagree with the patriarchal model. Parish and Willis argue that in Taiwan, parental investment in children's education is conditionally altruistic. When confronted by scarce resources, parents "were forced to favor sons, who provided the family's long-term security" (1993:868). Due to credit constraints, early born children in large families do poorly, especially if they are female and can, hence, marry early. Along with the rapid economic development in Taiwan, once families have more income, more savings for old age, and greater social benefits at the workplace, sons and daughters begin to get more equal education.

As a matter of fact, the conditional altruism as argued by Parish and

Willis is not necessarily at odds with a patriarchal view grounded in economic rationality, at least in terms of the material flow from parents to children. Credit constraints certainly affect parents' decisions on how to allocate limited resources and force them to choose among different children. What distinguishes an altruistic perspective from a patriarchal one is that, in the patriarchy model, the material flows between parents and children are quid pro quo exchanges. Since sons' material return is expected to be long-term, parents are willing to invest more in them when encountering credit constraints. That is, although appearing to be altruistic, parents' investment in children mainly reflects their concern over their own welfare. The key point of the patriarchy perspective is how sons and daughters repay their parents according to different terms. To test the altruistic and the patriarchal perspectives, therefore, requires an examination on the material flow from children to parents to see if there are links between different parental investments and children's repayments. In this study, I will examine the material flows from parents to children and those from children to parents in various aspects.

## Research Method and Data

Two large-scale nationwide social survey data sets are used for quantitative analyses in this project: (1) "A General Survey of Social Change in Taiwan" (*Taiwan diqu shehui bianqian jiben diaocha*)<sup>3</sup> (hereafter SC); and (2) "The Survey on the Living Condition of Women in Taiwan" (*Taiwan diqu funü shenghuo zhuangkuang diaocha*) (hereafter LCW) conducted in 1989. Two SC data sets are used in this project: one conducted in 1990 (SC90-1, SC90-2) and one conducted in 1991 (SC91-1). Respondents for the SC surveys are selected by proportionate two-stage random sampling conducted island-wide. After aborigines and foreigners are excluded, the SC90-2 survey contains 2,498 valid cases, and SC91-1 survey contains 2415 valid cases. The LCW survey uses the national family income survey (16,434 households) conducted by the government in 1988 as the sampling population. A two-stage random sampling procedure was then used to draw 4,328 women from the total population of 16,434 households. Using this criteria,

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3 The surveys were funded through a grant from National Science Council, Republic of China (NSC 78-0301-H001-23 for SC90-2; NSC 80-0301-H001-31-B1 for SC91-1), and conducted by Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.



there are 3,803 valid cases in this survey.

There are problems and restrictions in making analyses across different data sets. Since none of the data alone contains the major variables required for testing our hypotheses, there is no better alternative other than to proceed with caution. Some data restrictions and problems are addressed as follows:

(1) There are discrepancies in sampling population and in categorization of ethnic groups between the SC surveys and the LCW survey. The SC surveys have three ethnic background categories, namely the Hokien, the Hakka, and the Mainlanders, whereas the LCW survey only distinguishes the Taiwanese from Mainlanders.<sup>4</sup> The differences between the Hokien and the Hakka cannot be distinguished in the latter. Furthermore, since the ethnic categories in the LCW data are based on information regarding the respondent's place of origin (rather than the self-identified ethnicity, as in the SC surveys), the aborigines are included in the category of Taiwanese. Nevertheless, the very small population of the aborigines in Taiwan (approximately 1% of the total population) minimizes the possible distortion. To cope with problems posed by collapsing Hokiens and Hakkas, the SC data on topics similar to those analyzed with the LCW data are also presented to show the differences between Hokiens and Hakkas.

(2) Although the intermarried persons and their families deserve special attention,<sup>5</sup> such treatment is difficult. Neither the SC surveys nor the LCW survey contains data on the ethnic background of the respondent's parents, which make an analysis on how the family ethnic background affects one's status attainment impossible. The ethnicity of respondent's spouse provided in the SC91-1 and the LCW survey, is only used in examining the differences of gender culture at home among Taiwanese, Mainlander, and intermarried couples.

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4 Although the ethnic boundary between the Hokien and the Hakka can be found in many aspects of daily life, the historical experiences and political situations the two groups have shared since the Japanese colonial era have also provided them a common identity of being "Taiwanese" in addition to their own Hokien or Hakka group identity. Therefore, the Hokien and Hakka are sometimes regarded as two subethnic groups of the "Taiwanese" as well.

5 According to the result of a social survey conducted in 1991, about 94.1% of Taiwanese had a Taiwanese spouse, and only 5.9% of Taiwanese had a Mainlander spouse. For Mainlanders, 50.4% had a Mainlander spouse and 49.6% had a Taiwanese spouse (F. Wang 1993:81). For a detailed analysis of this topic, see F. Wang (1993, 1994).

(3) Although both the SC surveys and the LCW survey have relatively large sample sizes and reliable representative samples, restrictions do exist. Since LCW survey selects samples from households with at least one woman aged 25 to 59 only, single men are left out from the sample. This exclusion would particularly affect the first generation Mainlander soldiers, among them many are trapped in the lowest rank of society and have never married. Social experiences of this group are absent from the LCW survey.

Besides, the interethnic marriage rate in LCW data is lower than those found in other related studies.<sup>6</sup> This could be due to the fact that the range of respondents' age (25-59 years old) is narrower than that of some other large-scale social surveys containing data on ethnicity (usually 20-65 years of age), such as SC and Social Image surveys. LCW sample truncates the oldest and the youngest population, while the highly unbalanced sex ratio among first generation Mainlanders and the ethnic assimilation process in later years could have positive effect on the interethnic marriage rates of these two age groups (F. Wang, 1994). Since intermarried women tend to have higher education than those who married men from the same group (F. Wang, 1994), the lower interethnic marriage rate in LCW sample also links to an educational distribution profile that is lower than that of the population. This representative problem needs to be bare in mind while examining the data on intermarried couples, such as in Table 6, 7, and 12.

## Findings and Analysis

My findings suggest that in Taiwan, Greenhalgh's theory of intergenerational contract can better explain the material relationships between parents and children than Becker's altruistic model. Greenhalgh's argument is based on a small-size, all-Taiwanese sample.<sup>7</sup> With the inclusion of ethnic variations in this research, I find that, although the argument of parent-child contract relationship is generally valid, the contents of contracts vary among ethnic groups, especially between the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. Although the investment pattern of favoring sons over daughters holds across the ethnic line, different locations in the economic structure provide distinct contexts for shaping different parental calculations.

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6 I have to thank one of the two anonymous reviewers pointed out to this matter.

7 Her study conducted in 1978-1980 is based on a longitudinal study of 80 families in northern Taiwan. The sample is limited to Taiwanese families.

Greenhalgh claims that different gender socialization and child-raising strategies are, at heart, economic (1985:266). However, I suspect that gender socialization is affected by different demographic traits and group sub-cultures as well. To be more specific, family memberships of sons and daughters are not necessarily a fixed cultural consensus for all ethnic groups. For Mainlanders, a migrant group, their unique family structure and social relations redefine the terms of memberships for daughters. Although it may be premature to conclude that the contract term between Mainlander parents and daughters is longer than that of Hokiens and Hakkas, my findings indicate that Mainlander parents invest relatively more in their daughters and expect higher return from them, too. The concept of a "contract" appropriately describes the corresponding relationship between the rights and obligations of parents and children.

My analysis of the findings is divided into three parts and discussed in the following sections: (1) the different structural incentives for parental investments in children's education among ethnic groups; (2) the children's corresponding obligations to parents; and (3) gender role socialization among different ethnic groups.

## **1. Parental Investment**

### **A. Cost and Opportunity Cost of Children's Education**

Most empirical studies on educational opportunities in Taiwan agree on the unequal educational opportunities between men and women (Hsieh 1987, 1992; Tsai & Chiu 1988; Tsai & Wen 1985; Tsay 1985). However, there is not much consensus on the ethnic gaps of educational opportunities (Huang 1990; Hsieh 1992; Tsai 1988; Lin and Lin 1993). In Table 1, gender and ethnic distribution of education is presented to show the human capital differences after ethnic background is taken into consideration. Although men generally enjoy higher education over women, this educational advantage does not hold true between Taiwanese men (both Hokien and Hakka) and Mainlander women. The educational profiles for both Mainlander males and females are skewed toward the middle-to-high end of the education ladder (from high school to university level), while those for Hokiens and Hakkas are concentrated on the lower-to-middle range of the education ladder (from primary school to high school level).

The ethnic differences in education are particularly overt between Mainlanders and the other two groups. The results suggest that ethnic gaps in education are very similar for both genders. For both men and women,

**Table 1. Educational Distribution by Gender & Ethnic Background**

Column pct	Male			Female		
	Hokien	Hakka	Mainlander	Hokien	Hakka	Mainlander
<b>Primary</b>	31.6	27.0	11.7	43.7	38.3	7.7
<b>Middle</b>	19.6	18.9	8.6	16.9	15.8	8.3
<b>High</b>	27.9	36.5	35.0	24.4	31.7	46.8
<b>College</b>	10.4	10.1	19.0	8.8	7.7	16.7
<b>University</b>	9.2	6.1	24.5	5.7	5.5	17.3
<b>Graduate</b>	1.4	1.4	1.2	.5	1.1	3.2
Total cases	868	148	163	979	183	156


Chi-square=75.7027      P- value=.0000

Chi-square=123.1008      P- value=.0000

Data source: SC90-1 and SC90-2

\* Respondents born before 1949 are excluded

Hokiens and Hakkas share similar patterns of educational distribution which look very different from that of Mainlanders. These different patterns can be further demonstrated by ethnically different gender gaps in educational achievement presented in Chart 1. The y-axis in Chart 1 is constructed by subtracting the percentage of males with the percentage of females in each educational category across ethnic line. The gender gap patterns suggest that both Hokien and Hakka women concentrated on

**Chart 1. Educational Differences of Men & Women, by Ethnicity**

lowest end of educational ladder. By contrast, Mainlander women concentrated on the senior high school level.

In the above section, I have briefly discussed some historically specific institutional factors that could produce the ethnic/gender differences in educational achievement. These factors are examined more closely here. The state's welfare policy has significant effect on the public employees' children's education. Although the amount of educational subsidies varies among the covered groups (Jungongjiao, i.e. the military personnel, the public employees, and the employees of educational institutes), employees of the public sector as a whole receive substantial subsidies for their children's tuition. On the average, public employees' children who study at public universities receive subsidies equal to 77.9% of tuition, and those who study at private universities receive 84.5% of tuition. The minimum subsidy granted to children of the public employees at university level is almost 60% (C. Chang, 1992:33). If education is a rational investment, such a substantial advantage in educational cost over the non-public employees should be an important incentive for public employees, many of them Mainlanders, to invest more on children's education.

Nevertheless, the expenditure on children's education does not reflect the overall cost to parents. The opportunity cost of children's education, that is, the potential loss for parents by sending children to school, is a factor in the parents' calculation as well. To put it in economic terms, the opportunity cost for a daughter's schooling includes helping in the field, doing child care, domestic chores, home-based productive work, or a salary from a waged job, and so on. The opportunity cost of a daughter's education varies by the area in which the family lives.

In the economic development of Taiwan, job opportunities increased drastically in the mid-1960s and the 1970s. These new job opportunities came mostly from the labor-intensive manufacturing industries. Of the 4,431,000 new jobs created between 1965 and 1990, 51% was unskilled production work (K. Wang, 1991:9). This modern industrial sector depended largely on adolescents (Gates, 1979). The increase of labor demand in manufacturing industries drove up the wage level and further increased the opportunity costs for schooling daughters. As Hill Gates and others have pointed out, among all types of households, petty bourgeoisie households (such as farming, small owner-operator stores, small enterprises, family factories) mostly needed a large and flexible labor supply. By self-exploitation of its underpaid or unpaid family members, these petty bourgeoisie survived and

maintained their competitiveness in the market (Gates, 1979:397-402; Lu, 1992).

Children of petty bourgeoisie often leave school earlier to work for the family or to take a factory job. This is particularly true for daughters, since sons are usually expected to advance their education or career training. By contrast, the new urban middle class parents do not expect their children to work, or even help with household chores (Gates, 1979:400). On the one hand, the urban middle class households have no need of family labor for their productive work. On the other hand, entrance examinations for schools beyond the compulsory education level are so competitive that students have to study very hard to get in.

Due to the ethnically uneven distribution in geographical areas, industrial sectors, and employment status, the calculation of the cost and opportunity cost of education could lead to an ethnically different preferences on sons' and daughters' education. If the family strategy of making full use of its female labor is adopted, the education of daughters would most likely be discontinued as soon as possible—either right after the compulsory education or, if a high school degree is required to obtain a factory job, after high school. A crosstabulation of expectation on children's education is conducted to check the difference in parental preferences (Table 2). The pattern of educational expectation agrees with the rational calculation of children's educational cost. The Mainlanders' educational expectation for both boys and girls is the highest among all groups, followed by Hakkas, and then Hokiens. The gender gap in educational expectation exists in all three groups; however, the percentages of Hokiens and Hakkas who believe girls should receive no more than high school education are much higher than that of Mainlanders (69% and 65.4% vs. 49.9%, respectively). The figures for the sons' expected education are 56.5% for Hokiens, 49% for Hakkas, and 37.6% for Mainlanders.

Moreover, if the preference for children's education is affected by the class background or the need of family labor, the willingness to invest in children's education should vary by the parent's class background as well. To verify this argument, I use children's private tutoring activities (*buxi*)<sup>8</sup> as the indicator of parents' willingness to invest in children's education and examine the class differences in this regard. Private tutoring, a common

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8 This variable is reconstructed from 5 variables of *buxi*, such as private tutoring at school, at teacher's place, at private institutes, etc.

**Table 2. Expectation on Educational Attainment of Boys and Girls by Ethnicity (How much education should a boy/girl have?)****1A. Hokien**

Total %(N) <i>Edu of Boys</i>	<i>Education of Girls</i>					Row Total
	<i>P r i- mary</i>	<i>Junior hi</i>	<i>Senior hi</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>U n i v e r- sity</i>	
<b>Primary</b>	.5(9)	.1(1)	.1(1)			.6(11)
<b>Junior hi</b>	.3(5)	6.7(116)	.5(8)			7.5(129)
<b>Senior hi</b>	.1(1)	4.0(69)	43.9(758)	.3(5)	.2(4)	48.4(837)
<b>College</b>		.2(3)	9.5(165)	13.5(234)	.3(5)	23.6(407)
<b>University</b>	.1(1)	.1(1)	3.2(55)	3.6(62)	13.0(225)	19.9(344)
<b>Column Total</b>	.9(16)	11.0(190)	57.1(987)	17.4(301)	13.5(234)	100.0(1728)

Chi-square: 3349.491

P-value: .0000

**1B. Hakka**

Total %(N) <i>Edu of Boys</i>	<i>Education of Girls</i>					Row Total
	<i>P r i- mary</i>	<i>Junior hi</i>	<i>Senior hi</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>U n i v e r- sity</i>	
<b>Primary</b>	1.6(5)					1.6(5)
<b>Junior hi</b>	.3(1)	2.9(9)				3.2(10)
<b>Senior hi</b>	.1(1)	1.3(4)	42.6(133)	.3(1)		44.2(138)
<b>College</b>		.3(1)	11.2(35)	13.8(43)	1.0(3)	26.3(82)
<b>University</b>			5.1(16)	5.1(16)	14.4(45)	24.7(77)
<b>Column Total</b>	1.9(6)	4.5(14)	59.0(184)	19.2(60)	15.4(48)	100.0(312)

Chi-square: 691.124

P-value: .0000

**1C. Mainlander**

Total %(N) <i>Edu of Boys</i>	<i>Education of Girls</i>					Row Total
	<i>P r i- mary</i>	<i>Junior hi</i>	<i>Senior hi</i>	<i>College</i>	<i>U n i v e r- sity</i>	
<b>Primary</b>	.6(2)			.3(1)		1 (3)
<b>Junior hi</b>	.3(1)	2.3(7)	.3(1)	.3(1)		3.2(10)
<b>Senior hi</b>		2.6(8)	30.9(96)			33.4(104)
<b>College</b>			10.3(32)	24.4(76)	.3(1)	35 (109)
<b>University</b>			2.6(8)	5.1(16)	19.6(61)	27.3(85)
<b>Column Total</b>	1.0(3)	4.8(15)	44.1(137)	30.2(94)	19.9(62)	100.0(311)

Chi-square: 582.720

P-value: .0000

Data source for all three tables: SC90-2

practice in Taiwan, differs in kind and charge. Table 3 shows the average numbers of private tutoring activities (out of five types of private tutoring) that respondents' children have been involved in during their school years. In general, parents invest more in a son's education than in a daughter's, even after the effects of ethnic background and a father's work status are controlled. A father's work status does have an effect on the extra investment in children's education, especially for daughters. Girls whose fathers are classified as self-employed or family workers have the least chances of getting private tutoring, particularly among the Taiwanese. When fathers are public or private employees, the daughters' private tutoring activities are almost identical, regardless of ethnic background (1.6 for Hokiens and Mainlanders, and 1.5 for Hakkas). However, the same pattern is not found for sons.

Boys with self-employed fathers do have fewer private tutoring activities compared to boys from other class backgrounds. However, boys whose fathers work as family workers have more private tutoring activities than that of the employed (2.5 vs. 1.9). The private tutoring activities for boys and girls suggest that a father's work status is an important determinant for the girls' extra educational investment, while it is not the case for sons' education across ethnic lines. On the contrary, ethnic preference is a determinant for the extra educational investment in sons but not in daughters. For sons, Mainlanders do show a consistently higher willingness/afford ability than do Hokiens and Hakkas to pay more for their sons' education, controlling for father's work status. However, ethnicity does not appear to be an important determinant in the daughters' extra educational investment. The differences between sons' and daughters' buxi activities are statistically significant at .01 level.

## **B. Inheritance Right**

In addition to the unequal preferences of educational investments between sons and daughters, another important dimension of the parent-to-children material flow is the parental property division. Although laws have been enacted in Taiwan to protect the equal inheritance right of daughters, more often than not, the inheritance practices follow the custom that favors sons and discriminates against daughters. Some anthropologists studying the property rights of sons and daughters in Taiwanese communities find that even before the family division takes place, sons are endowed with or encouraged to own tangible assets, while daughters are endowed with con-



**Table 3. Average Buxi (Private Tutoring) Activities of Children by Ethnicity, Father's Employment Status, and Sex of Children**

Means (Cases)	Sons			Sons		
	<u>Hokien</u>	<u>Hakka</u>	<u>Mainlander</u>	<u>Hokien</u>	<u>Hakka</u>	<u>Mainlander</u>
<b>Employer</b>	2.547 (53)	1.500 (6)	4.500 (4)	2.581 (74)	2.000 (5)	1.750 (12)
<b>Employed</b>	1.865 (126)	1.957 (23)	2.222 (27)	1.629 (280)	1.511 (45)	1.625 (56)
<b>Self-employed</b>	1.630 (92)	1.286 (14)	2.000 (3)	1.390 (123)	0.813 (16)	1.750 (8)
<b>Family worker</b>	2.476 (21)	1.500 (2)	— (0)	1.429 (49)	0.833 (6)	0.667 (3)

Data source: SC91-1

(N=1048)

## ANOVA Summary Table: Sons and Daughters

<i>Source</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>
Between groups	25.754	1	25.754	9.781
Within groups	2754.169	1046	2.633	

\* P = .0018

sumer durables for their dowries (Greenhalgh, 1985; R. Gallin, 1991; Kung, 1983:118).

Since sons are life-long members of family and are responsible for the parents' well-being as well as being providers of old age support, they are entitled to inherit the major share of family property. The daughters, however, are entitled to receive their dowries as their patrimonies and have no right to claim their inheritance from the family division (R. Gallin, 1991:78). Although the information on actual values of parental property inheritance are not available in the LCW survey, I try to examine whether the gender-biased inheritance practice exists and the effect of sibling size on it. Also, if the argument of ethnically different contracts is valid, the parental property inheritance, as a form of intergenerational material flows, would be ethnically different as well and would be similar to what we found in educational investment.

First, I compare the attitude differences regarding parental property division across gender and ethnic groups. The findings of the parents' attitude toward family property division are quite interesting (see Table 4A). Although the gender and ethnic differences in this regard are somewhat

consistent with those of education, the overwhelming majority of every ethnic group supports, or claims to support, the equal sharing of family property for sons and daughters. As expected, females tend to support the equal property right more than males, and Mainlanders tend to do so more than the Hokien and Hakka. However, the proportions of population with the traditional attitude of favoring sons are very small, ranging from 9.4% to 29.9%.

**Table 4A How Should Parental Property be Divided?**

Column pct (Count)	Hokien		Hakka		Mainlander	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<b>son(s) get all or more equal share for son(s) &amp; daughter(s)</b>	29.2 (185)	25.8 (188)	29.9 (32)	19.5 (25)	17.3 (18)	9.4 (10)
	70.8 (448)	74.2 (540)	70.1 (75)	80.5 (103)	82.7 (86)	90.6 (96)

Data source: SC90-2

(N=1806)

The inheritance practice, however, is quite different from self-proclaimed attitude (see Table 4B). Among Taiwanese respondents who had experienced family division, cases in which daughters actually inherited anything only account for 14.9%, and the figure for Mainlanders is only 27.6%. There are two possible reasons for such an inconsistency between attitude and practice. First, the attitude question measures attitudes regarding family division of a respondent's generation, while the actual family division practice often reflects the decision of the respondent's parents. There could be a distinct generation gap in attitude toward family division and toward gender roles in general.

Second, the gap between attitude and practice could reflect the gap between social desirability and common practices. People (particularly men) know that it is inappropriate to express their gender discriminatory view during the interview, yet they act that way. Nevertheless, I tend to agree less with the second reason. A custom, such as the gender difference in family property division, that can be so commonly followed must have its legitimate grounding in social consensus. People follow this custom because they see it as appropriate. A possible explanation hinges on the way people define "equal share." At family division, properties often are given to family members directly rather than being sold and then the proceeds divided. What some refer to as "equal share" may be understood as "fair share." In

other words, every member gets something, while each share is not necessarily equal in monetary term. The pattern shown in Table 4B, that sons get real estate properties while daughters get cash,<sup>9</sup> may serve as such an example.

To analyze the gender/ethnic pattern of family division, the prerequisite is that there are family properties to be divided. Many believe that Mainlanders are economically disadvantaged in postwar Taiwan because

**Table 4B Who Actually Got What in the Division of Parental Property**

Column pct (Count)	(percentage in its ethnic group population)			
	Taiwanese		Mainlander	
	Daughter(s)	Son(s)*	Daughter(s)	Son(s)*
<b>Land</b>	4.6	62.9	6.0	41.0
	(43)	(582)	(5)	(34)
<b>House</b>	2.6	12.6	6.0	16.9
	(24)	(117)	(5)	(14)
<b>Cash</b>	6.2	2.2	9.6	3.6
	(57)	(20)	(8)	(3)
<b>Others*</b>	1.5	0.3	6.0	0.0
	(14)	(3)	(5)	(0)

Data source: LCW \*Other parental properties include business properties, stocks, etc.

Note: 1. Respondents who have no siblings are excluded.

2. As answered by female respondents; answers are recoded. Respondents who claimed either "self" or "sisters" got some share of a particular item of parental property are recoded as "daughters." Respondants who answered "brothers" are recoded as "sons" for that item.

9 Since the result shown in Table 4B is based on female respondents' claims, the gender bias may be a concern. Nonetheless, I believe, except for cash, these answers are relatively reliable. Since the transfers of land and houses have to be registered officially anyway, respondents' concern regarding tax is minimized in the case of land and house inheritance. The results of these two items should not be distorted in a gender specific manner. This tax concern, however, may affect the actual cash flow reported. The fact that the total percentages of cash inheritance within each ethnic group are quite small (8.4% for Taiwanese and 13.2% for Mainlanders) further raises our suspicion of underreported cash transfer. Nevertheless, with regard to the ethnic pattern of property division, we have no reason to suspect the results are underreported in ethnically different ways.

they came to Taiwan with no land or houses. As a result, their children, unlike their Taiwanese counterparts, have little property to inherit. The results presented in Table 4C suggest that Mainlanders' economic disadvantage in property ownership does exist, especially among the first generation. However, although it does not disappear altogether, this economic disadvantage has decreased for the second generation of Mainlanders who are born in Taiwan. For the pre-1949 generation, the percentage of Mainlanders who claim no family property to be divided is 57.7%, about 20% higher than that of the Taiwanese.<sup>10</sup> The percentage of Mainlanders who claim to have no family property to divide decreases to 41%, and the gap with their Taiwanese counterparts narrows to 12.8%.

**Table 4C Has Parental Property Been Divided?**

Column pct (Count)	Before 1949		After 1949	
	Taiwanese	Mainlander	Taiwanese	Mainlander
<b>Yes, or partially</b>	42.0 (515)	25.5 (50)	19.2 (380)	10.1 (24)
<b>Only net debt</b>	0.2 (2)	0.5 (1)	0.2 (3)	0.0 (0)
<b>Not yet</b>	20.3 (249)	16.3 (32)	52.5 (1037)	49.0 (117)
<b>None to divide</b>	37.5 (459)	57.7 (113)	28.2 (557)	41.0 (98)
Chi-square	32.622		22.621	
P-value	.0000		.0002	

Data source: LCW

N=3637

Furthermore, the ethnic inheritance pattern we find here does not support the argument that, with limited resources, Mainlanders invest more in their children's education because they invest less in real estate and other business ventures. Although Mainlanders tend to invest more in children's education, their house investment is no less than that of Taiwanese. Mainlanders who have experienced parental property division are disadvantaged

<sup>10</sup> Since many Mainlanders of the first generation came to Taiwan when they were too young to take part in the division of their families in China, this figure is not surprising.

concerning land ownership,<sup>11</sup> yet they certainly show no disadvantage in the ownership of houses compared to Taiwanese (see Table 4B). Compared to the 67.5% of Taiwanese (4.7% for daughters plus 62.8% for sons) who inherited land at family division, only 47% of Mainlanders (6% for daughters, 41% for sons) inherited land. By contrast, the proportion of Mainlanders who inherited houses is higher than that of the Taiwanese (22.9% vs. 15.2%).<sup>12</sup>

Regarding the gender gap in inheritance right, the ethnic pattern is consistent with the pattern we found above: both Taiwanese and Mainlander women are highly disadvantaged compared to men, yet Mainlander women are relatively better off in the inheritance of all kinds of family properties. The basic pattern of gender difference in inheritance is also very clear: assets like land and houses are mostly passed to male heirs, while daughters are given cash at family division. Gender appears to be a much more discriminating principle on parental property division than ethnicity.

In addition to the availability of family property to be divided, the share given to each child in family property division also depends on the number of children to share the family property. To check if the relative share of family property by sons and daughters is a function of the sibling size, crosstabulations of sons' and daughters' shares in family property division by the number of siblings have been conducted. The results are presented in Table 4D and 4E. For both sons and daughters, the results suggest that major fluctuations occur in the categories of less than two siblings of the respondents. However, this phenomenon may well be the result of not controlling the gender of sibling. The chance that respondents have only

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11 In postwar Taiwan, real estate is a tradable good available for any interested buyer, and is not less affordable for Mainlanders, concerning their income relative to the Taiwanese. The difference in property ownership is possibly due to the regulation limiting the transaction of agricultural land. Specific agricultural land can only be inherited by sons of tiller status, and cannot be sold freely. For this reason, agricultural land has no market value unless it is converted into business or residential land in the process of urban planning.

12 Since families with only one child do not have the conflict to allocate resources among different offsprings, the presence of one child family in the sample may distort the result of relative shares of family property by sons and daughters. Therefore, respondents who have no sibling are excluded from this part of analysis. In fact, to better capture the gender inequalities in family property division, gender of siblings should have been considered as well; however, such information is not available here.

**Table 4D Son's Share in Parental Property Division, by Number of Siblings**

Type of property	Number of Siblings								
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8+
<b>Land</b>	---	27.6%	44.2%	57.5%	57.7%	67.7%	62.2%	66.7%	64.3%
<b>House</b>	---	13.8%	19.2%	12.5%	15.9%	10.6%	12.6%	11.9%	12.6%
<b>Cash</b>	---	0%	0%	1.7%	3.5%	1.4%	2.8%	4.4%	1.4%
<b>Others</b>	---	0%	1.9%	0%	0.6%	0%	0%	0.7%	0.0%
Cases	(1)	(29)	(52)	(120)	(170)	(217)	(143)	(135)	(143)

Data source: LCW

(N = 1010)

\*Since the respondents are female siblings, inheritance information for the only son in families is not available here.

**Table 4E Daughter's Share in Parental Property Division by Number of Siblings**

Type of property	Number of Siblings								
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8+
<b>Land</b>	100%	24.1%	11.5%	4.2%	6.5%	3.2%	2.8%	2.2%	3.5%
<b>House</b>	0.0%	13.8%	1.9%	3.3%	1.8%	3.2%	2.8%	2.2%	2.1%
<b>Cash</b>	0.0%	10.3%	5.8%	10.0%	5.9%	4.2%	8.4%	5.2%	6.3%
<b>Others</b>	0.0%	10.3%	1.9%	1.7%	0.6%	1.8%	0.7%	3.0%	2.1%
Cases	(1)	(29)	(52)	(120)	(170)	(217)	(143)	(135)	(143)

Data source: LCW

N = 1010

sisters and no brothers decreases as the number of sibling increases. In other words, larger shares of daughters in the cases of few siblings are likely to be the result of no male competitors in family property division. As the number of siblings rises, the relative shares of sons and daughters in family property division remain relatively constant.

The findings suggest that except when the sibling set size is small, the effect of sibling set size on gender/ethnic resources allocation through family property inheritance does not appear to be important. The sibling set size may be an important determinant of the actual value of parental property each child inherits; however, it does not affect the relative shares of sons and daughters in a major way.

Based on the findings in the material flows from parents to children, I find that Taiwanese women, on the whole, are located in the most disadvantaged position in the economic hierarchy in Taiwan. As women in general, they have less education and own fewer means of production than men do. As Taiwanese, they share the economic burden of Taiwanese, such as undertaking self-exploitative family productive work. However, they do

not share the same economic advantage of Taiwanese men: ownership of means of production and real estate. The inheritance practice of land and houses has profound implications on the economic inequality between sexes when the prices of real estate become too high for the majority of the population.

So far, I have looked at some major forms of resource flow from parents to children. I find that parents invest more in sons' education and give more to sons at family division than to daughters. We also notice that the gender gap in these material flows seems to be smaller among Mainlanders than Taiwanese. In the following section, the material flows from children to parents and the expected obligations of sons and daughters will be discussed as forms of repayment in the intergenerational contracts.

## **2. Children's Obligations**

### **A. Repayment of Daughters**

According to Greenhalgh, daughters' repayments have to be made in a relatively short period of time before their marriages. Therefore, daughters often start to work early in their lives and make their repayments in the form of remittance sent home. By the same token, parents will try to keep daughters from marrying early so that the period of repayment will last longer. To measure the concern over daughters' short-term repayments, three indicators are used here: the average age of the daughter's first entry into the labor market, control over her own earnings, and the average age of the first marriage.

If the parent-children contract relationship exists and Mainlander daughters generally have a larger share of the family resources than Taiwanese daughters, we will expect to see a longer time period of repayment for Mainlander daughters. Higher education prevents them from entering the labor market early. Besides, the larger share of parental investment means a larger loan which takes a longer time to repay. The longer time period of repayment can be assured in two ways: (1) to start working earlier or to marry later if the deadline for repayment is at the time of marriage, or (2) an extension of economic obligation to the parents after the daughter is married. The latter also implies a somewhat continuing family relationship between the parents and the married daughter. The findings suggest that, in general, Taiwanese daughters have worked more years than Mainlander daughters before they married since they tend to start working earlier than their Mainlander sisters. However, the ethnic differences in control over

own earnings only partly support my hypothesis. Although Taiwanese women show less economic autonomy over own income than Mainlander women after they get married, the ethnic differences among unmarried daughters are not statistically significant.

Taiwanese girls on the average began working before 18 years of age, while Mainlander girls entered the labor market a little after 20 (see Table 5A). However, the shorter school years and the earlier labor market entry of Taiwanese girls did not result in an earlier marriage age for Taiwanese girls than for Mainlander girls. Their average ages of first marriage are about the same (see Table 5C). Regarding daughters' economic autonomy, ethnic differences in control over own earnings are very small both among the unmarried and the married women (see Table 5B). Moreover, all groups report considerable control over own earnings, around 1.5 on a scale from 0 to 2. This result is inconsistent with findings of previous studies on female workers in Taiwan:<sup>13</sup> a large proportion of the earnings of unmarried daughters is usually remitted to parents to supplement the budget of the household (Diamond, 1979; Kung, 1976, 1983; Greenhalgh, 1985; Wiltgen, 1990; D. Wolf, 1990).

My interpretation on the patterns of the first labor market entry and the age of the first marriage is that Mainlander daughters make their repayments to parents even after marriage. However, Taiwanese daughters' membership in their original families is largely eliminated after marriage. The Taiwanese daughters, therefore, have to make their repayments before marriage. More evidence regarding the ethnically different family memberships will be presented in the following section.

Among the married women, although the difference between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in control over own earnings is rather small (1.6 vs. 1.4), it might be an inkling of different domestic status between Mainlander and Taiwanese daughters-in-law. Greenhalgh's contract theory only deals with the contract relationship between parents and daughters, yet women's economic lives after marriage are left untouched. Without further research, we can neither confirm the existence of such a difference, nor incorporate the

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13 I suspect that this inconsistency could be due to the traditional values of filial piety that is commonly held among these working daughters. In other words, although daughters turn in a sizable portion of their earnings to parents, they may see it as a natural obligation which they carry out at their own discretion rather than see it as a lack of economic autonomy.



**Table 5. Indicators of Daughters' Economic Obligation to the Household, by Ethnicity**

<b>A. Average Age of First Labor Market Entry, by Ethnicity</b>			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Cases
<b>Taiwanese</b>	17.9	5.2	3148
<b>Mainlander</b>	20.2	6.9	419

<b>B. Economic Autonomy over Own Income* by Ethnicity and Marital Status</b>			
Mean (Cases)	<u>Single</u>	<u>Married</u>	
<b>Taiwanese</b>	1.5 (113)	1.4 (1851)	
<b>Mainlander</b>	1.6 (28)	1.6 (217)	

<b>C. Average Age of First Marriage, by Ethnicity</b>			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Cases
<b>Taiwanese</b>	22.8	3.1	3212
<b>Mainlander</b>	22.9	4.1	435

ANOVA Summary Table: Age of First Labor Market Entry by Ethnicity (Table 5A)

Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Between groups	1961.407	1	1961.407	67.235	.0000
Within groups	104000.214	3565	29.173		

Economic Autonomy over Own Income by Ethnicity (Table 5B: Married)

Between groups	10.463	1	10.463	27.983	.0000
Within groups	772.466	2066	.374		

Economic Autonomy over Own Income by Ethnicity (Table 5B: Single)

Between groups	.130	1	.130	.356	.5517
Within groups	50.820	139	.366		

Age of First Marriage by Ethnicity (Table 5C)

Between groups	4.701	1	4.701	.440	.5074
Within groups	38987.609	3645	10.696		

Data source: LCW

\*The question is: "Can you use your own income as you wish?" The answer is coded: 0=no, all by others, 1=partially by self, 2=yes, all by self.

Notes: The intermarried population is excluded from the sample of the married.

story of daughters-in-law into the theory of intergenerational contracts. Nonetheless, some evidences seem to support such a conjecture.

In general, I argue that different parental investments and different perceptions on the family memberships of sons and daughters, lead to different repayment patterns among sons and daughters, and among daughters of different ethnic groups. Daughters receive low level of investment and are generally expected to complete the repayment before their marriages, which is particularly true for Taiwanese daughters. On the other hand, the higher parental investment in sons generates counter-obligations. The major responsibilities of parents' well-being, old age support, and daily life care mainly fall on the shoulders of sons. Although there is no guarantee that the sons will make their repayments, the common acceptance of filial piety as an important virtue in society serves both as an important source of socialization and a monitoring device for the performance of sons.

### **B. Structural Differences in Economic Security: Pension and Health Insurance**

Sons are held mainly responsible for the parents' economic security and old age support. Nevertheless, whether the parents need economic support from children, and how much economic support the parents need, are different issues. I argue that the economic security and the needs for old age support are structurally different for the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders which in turn provide rational grounds for ethnically differentiated intergenerational contracts. Among various determinants of economic security, the public/private sectoral concentration among Taiwanese and Mainlanders is the most important one.

The division of the public and the private sectors, to a great extent, determines whether and how much health insurance, medical care, and pension one can expect. Public employees enjoy a health care program that covers more family members, offers much better terms and wider-ranged coverage (*Gongbao*) than the one for the private employees (*Laobao*). Public employees also receive much higher old age payments and pension than private employees. Besides, public employees enjoy a preferential interest rate for their savings, which is not available for non-public employees. Among private workers, agricultural workers enjoy the least coverage and the worst terms for their health care program (*Nongbao*). They do not have old age payments nor a pension. Under such a welfare system, an individual's old age security certainly will vary by the sector in which he/she works.

The sectoral segregation among ethnic groups thus contributes to the ethnic differences in economic security and old age economic needs.

The gender/ethnic patterns of health insurance and pension entitlement support the argument above (see Table 6A, 6B). In general, female respondents are much less likely to have health insurance and an old age pension than their husbands. The only exception to this gender inequality of economic security is the intermarriage group of Mainlander wives with Taiwanese husbands. The gender equality in economic security among this group might be attributable to the generally younger age cohorts and higher educational background of this group (F. Wang, 1991:14), and Mainlanders'

**Table 6. Economic Security and Pension, by Ethnicity**

**A. Are you and your husband insured at work?**

Column pct (Count)	Taiwanese	Mainlander	W:Taiwanese H:Mainlander	W:Mainlander H:Taiwanese
<b>Neither</b>	18.7 (553)	14.8 (54)	9.2 (6)	5.1 (2)
<b>Both</b>	47.6 (1405)	48.8 (178)	56.9 (37)	74.4 (29)
<b>Husband only</b>	27.9 (823)	31.8 (116)	30.8 (20)	10.3 (4)
<b>Self only</b>	5.8 (170)	4.7 (17)	3.1 (2)	10.3 (4)
Chi-square	25.456	P-value	.0025	N = 3420

**B. Will you and your husband have a pension at old age?**

Column pct (Count)	Taiwanese	Mainlander	W:Taiwanese H:Mainlander	W:Mainlander H:Taiwanese
<b>Neither</b>	55.6 (1482)	20.8 (71)	18.6 (11)	37.5 (12)
<b>Both</b>	17.0 (452)	19.9 (68)	28.8 (17)	37.5 (12)
<b>Husband only</b>	23.9 (638)	57.6 (197)	47.5 (28)	9.4 (3)
<b>Self only</b>	3.5 (92)	1.8 (6)	5.1 (3)	15.6 (5)
Chi-square	250.826	P-value	.0000	N = 3097

Data source: LCW

relative concentration in the public sector. Regarding gender and ethnic differences in health insurance (see Table 6A), 46.6% of wives and 24.5% of husbands in all-Taiwanese families have no health insurance coverage. The same figures for all-Mainlander couples are 46.6% (wives) and 19.5% (husbands); for Mainlander husband-Taiwanese wife couples, 40% (wives) and 12.3% (husbands); and for Mainlander wife-Taiwanese husband couples, 15.4% for both.

The gender and ethnic gaps in pension entitlement are greater than that in health insurance coverage since health insurance is provided in the private sector, while pension entitlement is less common in the private sector. Among all-Taiwanese couples, 55.6% expect no pension at old age for husband or wife, while only 20.8% of Mainlander couples expect no pension

**Table 7. Old Age Support of Parents, by Ethnicity**

**A. Do you and your husband need old age support?**

Column pct (Count)	Taiwanese	Mainlander	W:Taiwanese H:Mainlander	W:Mainlander H:Taiwanese
<b>Yes</b>	48.6 (1070)	28.8 (90)	26.5 (13)	14.3 (4)
<b>Not really</b>	13.7 (301)	6.7 (52)	14.3 (7)	10.7 (3)
<b>No</b>	37.7 (831)	54.5 (170)	59.2 (29)	75.0 (21)
Chi-square	67.160	P-value	.0000	N = 2591

**B. Expected old age support from whom?**

Column pct (Count)	Taiwanese	Mainlander	W:Taiwanese H:Mainlander	W:Mainlander H:Taiwanese
<b>all children</b>	37.3 (475)	47.3 (62)	38.9 (7)	33.3 (2)
<b>son(s)</b>	55.4 (705)	38.9 (51)	33.3 (6)	66.7 (4)
<b>daughter(s)</b>	3.7 (47)	10.7 (14)	11.1 (2)	
<b>others</b>	3.6 (46)	3.1 (4)	16.7 (3)	
Chi-square	34.563	P-value	.0001	N = 1428

Data source: LCW

from work (Table 6B). The pension entitlement among different groups further provides evidence of the connection between ethnic background (unbalanced sectoral distribution) and old age economic security, especially among men. For all-Taiwanese couples, 59.1% of the husbands and 79.5% of the wives expect no pension at old age, while the figures for all-Mainlander couples are 22.6% and 78.4%; for Taiwanese wife-Mainlander husband couples, 23.7% and 66.1%; and for Mainlander wife-Taiwanese husband couples, 53.1% and 46.9%.

The ethnic differences in the expected need for old age support<sup>14</sup> further uphold the argument of ethnically differentiated levels of economic security (see Table 7A). The ethnic gap in the need for old age support is similar to the one for pension entitlement (Table 7B). Almost half of the Taiwanese couples (48.6%) claim to need old age support, while Mainlander couples who claim to have such need are about 20% less (28.8%). And the same figures for the intermarried population are even less (26.5% for Taiwanese wife-Mainlander husband couples and 14.3% for Taiwanese husband-Mainlander wife couples).

Based on these results, I argue that since Taiwanese parents generally have a low degree of economic security, the uncertainty concerning their old age rationalizes the traditional patriarchal idea of favoring sons over daughters, and reinforces the household strategy of allocating most available resources to sons. With the limited household resources, the cost of education becomes a negative factor for daughters' educational opportunities. For Taiwanese parents, the daughter's marriage effectively puts an end to her membership of the family and her economic contribution to the parents. Without institutional welfare protection, the only and the most rational alternative for Taiwanese parents is to rely on their sons for old-age support.

By contrast, the "iron bowl" of the public employment minimizes the educational cost for children, both sons and daughters; it further offers a relatively secure economic life in old age. Therefore, the conflicts in allocating limited household resources between sons and daughters regarding their

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14 This question belongs to a set of questions on economic security at old age. It refers to respondent's expectation on economic independence at old age. Following the question: "Do you and your husband have savings prepared for old age?", this question read: "Do you need economic support other than your own savings at your old age?"

education is reduced. A relatively secure old age also decreases Mainlander parents' dependence on the sons. Although still not permanent members of the family, Mainlander daughters tend to have a relatively larger share of the household resources since their parents are less driven by anxiety over old age support and dependence on sons. On the other hand, a larger share of family resources generates a correspondingly larger share of obligations among Mainlander daughters. The deadline for repayment is also less clear for Mainlander daughters than for Taiwanese daughters.

To support the argument above, the gender and ethnic differences in three main dimensions of parents' support are discussed in the following section: living cost, medical expenditure, and the living arrangements of the parents. The parental expectation is distinguished from the actual sources for the parents' living cost to see whether the implicit contract is based on mutual expectation of parents and children. In addition, the care providers are distinguished from the cost bearers in parental medical treatment to see if different genders carry different kinds of obligations. The results agree with my argument of ethnically different intergenerational contract relationships.

### **C. Parental Expectation and Practice on Old Age Support**

Although both Taiwanese and Mainlander parents consider their sons as the major source of their old age support, Taiwanese parents apparently expect more from their sons than Mainlander parents do (see Table 7B). More than half of Taiwanese parents (55.4%) expect old age support only from their sons, while only 38.9% of Mainlander parents have the same expectation. Compared to the expected obligation of sons, daughters are held much less responsible for their parents' old age support across ethnic groups. More Mainlander parents than Taiwanese parents expect support, solely or partially, from their daughters (10.7% vs. 3.7% for support solely from daughters; 47.3% vs. 37.3% for support from all children).

In practice, sons and daughters of different ethnic groups also show a pattern of supporting parents' lives consistent with the pattern of parental expectation (see Table 8A, 8B). Across ethnic categories, the sons play a major role and the daughters a minor role in supporting parents' economic needs. As the minor provider of parental living cost, Mainlander daughters' relative share in supporting parents' living appears to be larger than that of Taiwanese daughters (55.2% vs. 43.4%). Table 8A also shows that more Mainlanders than Taiwanese rely on pension as the major economic

**Table 8. Parental Living Cost****A. Major Economic Sources of Parents' Living Expenses (in the past 2 years)**

Row pct Count	<u>Son(s)</u>	<u>Daughter(s)</u>	<u>Pension</u>	<u>Own Saving</u>	<u>Own Income</u>	<u>Others</u>
<b>Taiwanese</b>	40.1	4.1	1.3	5.2	48.3	1.0
	816	83	27	105	983	20
<b>Mainlanders</b>	33.8	4.6	7.3	8.5	45.8	
	88	12	19	22	119	
Chi-square	50.978	*	P-value = .0000			N = 2294

**B. Minor Economic Sources of Parents' Living Expenses (in the past 2 years)**

Row pct Count	(Multiple Choices)					
	<u>Son(s)</u>	<u>Daughter(s)</u>	<u>Pension</u>	<u>Own Saving</u>	<u>Own Income</u>	<u>Others</u>
<b>Taiwanese</b>	19.2	43.4	3.2	18.8	14.4	0.9
	162	367	27	159	122	8
<b>Mainlanders</b>	9.0	55.2	4.1	20.7	8.3	2.8
	13	80	6	30	12	4
Chi-square	18.452		P-value = .0024			N = 990

Data source: LCW \*Respondents who have no siblings are excluded.

resource of living (7.3% vs. 1.3%).<sup>15</sup>

**D. Medical Cost and Provision of Care**

The same gender/ethnic patterns of economic obligations of children are found in the provision of parental medical cost (Table 9A, 9B). When Taiwanese parents are sick, in about two-thirds of the cases (66.4%), the medical cost is mainly paid by their sons. For Mainlanders, this proportion is less than one half (46.7%). By contrast, only 10.6% of Taiwanese parents' medical cost is paid mainly by their daughters, while the same figure for Mainlanders is 23.3%. A similar pattern also can be found among the minor providers of parents' medical cost (Table 9B). About 83% of Mainlander daughters pay a minor share of the parental medical cost, while the same figure for Taiwanese daughters is only 62.5%. These findings suggest that

15 These figures underestimate the real ethnic gap in pension coverage among the elderly, since a large proportion of these respondents' parents is too young to receive pension.

**Table 9. Parental Medical Cost****A. Major Sources of Parents' Medical Cost Coverage**

Row pct						
Count	<u>Own</u>	<u>Sons</u>	<u>Daughters</u>	<u>Relatives</u>	<u>Insurance</u>	<u>Others</u>
<b>Taiwanese</b>	5.1	66.4	10.6	1.7	13.2	3.0
	12	156	25	4	31	7
<b>Mainlanders</b>		46.7	23.3	3.3	23.3	3.3
		14	7	1	7	1
Chi-square	8.989			P-value = .1095		N = 265

**B. Minor Sources of Parents' Medical Cost Coverage**

Row pct	(Multiple Choices)					
Count	<u>Own</u>	<u>Sons</u>	<u>Daughters</u>	<u>Relatives</u>	<u>Insurance</u>	<u>Others</u>
<b>Taiwanese</b>	1.8	10.7	62.5	19.6	1.8	3.6
	1	6	35	11	1	2
<b>Mainlanders</b>			83.3	16.7		
			10	2		
Chi-square	2.837			P-value = .7251		N = 68

Data source: LCW \*Respondents who have no siblings are excluded.

although the daughter's economic obligations to her original family are reduced after marriage, her minor economic obligations are still a common practice in Taiwan. However, due to the small sample size of Table 9A and 8B, these differences are not statistically significant at .05 level, and thus, it requires more evidence to uphold these findings.

The socialized gender roles of men as the bread-winner and women as the care-provider are evidenced in the division of family obligations among the sons and the daughters. In the provision of parental medical care, the importance of daughters and daughters-in-law increases sharply. Nevertheless, the same ethnic pattern of the daughter's and the son's relative family obligations still holds (Table 10A, 10B). That is, more Taiwanese sons take the responsibility of providing care than Mainlander sons (31% vs. 17.1% as major medical care-provider and 10.6% vs. 4.8% as minor care-provider), and more Mainlander daughters do so than Taiwanese daughters (43.9% vs. 23.2% as major care-provider, and 38.1% vs. 29.1% as minor care-provider). In both ethnic groups, the importance of sons decreased in providing care for parents' illness, compared to their obligations in providing old-age support. For Mainlander families, daughters become the most important care-



**Table 10. Who Took Care of Parents When They Were Ill?****A. Major Providers of Parents' Sick Care**

Row pct Count	<u>spouse</u>	<u>sons</u>	<u>daughters</u>	<u>daughters- in-law</u>	<u>grandchild</u>
<b>Taiwanese</b>	8.8	31.0	23.2	36.3	0.7
	27	95	71	111	2
<b>Mainlander</b>	7.3	17.1	43.9	29.3	2.4
	3	7	18	12	1
Chi- square	10.370		P-value = .0346		N = 347

**B. Minor Providers of Parents' Sick Care**

(Multiple Choices)						
Row pct Count	<u>spouse</u>	<u>sons</u>	<u>daughters</u>	<u>daughters- in-law</u>	<u>grandchild</u>	<u>paid nurse</u>
<b>Taiwanese</b>		10.6	29.1	50.8	6.3	2.1
		20	55	96	12	4
<b>Mainlander</b>	4.8	4.8	38.1	33.3	9.5	4.8
	1	1	8	7	2	1
Chi- square	13.981		P-value = .0299			N = 210

Date source: LCW \*Respondents who have no sibling are excluded

providers. For Taiwanese families, the responsibility of taking care of the parents falls on the shoulders of daughters-in-law.

When parents are sick, Mainlander daughters provide major care in 43.9% of the cases, and minor care in 38.1% of the cases. By contrast, Taiwanese daughters-in-law provide major care for their parents-in-law in 36.3% of cases, and minor care in 50.8% of cases. This outcome, along with the finding in personal autonomy over own earnings discussed above, suggests that Taiwanese daughters-in-law are expected to take the responsibility of the son's repayment as their own responsibility. Even though Mainlander daughters-in-law might also be expected to share their husbands' debt to the parents, their relative obligations in the family are less compelling than Taiwanese daughters-in-law because Mainlander daughters share more responsibilities in their original families than do Taiwanese daughters.

**E. Living Arrangements**

The last, and probably the most important aspect of children's obligations to be examined is the living arrangements in providing food, care, and

daily life support to the parents. Clearly, the responsibilities of taking care of parents and residing with them go to sons (see Table 11). Although the ethnic differences regarding parental living arrangements are consistent with the previously found patterns, these differences are relatively small. Both Taiwanese and Mainlander parents are most likely to be found living with the married sons, and rarely reside with the married daughters. The percentage of Taiwanese parents living with their married sons is a little higher than that of Mainlanders (57.2% vs. 51.8%), whereas the proportion of Mainlander parents living with their married daughters is a little higher than that of their Taiwanese counterparts (10.3% vs. 5.7%).

**Table 11. With Whom Do Parents Reside?**

Column pct (Count)	<u>Taiwanese</u>	<u>Mainlander</u>
<b>live alone</b>	20.8(502)	20.6(58)
<b>with unmarried children</b>	14.3(345)	14.2(40)
<b>with married son(s)</b>	57.2(1382)	51.8(146)
<b>with married daughter(s)</b>	5.7(137)	10.3(29)
<b>each child take turn</b>	0.2(5)	0.7(2)
<b>others</b>	1.8(44)	2.5(7)
Chi-square 13.090	P-value = .0226	

Data source: LCW

N = 2697

The gender and ethnic differences found in previous sections, although they varied in the size of difference, consistently fit the hypothesis of ethnically different intergenerational contracts. While both Mainlanders and Taiwanese invest more household resources in sons than in daughters, the relative shares sons and daughters of each group are endowed are different. The relative shares of sons and daughters in total household resources generate parallel shares of obligations. Such a reciprocal relationship between parental investment and children's obligation cannot be satisfactorily understood by a theory focusing on the maximization of total household output of commodities. Even if a household's total welfare is maximized through domestic division of labor and resources allocation based on gender, it is still hard to understand why sons and daughters differ in such a consistent way in making their repayments to parents.<sup>16</sup> Yet these reciprocal

16 In fact, Becker's model focuses on various determinants of parental investments in children. Children's material contributions to parents, however, are by and large left

relationships of parents to sons and daughters can be better explained by a theory of implicit intergenerational contract relationships, like the one offered by Greenhalgh.

### 3. Gender Culture

In the above section, how would varied institutional factors linked to different rational calculus of families are discussed. However, this is not to argue that economic rationality is the only base of sexually discriminating household strategies. All the consistent variations among ethnic groups in various aspects of domestic life only tell the symmetrical relationship between children's shares of family resources and their shares of family obligations. We have no evidence indicating that these different "contracts" are economically determined, even though some of them may be economically rational. Questions like why the family obligations of sons and daughters have to be different, and like why are these obligations of sons and daughters are ethnically different, are still unanswered. If the hypothesis of different family memberships among daughters of different ethnic groups is empirically grounded, it would offer an interpretation to incorporate these intergenerational family behaviors. At the same time, such a hypothesis also implies that intra-household intergenerational economic relationships are culturally or socially related.

In the preceding sections, evidences suggest that Taiwanese and Mainlander daughters seem to have somewhat different domestic roles in the responsibilities toward their original and conjugal families. Moreover, demographic features of Mainlander population, such as the generally smaller family size and the larger proportion of the nuclear family<sup>17</sup> further make the speculation on different gender relationships by ethnic groups plausible. For Taiwanese daughters, their gender role socialization comes partly from the domestic interaction between their mothers and grand-

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out from his main analysis of family behavior. When Becker deals with adult children's contributions to parents' old age support, he also does not distinguish those made by sons from those made by daughters (1993:369-70). The rational and efficient principles that govern the behavior of children apply to both sons and daughters.

17 According to the 1976 Survey of Household Income and Expenditure, the average household size for Mainlanders is 4.38 persons, compared to 5.6 persons for Taiwanese households. Besides, the nuclear households accounted for 84.5% of total Mainlander households, yet they accounted for 72.1% of total Taiwanese households (Greenhalgh, 1984:538-39).

parents. However, for many Mainlander daughters, the ties with their grandparents in China had been cut off because of the political segregation. The absence of grandparents in their lives means the lack of opportunity to observe and learn the role of daughter-in-law from mothers. The hardships of adjusting to an unfamiliar society may also enhance both their internal solidarity as Mainlanders and domestic relationships among family members, including that between the parents and the daughters.

Although we have neither the intention nor the data to examine these hypotheses, we want to look more carefully to see if gender roles in different ethnic groups are actually different. Regardless of the cause, if such attitude differences do exist, we should certainly consider the possible impacts of these differences on the household's economic decision making. In the following section, several aspects of gender roles are examined to see if they are ethnically varied. They include the average time women spent on domestic chores and the role of the husband in helping to do it, attitudes on desired sex of children, and attitudes on a married couple's living arrangements. These aspects by no means provide a thorough understanding of the complex gender culture. Rather, they should be seen as an exploration of this rarely studied field.

### **A. Domestic Chores**

I first examine the average time the wife spends on household chores. Table 12A shows that on the average, a Taiwanese wife with a Taiwanese husband spent the most time among all wives on domestic chores (3.7 hours per day), and the Mainlander wife with a Taiwanese husband spent the least time among all wives (3.08 hours per day). With some exceptions, this ethnic pattern of household chore time holds after the wife's education is controlled. Among the all-Taiwanese and all-Mainlander couples, generally speaking, the higher the wife's education, the less time she spends on domestic chores. However, except for the Mainlander wife-Taiwanese husband couples,<sup>18</sup> the differences in time spent on domestic chores are rather small for all ethnic or educational backgrounds. Also, the ethnic differences of respondents' time spent on domestic chores are not statistically significant

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18 Since the intermarriage couples of Taiwanese husband-Mainlander wife tend to be the younger generation with high education, such a difference in time spent on domestic chores between this intermarriage group and other groups could be due to the effects of age cohort or education.

at .05 level ( $P = .0927$ ). Based on SC survey, full-time housewives account for a larger proportion among Taiwanese women than Mainlander women. If this finding holds with LCW survey data, the distribution of time spent on household chores may actually suggest a heavier “double burden” for Mainlander working women. Smaller-sized households also have fewer helping hands around to take care of the young and the elderly, which may also add up to the total workload of domestic chores.

By contrast, the husband’s share in helping with domestic chores<sup>19</sup> catches less effects of these factors, and thus presents a clearer picture of the domestic division of labor between husband and wife (Table 12B). In a scale of 0 to 2,<sup>20</sup> on the average, Taiwanese husbands with Taiwanese wives rank the lowest in helping with the chores (.85); Mainlander husbands with a Mainlander wife rank higher (1.07), and the husbands of interethnic marriages help the most in the wives’ views (1.14 and 1.11). These differences are statistically significant at .001 level. Even after the husband’s education is controlled,<sup>21</sup> except the husbands with the highest educational level (college and up), Taiwanese husbands consistently perform fewer household chores than Mainlander husbands or husbands of interethnic marriages, regardless of the husband’s educational background. In general, according to the wife, the husband’s attitude on sharing domestic work may vary by ethnic background; however, the actual domestic burdens of women in different ethnic groups are not much different from each other in terms of the time spent on household chores.

## B. Preference for Children’s Sex

One of the most important indicators of gender-biased culture is the preference for sons over daughters at birth. The comparatively undesirable status of Taiwanese women is witnessed in the attitude toward the sex of

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19 This variable is not measured in actual time spent on household chores. It is a rough measurement subjectively defined by the wife.

20 0 means the husband does not help at all, and 2 means the husband helps a lot.

21 We also checked the husband’s share in domestic chores controlling for the wife’s education. The results for the all-Taiwanese and all-Mainlander couples remain the same, while the results for intermarriage couples changed greatly. This result suggests that the education of the wife and the husband is highly associated with each other for all-Taiwanese and all-Mainlander groups, yet for intermarriage couples, this is not the case. Since we would need more data on intermarriage groups before any conclusion can be drawn about them, we do not present the results of this part.

**Table 12. Domestic Chores****A. Average Hours of Domestic Chores Per Day, by Ethnicity and Education of Wife**

Mean (Cases)			W:Taiwanese	W:Mainlander
	Taiwanese	Mainlander	H:Mainlander	H:Taiwanese
<b>Primary</b>	3.68 (1597)	3.60 (179)	3.58 (19)	3.00 (9)
<b>Junior High</b>	3.79 (368)	3.68 (44)	3.90 (10)	3.50 (4)
<b>Senior High</b>	3.78 (552)	3.55 (80)	3.17 (23)	3.10 (10)
<b>College &amp; up</b>	3.40 (208)	3.44 (48)	3.64 (11)	3.00 (14)
Column total	3.70 (2725)	3.58 (351)	3.49 (63)	3.08 (37)

N = 3176

**B. Husband's Share in Domestic Chores,\* by Ethnicity and Education of Husband**

Mean (Cases)			W:Taiwanese	W:Mainlander
	Taiwanese	Mainlander	H:Mainlander	H:Taiwanese
<b>Primary</b>	0.79 (964)	1.36 (44)	1.75 (4)	1.20 (5)
<b>Junior High</b>	0.82 (265)	1.20 (25)	1.00 (6)	1.50 (2)
<b>Senior High</b>	0.90 (432)	1.09 (58)	1.14 (7)	1.00 (4)
<b>College &amp; up</b>	1.01 (302)	0.87 (87)	1.06 (18)	1.06 (16)
Column total	0.85 (1963)	1.07 (214)	1.14 (35)	1.11 (27)

## ANOVA Summary Table: Time for Domestic Chores by Ethnicity (Table 12A)

Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Between groups	19.817	3	6.606	2.145	.0927
Within groups	9770.662	3172	3.0803		

## Husband's Share in Domestic Chores by Ethnicity (Table 12B)

Source	SS	df	MS	F	P
Between groups	13.446	3	4.482	9.412	.0000
Within groups	1064.267	2235	.476		

Data source: LCW

N = 2239

\* "husband helps a lot" coded 2, "husband helps some" coded 1, "not at all" coded 0.

children. Table 13 presents the respondents' preference for the ideal combination of sons and daughters. Since women bear more burden in child-bearing and often are blamed for being unable to give birth to a son, the sex of parent may be a crucial determinant on the preference for children's sex. For this reason, the sex of parent is controlled here. The results suggest that the preference for the combination of sons and daughters is fairly consistent for men and women in each ethnic group. Respondents' preference for the sex of children is less sexually diversified, yet more ethnically diversified. This may serve as an evidence of ethnically different gender culture.

**Table 13. Ideal Combination of Daughter(s) and Son(s), by Respondent's Ethnicity and Gender**

Count Column pct	Female			Row	Male			Row
	Hokien	Hakka	Mainlander	Total	Hokien	Hakka	Mainlander	Total
<b>half &amp; half</b>	370	43	71	484	319	50	54	423
	38.6	38.1	50.7	39.9	34.8	38.5	36.7	35.5
<b>more son</b>	191	21	16	228	187	30	16	233
	19.9	18.6	11.4	18.8	20.4	23.1	10.9	19.5
<b>more daughter</b>	17	3	5	25	14	2	2	18
	1.8	2.7	3.6	2.1	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5
<b>at least 1 of each</b>	126	18	15	159	136	15	15	166
	13.1	15.9	10.7	13.1	14.8	11.5	10.2	13.9
<b>doesn't matter</b>	255	28	33	316	260	33	60	353
	26.6	24.8	23.6	26.1	28.4	25.4	40.8	29.6
Column total	959	113	140	1212	916	130	147	1193
	79.1	9.3	11.6	100.0	76.8	10.9	12.3	100.0
Chi-square	13.228				17.400			
P-value	0.1042				0.0262			

Data source: SC91-1

Although respondents of all ethnic groups show the tendency of favoring sons over daughters, Taiwanese (both Hokiens and Hakkas) do more so than Mainlanders. Hokiens and Hakkas also reveal very similar patterns of preference for children's sex. Regardless of respondents' sex, the percentages of Hokiens and Hakkas who prefer more sons than daughters are higher than that of Mainlanders (19.9%, 18.6% vs. 11.4% for females; 20.4%, 23.1% vs. 10.9% for males). By contrast, the proportions of those who like to have more daughters are very tiny in all categories (1.8%, 2.7%, and 3.6% for females; 1.5%, 1.5%, and 1.4% for males). I believe that the actual

degrees of favoring sons over daughters would be higher than that suggested in Table 13 because the key of favoring sons over daughters is missing from the question. To many people, what really matters is whether they have at least one son, rather than how many sons or daughters they want. Nevertheless, even with the results derived from this question, the ethnically different preferences for sons and daughters are evident.

### C. On Living Arrangements

The last aspect for examination is the living arrangements of a married couple. This variable is different from the question of parental living arrangements discussed above. While the question of parental living arrangements asks with which family member the parents actually live, the question of a married couple's living arrangements asks with whom should a married couple live. The latter question is phrased implicitly to ask a respondent's opinion from a young couple's view. The results shown in Table 14 indicate a distinct ethnic pattern in the expected living arrangements of a married couple. It is not surprising that men predominantly support the idea of living with the husband's family. Neither men nor women (very few) consider living with the wife's family as an alternative. Although the same ethnic pattern of a more patriarchal Taiwanese culture persists in

**Table 14. Attitude on Living Arrangement: Where Should a Married Couple Live?**

Count Column pct	Female			Row Total	Male			Row Total
	Hokien	Hakka	Mainlander		Hokien	Hakka	Mainlander	
<b>w/husband's family</b>	513 53.3	97 53.0	40 26.1	650 50.1	543 63.7	105 71.9	65 41.4	713 61.7
<b>w/wife's family</b>	1 0.1	1 0.5	2 1.3	4 0.3	1 0.1			1 0.1
<b>either is fine</b>	98 10.2	23 12.6	19 12.4	140 10.8	43 5.0	4 2.7	14 8.9	61 5.3
<b>own place</b>	302 31.4	51 27.9	85 55.6	438 33.7	223 26.2	33 22.6	65 41.4	321 27.8
<b>others</b>	48 5.0	11 6.0	7 4.6	66 5.1	42 4.9	4 2.7	13 8.3	59 5.1
Column Total	962 74.1	183 14.1	153 11.8	1298 100.0	852 73.8	146 12.6	157 13.6	1155 100.0
Chi-square		53.096				37.107		
P-value		0.0000				0.0000		

Data source: SC90-2



the male and female population, women are consistently less willing to live with the husband's family than men of the same ethnic groups.

With regard to ethnic differences, regardless of sex, both Hokiens and Hakkas predominantly believe a couple should live with the husband's family. This attitude is particularly strong among Hakka males (71.9%). Yet many fewer Mainlanders share the same view (26.1% for Mainlander women and 41.4% for Mainlander men). By contrast, the proportions of Mainlanders, both males and females, who think a couple should live alone are much larger than their Taiwanese counterparts (41.4% vs. 26.2% for Hokien men and 22.6% for Hakka men; 55.6% vs. 31.4% for Hokien women and 27.9% for Hakka women).

Living with the husband's family often brings many disadvantages to the wife, such as being expected to performing various duties as the daughter-in-law, less privacy, and less power in domestic decision making. However, the fact that more Hokien and Hakka women support living with the husband's family cannot be interpreted as being indicative a more desirable domestic life in their husband's families. Rather, I would argue, it is a part of their socialized gender roles that a woman becomes the member of her husband's family after marriage. Therefore, they have no place in their own families. Although Mainlanders seem to hold the same view that a woman is no longer a member of her original family after marriage, if the living arrangements can be understood as a symbolic indicator of the wife's family membership, Mainlanders seem to be less strict about the wife's new family membership. This result, along with other findings discussed in early sections, further suggests that Mainlander daughters' family memberships may not be as clear-cut as those of Taiwanese daughters. Their relationships with the original families remain to a certain degree after their marriages. At the same time, their memberships in the husbands' families are also less clear-cut, as in the case of Taiwanese wives.

The intergenerational resources allocation and the division of family obligations, to a certain extent, also can be seen as indicators of intra-household power relationships. According to some of the previous findings, Taiwanese women, both as daughters and daughters-in-law, seem to show less power within the household as compared to their Mainlander counterparts. Nevertheless, these measurements do not take the differences between generations into consideration.

According to Hu's field research on Taiwanese villages, rural industrialization in Taiwan does not change the patriarchal ideology and the basic

structure of male dominance, yet it does improve the status of women of younger generation who are engaged in industrial work (Hu, 1985). Based on her field works in one Taiwanese village from 1957 to 1990, Rita Gallin (1991) reaches similar conclusion. As a result of the national policy of "low prices for agricultural products" and rapid rural industrialization since the 1960s, daughters and daughters-in-law who work in factories now enjoy more income, more autonomy and higher status, whereas their mothers, mothers-in-law and the male household heads who rely on agricultural income now have lower status. The intergenerational changes found in Hu's and Gallin's studies suggest a trend of reducing the gap in domestic power relationships between parents-in-laws and daughters-in-law as industrialization grows. Since agricultural households are predominantly Taiwanese, this change may also imply a reducing gap in intergenerational power distribution between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders.

The various issues analyzed here, from educational investment in children, parental property division, to gender roles in domestic context, are of course far more complicated than what gender and ethnicity can explain. In this study, I have no intention to explore the causes of them or the mechanisms through which they function. Instead, they are analyzed in a rather straightforward way to check on our main hypotheses. Although each of the patterns presented here may have resulted from a number of different factors under varied circumstances, together they offer a portrait of ethnically different household strategies and dynamics that are largely coherent with my hypothesis.

## Conclusion

In this study, I try to search for the roots of women's economic subordination within the household, and attempt to connect different household strategies in raising sons and daughters to ethnically specific economic contexts. I argue that, although the common practice of sex-discriminating household resources allocation is deeply rooted in the traditional patriarchal system, it is also economically rational. The different locations of each ethnic group in the economic system enhance or mitigate these traditional household strategies, which in turn, generate different impacts on women of different ethnic groups. However, the economic rationality model suggested by human capital theorists can only provide interpretation for half of the story, namely, the material flows from parents to children, while it fails to

explain why the intergenerational material flows are symmetrical.

With a special reference to Greenhalgh's theory of intergenerational contracts, I presented the reciprocal relationships between parental investments in children, and children's obligations to support parents' lives in old age. However, I argue that these intergenerational contracts are different among different ethnic groups. The resources allocation strategy Greenhalgh described in her work is less applicable for Mainlanders. A key difference between contracts of Mainlander households and Taiwanese households is the family membership of the daughter.

Although the ethnic differences in gender culture are not always consistent for all aspects we examined, more often than not, the differences suggest that Taiwanese women's family membership is relatively clearly defined. A Taiwanese woman's major economic relationship and family obligations with her original family shrink significantly after her marriage. Afterwards, she becomes the member of her husband's family and is expected to perform major household duties in the new family. For Mainlander women, their family membership transformation is not so clear-cut. Their relationships with the original family in terms of economic and family obligations tend to be stronger than that of Taiwanese married women. At the same time, their membership in the new family is also less taken for granted. This ambiguity of family membership makes the daughter's larger repayment to her parents possible.

Enjoying more state subsidies, on the average Mainlander parents have little burden of children's educational cost. Under the state's umbrella, their old age economic lives are also relatively secured. Without these economic concerns, Mainlander parents tend to invest more in their daughters than Taiwanese parents, even though the investment in daughters is still less than that in sons. This "debt" of higher investment flow to daughters is later returned in the forms of more economic contributions and more family obligations to the parents.

The story for the Taiwanese is rather different. With less public resources, daughters have to compete for the limited household resources with sons. Since daughters will no longer be family members after marriage, and the parents' long term well-being depends on the sons' prosperity, the parents will give as much as they can to the sons rather than the daughters. Besides, the nature of many Taiwanese families' productive work requires the self-exploitation of cheap or free family labor, which further disadvantages the daughters' chances of competing for resources for higher educa-

tion. As daughters, Taiwanese girls are seen as temporary members of the family. Their chances of getting long-term investments like education or career training are affected by this temporary membership. They often have to help around the house or work outside to help the family's economy. The situation, however, does not turn better after she married into her "permanent" family, that of the husband's. The tremendous debt of her husband to her parents-in-law now falls heavily on her shoulder. As a daughter-in-law, she is expected to perform major family duties like taking care of the sick parents-in-law.

The two main different types of intergenerational contracts among Taiwanese and Mainlander families we discussed above represent different household strategies between the two groups. They are both developed from a same cultural heritage. Within the social definition of women's roles as the daughter and the daughter-in-law, different economic rationales work to form and reshape household strategies in raising sons and daughters. Public policies and institutional designs, such as health care and pension plans obtained through public employment, have important implications in determining intergenerational relationships and in mitigating son preference within the household.

The patriarchal culture reflected in parental investment strategies among different ethnic households, in a sense, can be understood as an outcome of institutional constraints. However, the economic rationality and institutional constraint model run into difficulty in explaining children's repayments to parents. Such a "rational actor" analysis may even mask another parallel process going on, which is that sons and daughters receiving these different treatments are learning patriarchal attitudes or being acculturated in different gender roles. Accordingly, when sons and daughters reach adulthood, they assume these learned gender roles and gender-differentiated family obligations to make their repayments to parents. These gender roles may also be reproduced later in their own childrearing.

This study also shows that although different ethnic groups face distinct structural economic opportunities, the collective privileges or disadvantages of any ethnic group are not evenly shared or carried as a burden by women and men of the same group. The gender socialization in a society might not affect its members in an indiscriminating way. Gender relations and sexual division of labor within each group coevolve with these ethnically specific structural factors to shape the economic stratification in postwar Taiwan.

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# 省籍性別文化的經濟影響： 台灣家庭資源配置策略的省籍性別分析

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## 摘 要

「閩南人比較重男輕女」「娶妻當娶客家女」這些社會上普遍存在的刻板印象究竟有沒有現實基礎？不同省籍族群間是否存在不同的性別權力文化？如果省籍族群背景與女性在家中地位有關的話，這種省籍間不同的性別權力關係會如何影響個人的經濟條件及生活機會？從這些研究問題出發，本研究運用大型社會調查資料，試圖針對新家庭經濟學者之理論及 Susan Greenhalgh 對台灣家庭中之權利義務關係所提出的代間契約理論，探索家庭做為資源分配的一個中介機構，如何透過各種資源分配手段，如對子女教育之投資、財產之繼承和對父母的照顧奉養等，影響不同省籍族群中兩性的生活機會。本研究中同時分析在特定的歷史情境下，省籍族群背景所代表的結構性經濟條件與家庭結構差異，如何透過家庭的資源分配機制和性別文化的學習而成為社會階層化的一個重要因素。

**關鍵詞：**代間契約理論、家庭資源分配、父權文化、省籍族群