

東南亞區域研究通訊

第十四期 二 一年八月

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫

台北・南港

目 錄



東南亞區域研究通訊第十四期

主持人的話 / 蕭新煌.....	1
研究員通訊	
東南亞文化史上若干重要問題 / 張光直.....	4
「素可泰時期的美術」研究計畫簡介 / 嚴智宏.....	32
會議論文	
Islam and Politics in Malaysia: A Changing Scenario / Zambry Abd. Kadir.....	36
Islam in Southeast Asia at the Dawn of the New Millennium: Prospects and Challenges / M. Kamal Hassan.....	54
Islam Issues in the Present Malaysian Political Movement / Ibrahim Abu Bakar.....	62
東南亞研究書籍介紹	
<i>Chinese Business in South-East Asia: Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship</i> / Edited by Edmund Terence Gomez and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao / 嚴智宏.....	82
《華裔東南亞人》廖建裕編 國立暨南國際大學東南亞研究中心譯 / 嚴智宏.....	85
《東南亞政府與政治》顧長永著 / 嚴智宏.....	87
《東南亞政治與發展》Michael R. J. Vitikotis 著 林若雱譯 / 戚常卉.....	89
《台灣與東南亞的政治經濟關係：互賴發展的順境與逆境》顧長永著 / 戚常卉.....	91

東南亞與亞太研究機構簡介

越南國家人文社會科學中心.....	93
香港大學亞洲研究中心.....	95

東南亞區域研究計畫辦公室報導..... 97

奠定基礎、向上提升：本院東南亞區域研究計畫舉辦之研討會及出版成果

1995-2001 / 蕭新煌.....	101
八十三年到九十年度分支計畫題目一覽表.....	110
八十七年到九十年度博士後研究及博（碩）士論文獎助題目一覽表.....	114

會議報導

2002 年台灣東南亞區域研究年度研討會.....	117
2001 年 9 12 月東亞及東南亞研究相關會議時間表.....	118

Contents



Newsletter of the Southeast Asian Studies No.14



Letter from the Director

By Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao..... 1



News from PROSEA Researchers

Major Problems in the Culture History of Southeast Asia
By Kwang-Chin Chang.....4

Art of the Sukhothai Dynasty of Thailand
By Chih-Hung Yen.....3 2



Conference Papers

Islam and Politics in Malaysia: A Changing Scenario
By Zambry Abd. Kadir.....36

*Islam in Southeast Asia at the Dawn of the New Millennium:
Prospects and Challenges*
By M. Kamal Hassan.....54

Islam Issues in the Present Malaysian Political Movement
By Ibrahim Abu Bakar 62



Introduction to Books on Southeast Asian Studies

*Chinese Business in South-East Asia:
Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship
/ Edited by Edmund Terence Gomez and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao*
By Chih-Hung Yen.....82

Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians / Edited by Leo Suryadinata
By Chih-Hung Yen.....85

Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia / By Samuel C. Y. Ku
By Chih-Hung Yen.....87

Political Change in Southeast Asia / By Michael R. J. Vitikotis
By Chang-Hui Chi89

Taiwan & Southeast Asia: Economic & Political Changes / By Samuel C. Y. Ku
By Chang-Hui Chi91



Introduction to Overseas Institutes of Southeast Asian and Asia Pacific Studies

<i>National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities of Vietnam, NCSSH.....</i>	<i>93</i>
<i>Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong.....</i>	<i>95</i>



News from PROSEA Office

<i>Going Strong: Conferences Sponsored and Publications Published by PROSEA</i>	
<i>By Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao.....</i>	<i>101</i>
<i>PROSEA Research Grants: 1994 - 2001</i>	<i>110</i>
<i>PROSEA Postdoctoral, Doctoral, and Master Research Grants: 1998 - 2001</i>	<i>114</i>



Conference Information

<i>Annual Conference of Southeast Asian Area Studies in Taiwan, 2002</i>	<i>117</i>
<i>Sep. ~ Dec. 2001 Calendar of Conferences and Meetings on East and Southeast Asia</i>	<i>118</i>

主持人的話

蕭新煌

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫主持人

本計畫的前主持人張故副院長光直院士，在四十年前寫過「Major Problems in the Culture History of Southeast Asia」這篇具有影響力的大作，並登在本院民族所集刊第十三期（1962）。這篇論文企圖為當時台灣的東南亞文化史研究主題定調，並強調必須採取多學科的理論和方法，以及文獻和田野資料並重。四十年後，我們再讀此文，仍然格外感到親切和切題。

本計畫由李院長親自促成設置，張光直院士領軍督導，至今已進入七年。回顧和評估本計畫的發展歷程，我可以用張故副院長生前曾經告訴我的話來做總結：「我們是在無中生有的創造和打基礎，當然要有耐心和決心」。他也相當體認到東南亞區域研究既然是新領域，就不可能急著有「卓越」成績，更不能過於苛刻地要求參與開創新領域的同仁要有「急就章」的成果，或矮化此一需要長時間培養和開發的學術領域成為只是單純的個別、零散研究而已。

為了讓參與本計畫的各分支計畫主持人能深深體會張院士生前對本計畫的期許和領導風格，我們特地在本期通訊重刊他那四十年前的論文，以期大家能在讀後激發一些新的學術思緒和靈感。

雖說本計畫一向採取推動、開拓和促成的態度來為本院內和院外的東南亞學術研究向下打基礎，但我們也應該更重視從今而後必須向上提昇的自我要求。李院長在日前表示，如果立法院能在今年九月間通過本院組織法修正條文，那麼東南亞區域研究計畫和東北亞區域研究計畫可望合二為一，將可籌設「亞太區域研究中心」。成立中心的層級組織是本計畫設置的第一天就立下的目標，張故副院長和楊前副院長均極力認同此一發展方向，本計畫諮詢委員王賡武院士和李亦園院士也一再表示，這是必要的組織目標。我們希望院方能正視和玉成此一關鍵發展願景，並讓它儘早實現。

為了實現此一目標，本計畫不斷對自己做嚴格的自我要求。自成立伊始，我們就致力於奠定本院各人文社會所（處）對東南亞區域研究之基礎，加強本院與國際學術機構和學者之合作及交流，並培養國內東南亞研究的新生代。

本計畫依照這些原則認真執行，至今已支持六十個分支計畫（其中，一年期的有廿七個，多年期的有卅三個、共七十九個計畫次，一年與多年期兩者合計總共一百零六個計畫次），七個合作計畫（其中，一年期的有四個，兩年期的有三個、共六個計畫次，一年與兩年期的兩者合計總共十個計畫次）。本計畫還培養六位國內的博士後研究學者，獎助十一位博士班學生、卅九位碩士班學生（90年度的受獎名單也已揭曉）。自87學年度起，本計畫又為暨南大學、淡江大學東南亞研究所的學生開設「東南亞區域研究專題討論」課程，由本計畫的分支計畫、合作計畫主持人各自講授他們正在進行的研究計畫。

本計畫又積極加強與學術界的合作及交流。本計畫主動邀請國內外學者做專題演講或午餐研討會，至今已舉辦六十三場。本計畫勤於舉辦學術會議。繼三年前催生第一屆「台灣的東南亞區域研究年度研討會」之後，連續協辦了兩屆。至今年五月已連辦三屆，分別由本計畫、淡江大學東南亞所、暨南大學東南亞所主辦，明年的研討會也已決定由中山大學東南亞研究中心主辦。本計畫單獨舉辦、或與院內外各單位以及與國際研究機構合辦研討會共三十一次，年底以前並將舉辦「台灣與砂勞越的比較國際學術研討會」。這些研討會的論文經審查修改後，有的結集為專書，有的刊登於《通訊》，有的刊登於「東南亞研究論文系列」（至今已出版五十本）或「東亞研究論文系列」（已出版十一本）。本計畫還出版研究書目及史料彙編共九種。完整的清單和所有的出版成果，已刊載在本院週報832期（90年8月9日），也在本期《通訊》刊出。

繼之前已經簽約的八個合作對象之後，本計畫最近又與日本早稻田大學亞洲太平洋研究中心暨同大學大學院亞洲太平洋研究科、香港中文大學亞太研究所、香港大學亞洲研究中心、美國杜克大學（Duke University）亞太研究所等四個機構簽訂合作協定，強化本計畫與在東南亞研究上聲譽斐然的國際機構之交流。尚在商議中的合作協定還包括澳洲的新南威爾斯大學（The University of New South Wales）的亞澳學院、格理菲斯大學（Griffith University）亞太研究所、美國夏威夷大學東南亞研究中心、越南國家人文社會科學中心的東南亞研究所、社會學研究所、中國研究中心等等。

此外，本計畫各分支計畫主持人也多與國內外建立良好的合作關係。例如，印度太平洋史前學會（IPPA）就主動邀請本計畫及本院史語所籌辦明年的第十七屆大會。本計畫在組團參加第十六屆國際亞洲歷史學家學會（IAHA）2000年年會並發表論文後，兩百多位各國學者對我們刮目相看。大會甚至決議由我國主辦2004年的IAHA年會。屆時，本計畫或未來的研究中心勢必扮演更重要的角色。

最後，自1998年起本計畫並接受國科會委託執行「東亞研究資訊服務」計畫，為期三年，旨在蒐集和補充國內外東亞研究相關資訊，建立「東北亞與東南亞研究學者檔」與建構互動管道，以達到資訊整合、交流及共享之目的。（關於上述所有工作項目的詳細資料，都可以在本計畫所架設的全球網站上查到。）

七年來，所有曾經參與本計畫的專家學者和同仁們莫不兢兢業業，在大家共同的用心耕耘、耐心照料下，我國的東南亞研究已經從無到有，札下相當的基礎，並獲致一定的成果。今天重新展讀張故副院長的大作，我們決心要使我國東南亞研究的數量更多、品質更高。面對未來，我們仍將全力以赴，以更謙虛的心情達成李院長在七年前許下的諾言。

東南亞文化史上若干重要問題*

張光直

摘要

近年來人類學界對東南亞現代文化之分析有很多的貢獻，但在東南亞文化史敘述上甚少新穎的見解。本文將其重要的諸問題作一摘敘，提供近年發現的新資料，並嘗試指出未來解決這些問題的可能途徑。

一、食物採集時期

東南亞最初的人類，為更新統早期末或中期初與 Djetis 動物群共生的 Meganthropus 及 Pithecanthropus；此種人類到更新統的中期散布於東南亞之各地，其石器工業以砍器為共同的特徵，其生業似為一般性的食物採集。在歐非兩洲更新統中期盛行的手斧及勒伐石片工業，在東南亞都不發達，這或許表示，人類之移入本區是在手斧及勒伐工業在非洲始現之前。

到了更新統的晚期，東南亞人類的體質與文化都經歷顯著的變化。在體質方面，先有尼安德特型的長陽人及 Solo 人之出現，復在第四冰河期有「真人」(Homo sapiens) 之演化。後者在體質的種族特徵上，已經呈現了海洋黑種人樣相，但是此時黃種與黑種人的分化似尚未完成。

在石器工業方面，東南亞的舊石器晚期文化似乎已經現分化為不同的傳統的趨勢。目前所有的考古資料，似可分為兩個主要的區域傳統：大陸的砍器工業，

* 本文原刊載於中央研究院民族學研究所集刊，第十三期，民國五十一年春季，頁 1-27。

及島嶼區的石片與石瓣工業。前者可能代表舊石器時代早期一般食物採集生業的持續，而後者似乎屬於狩獵大型陸獸的民族。這種區分，與北美舊石器時代的工業傳統頗有相似之處。

東南亞區域更新統地質時代之結束，可能並未伴隨劇烈的氣候與生物上的變化，而舊石器時代晚期的兩大傳統持續為中石器時代的貨平文化 - 一般採集民 - 及細石器文化 - 狩獵為主的文化 - 兩大傳統。但到了中石器時代，蒙古種與海洋黑種的種族分化可能已經完成，而東南亞的中石器時代文化或為海洋黑種民族的產物。

二、農業之開始

文化史家多半同意，作物之培養及動物之豢養為人類史上劃時代的發明，而二者可能均在近東及美洲之核心地區先後獨立出現。除這二區域以外，世界上其餘的地區或也曾有其獨立之發明，而東南亞地區或即其一。

對農業曾否在東南亞獨立發明一問題，可自兩個不同的角度來看：(1)作物培植之抽象觀念及實際上的知識，及(2)特殊野生作物的培植。東南亞無疑為人類文化史上若干特殊作物首次培植之園地，尤其若干熱帶地區之果實及根莖作物如芋薯之類。但根據考古學上已有之證據看來農業的知識似自外界傳入而應用於土著的植物之上。作這種結論的根據，可以從三方面加以說明。

其一：東南亞的史前史上，在時間緊接著中石器文化遺物的文化期，為亞新石器時代型的器物群所代表。換言之，中石器時代的基本文化持續，但加入磨光石器及陶器。這種現象似乎表示，在中石器時代文化持續的過程中，其居民與外界的新石器時代有接觸關係，而有磨光石器及陶器之輸入；農業的知識也許曾跟著傳入，但亞新石器時代住民的主要生活方式仍是漁獵與採集。這裏所說的外界的新石器時代文化，可能即是華北的仰韶期文化或比仰韶期更晚的新石器時代文化，可能即是華北的仰韶期文化或比仰韶期更早的新石器文化。

其次：東南亞的史前史的次一階段，即農業村落文化及方角石斧使用的階段，從文化形態上看，與以前的中石器時代及亞新石器時代有一清楚分明的變化，而與華北的龍山文化有明確的關聯。易言之，東南亞的農村新石器時代文化不像是土生的，而多半是自外面輸入的。

其三：這一個新文化階段中的居民，從體質上看，也和以前有了顯著的區別。中石器及亞新石器時代的居民，是海洋黑種人，而新石器時代的民族是蒙古種人。

這三方面的資料指向一個結論，即東南亞的農業是華北的農民帶進來的。中石器時代的住民或者逐漸絕跡，或為新來的移民所同代，而其文化也就加入了新來的文化之中造成東南亞諸地區的地方色彩。

三、水田及金屬工業之輸入

東南亞文化史在農業輸入以後影響最為深鉅的事件，學者公認為水稻之耕作；民族學家根據現代農業技術與社會形式之配合關係而推論：水稻之輸入東南亞造成村落自治制度之瓦解及部落與王國之形成。這一推論，在華南地域，已為古代文獻及考古上的證據所加強。水稻及金屬工業之傳入及發展，很可能促進南方文明之發達，為後日印度文明之傳入及土著王國之產生奠定了基礎。

四、向歷史時代之轉化

基督紀元後歷史時期逐漸開始於大部分的東南亞；東南亞的北部進入了漢文化的疆域，而南部在東山文化的基礎上，在印度文明的影響下產生了少數的王國。自此以後，東南亞文化史的研究到歷史文獻的幫助，但問題更形複雜。本文對若干問題著手研究的方法上略作討論。

Major Problems in the Culture History of Southeast Asia

Kwang-Chin Chang

In recent years, anthropologists have shown wide interest in the contemporary cultures of Southeast Asia, but for cultural historical synthesis they often still rely upon hypotheses that were formulated some time ago and are now largely dated. The paucity of new syntheses apparently is the result of the paucity of new field data, but it seems imperative that we make some fresh reevaluations of the old data to formulate new problems and to direct new field researches. The reevaluation could be considerably aided by new field data from prehistoric South China, which are highly suggestive of a solution for such recurrent problems as the beginning of food-production and the first appearance of irrigation techniques in Southeast Asia, problems that the archaeological materials from Southeast Asia itself have yet to shed much light upon. The purpose of the present paper is to review some of the major problems in the culture history of Southeast Asia, and to make explicit some of the directions along which their solution may eventually be found.

First in order is a definition of the area under study. In current scholarly literature, Southeast Asia usually refers to the Indo-Chinese and Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, British North Borneo, and the Philippines.¹ For the purpose of a discussion in its culture history, however, Southeast Asia rightfully includes South China as well as the peninsular and island areas to the south. Both in geology and geography, South China is sharply demarcated from North China by the crest of the Tsinling Mountains and the Huaiho valley (approximately the 33rd parallel) but continues on to the south. In culture history, South China was definitely a part of Southeast Asia throughout the various prehistoric and historic periods until after the Han Dynasty, when the islands and the peninsula, except for its northern fringes, first came under Indian and then under European influences. This vast cultural area was occupied during the early

¹ Brian Harrison, *South-east Asia*, London, MacMillan, 1954, p. ix.

post-glacial periods by similar groups of mesolithic hunter-fishers, and from the introduction of agriculture through the ethnographic present has been characterized by a number of common stylistic elements in its culture history.²

The Food-gather Stage

Southeast Asia has never been seriously considered as mankind's place of origin, despite the fact that Darwin's "missing link" was first discovered in this area in the form of *Pithecanthropus erectus* in 1890-91 by Eugene Dubois. From probably Lower Pleistocene deposits in Kwangsi of southwestern China, jaws and teeth of *Gigantopithecus blacki* have been found,³ but their morphology indicates anthropoid rather than hominid affiliations. The earliest human occupation of Southeast Asia can only be traced to the beginning of Middle Pleistocene or the very end of Lower Pleistocene, as it is evidenced by remains of *Meganthropus* and *Pithecanthropus* bones from Java in association with the Djetis fauna. The chronological position of the Djetis fauna is somewhat in dispute,⁴ but at any rate the currently available archaeological evidence shows conclusively that by the beginning of Middle Pleistocene (probably the Second Glacial stage in the Himalayan glacial sequence) the area of Southeast Asia had been populated by the forerunners of man. The evidence consists of both human fossils (*Pithecanthropus erectus* of Java and Mapa Man of Kwangtung) and remains of palaeolithic implements (the Patjitanian industry of Java, the Tampanian assemblage of Malaya, the Lower Anyathian of Burma, and several possibly lower palaeolithic industries dating from Middle Pleistocene in Thailand, Borneo, and South China).⁵ The mainland part of Southeast Asia and the archipelago, separated from each other at the present time by the South China Sea and Malacca Strait, formed a single land mass during each of the Glacial maxima of the Pleistocene

² A. L. Kroeber, *Peoples of the Philippines*, New York, American Museum of Natural History, second and revised edition, 1928, pp. 225-230; Ling Shun-sheng, "Tung-nan-ya ku-wen-hua yen-chiu fa-fan (An introduction to the study of the ancient Southeast Asiatic culture)", *Chu-yih.yü-kuo-ts'e*, no. 44, Taipei, 1955, p. 1.

³ Pei Wen-chung and Li Yu-heng, "Discovery of a third mandible of *Gigantopithecus* in Liu-cheng, Kwangsi, South China", *Vertebrata Palasiatica*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1958, pp. 193-97.

⁴ D.A. Hooijer, "Fossil mammals and the Plio-Pleistocene boundary in Java", *Proc. Kon. Akad. Wet. te Amsterdam*, vol. 55, no. 4, 1952, p. 439; H.L. Movius, Jr., "Palaeolithic archaeology in southern and eastern Asia, Exclusive of India", *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1955, p. 260; F. C. Howell, "The Villafranchian and human origins", *Science*, vol. 130, 1959, p. 833.

⁵ H. L. Movius, Jr., "Early man and Pleistocene stratigraphy in southern and eastern Asia", *Papers, Peabody Museum*, vol. 19, 1944; "The lower Palaeolithic cultures of southern and eastern Asia", *Trans. Am. Phil. Soc.*, n. s., vol. 38, 1949; *op. cit.*, 1955; H. R. van Heekeren, *The Stone Age of Indonesia*, 'S-Gravenhage, 1957.

when the Sunda Shelf was exposed, and the various remains of fossil men and palaeolithic implements from the various regions of Southeast Asia dating from the Middle Pleistocene period indicate that this whole area was probably occupied by physically and culturally related groups of population. Generally speaking, these human groups were Pithecanthropoid,⁶ and their stone implements were fashioned primarily in the chopper-chopping-tool tradition-consisting of crudely flaked unifacial and bifacial implements on pebbles with big secondarily retouched flaking surfaces.⁷ The facts that identifiable hunting implements are lacking from these Middle Pleistocene Lower Palaeolithic assemblages and that faunal remains have been found but rarely in association with the palaeolithic industries seem to suggest that the Middle Pleistocene inhabitants of Southeast Asia were primarily food-collectors with a generalized subsistence pattern. Technological assemblages similar to the Southeast Asiatic Lower Palaeolithic industries have been discovered from the Middle Pleistocene deposits in North China (e. g., Choukoutienian) and India (e. g., Soan), and from the Lower and Middle Pleistocene deposits of Eastern and Southern Africa (e. g., the so-called "Kafuan", Oldowan, and Pre-Chelles-Acheul), and may represent the persistent occurrence in this part of the Old World of a Pebble Tool substratum which was, in Africa, the basis out of which the Abbevillio-Acheulian development subsequently was derived. It is significant to note that for Southeast Asia as a whole, neither Abbevillio-Acheulian hand-axes nor the Levalloisian flakes that characterize many Middle Pleistocene stone industries of Africa and Europe are significantly represented in the lower palaeolithic assemblages. This may indicate that man with a pebble tradition of culture came to Southeast and Eastern Asia from Africa before the great Hand-axe-Levalloisian development took place, although it is also possible to formulate other interpretations to account for the facts, such as those taking into account the nature of raw materials or the tropical environment of Southeast Asian habitat which might have favored the persistence of the older traditions.⁸ The basic explanation, however, must necessarily lie in historical factors, for the wide and transitive distribution of the various technological traditions in the various parts of the Old World cannot be explained by either petrological or ecological factors alone.

⁶ W. E. Le Gros Clark, *The fossil evidence for human evolution*. The University of Chicago Press, 1955. pp. 81-112.

⁷ H.L. Movius, Jr., *op. cit.*, 1949, 1955; H.L. Movius, Jr. (guest editor), "Special Palaeolithic Issue", *Asian Perspectives*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1958. For an alternative terminology, see B. B. Lal, "Palaeoliths from the Beas and Banganga valleys, Panjab", *Ancient India*, vol. 12, 1956, pp. 65-67.

⁸ Augustus J. Sordinas, The functional character of crude tools in the tropics. Report for Anthropology 111, Harvard University, 1960, ms. Ralph Linton, in *Tree of Culture* (1955, New York, Knopf, p. 474), attempts to explain the distribution of different Lower Palaeolithic industrial traditions in India in ecological terms, but fails to make his point because he cites the industrial distribution incorrectly.

Furthermore, available archaeological evidence appears to indicate that hand-axes, though insignificantly represented numerically, were used along the southern fringes of the Southeast Asia area-such as Malaya, Java, the Philippines, and as far north as Japan.⁹ It is therefore possible that cultural influences from the Hand-axe-Levalloisian centers in Africa and southwestern Asia might have been diffused subsequently into our area along a coastal route, but we certainly need many more archaeological materials from the interior to confirm the latter area's negative aspect.

During the Upper Pleistocene period, several major changes took place in South-east Asia concerning both man's physical characteristics and his cultural equipment. In physique, both Solo Man of Java and Ch'ang-yang Man of central China show characteristic features of the neanderthaloids¹⁰; whether they were the direct descendants of *Pithecanthropus* in this same area or whether they were affiliated with the neanderthaloids elsewhere in the Old World, are questions beyond the scope of the present discussion. *Homo sapiens* appeared, in a later phase of the Upper Pleistocene, in Southwest China (Tzu-yang Man and Liu-chiang Man) and in Java (Wadjak Man). Franz Weidenreich¹¹ contends that Wadjak Man was probably ancestral to modern Australians, and Woo Ju-kang has shown that Liu-chiang Man and Tzu-yang Man exhibit both Mongoloid and Oceanic Negroid characteristics.¹² Coupled with the fossil man discoveries in other parts of the Far East, these findings appear to indicate that the modern races of Southeast Asia had not yet been formed during Upper Pleistocene, but that their differentiation may have initiated toward the end of that

⁹ Hand-axes are thus seemingly confined to the island arc along the southern and eastern fringes of Asia; see: Ann Sieveking, "The palaeolithic industry of Kota Tampan, Perak, Northwestern Malaya", *Asian Perspectives*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1958, pp. 91-102; H.L. Movius, Jr., *op. cit.*, 1949; G.H.R. von Koenigswald, "Preliminary report on a newly-discovered Stone Age culture from northern Luzon, Philippine Islands", *Asian Perspectives*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1958, pp. 69-70; H. Otley Beyer, "Philippine and East Asian archaeology, and its relation to the origin of the Pacific Islands population", *National Research Council of the Philippines Bulletin*, no. 29, 1948, p. 11; Robert B. Fox, *The Philippines in prehistoric times*. The Unesco National Commission of the Philippines. 1959, p. 12; Harumi Benu and C. S. Chard, "Pre-ceramic cultures in Japan", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 62, 1960, p. 820. For the occurrence of hand-axes in the interior of the Eastern Asiatic mainland, see: K.C. Chang, "New light on early man in China", *Asian Perspectives*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1958, p. 50; D.C. Graham, "Implements of prehistoric man in the West China Union University Museum of Archaeology", *Journal of the West China Border Research Society*, vol. 7, pp. 47-56, 1935.

¹⁰ F. Weidenreich, "Morphology of Solo Man", *Anth. Papers, Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, vol. 43, 1951; Chia Lan-po, "Notes on the human and some other mammalian remains from Chang-yang, Hupei", *Vertebrata Palasiatica*, vol. I, no. 3, 1957, pp. 247-57.

¹¹ F. Weidenreich, *Apes, Giants, and Man*, The University of Chicago Press 1946, p. 30. Cf. E. A. Hooton, *Up from the Ape*. MacMillan, New York, 1949, pp. 352-53.

¹² Pei Wen-chung and Woo Ju-kang, Tze-yang Man, 1957; Woo Ju-kang, "Human fossil found in Liukiang, Kwangsi, China", *Vertebrata Palasiatica*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1959.

period.¹³

In culture, the available archaeological data seem to suggest that during the Upper Pleistocene period there may again have been more than a single cultural tradition in Southeast Asia, and at least two regional phases seem to be discernable. One, represented in archaeological evidence solely by the Upper Anyathian of Upper Burma, appears to be a continuation of the older chopper-chopping-tool tradition of technology and of the generalized food-gathering subsistence into the Upper Pleistocene.¹⁴ The other, typified by the Ngandong industry of Java, the Tjabenge assemblage of Celebes, and the flake industry of Niah Cave in Borneo, also contained a significant amount of chopper-chopping-tool persistents, but these industries are in addition characterized by a considerable percentage of flake and blade artifacts in the assemblages.¹⁵ Stone and bone points have been found from the Ngandong beds of Java, and stone points from the Tjabenge industry of Celebes. In association with the Ngandong industry is a large number of bones of bison and water-buffalo, and with the Tjabenge, skeletons of pygmy elephants and stegodons. The association of rhinoceri and elephants with the flake artifacts at Niah is also suggested. One may infer that during the Upper Palaeolithic epoch the Southeastern Asiatic food-gatherers had differentiated into no less than two regional facies-interior food-collectors and lowland big-game hunters, somewhat analogous to the situation of western North America at the same period of time. This inference, to be sure, has yet to be better substantiated by future archaeological data, particularly data from the vast territory of South China, where the palaeolithic cultures are next to unknown. The origin of the flake and blade traditions in this part of the Old World is also an open question. Blade and flake industries have been found from deposits of corresponding temporal horizons in North China and India, and these are both possible sources of origin for the flake and the blade industries of Southeast Asia.¹⁶

As far as is known, the termination of the Pleistocene period in Southeast Asia did not involve major and decisive changes either in climate or in fauna. While glaciations and inter-glaciations mark the climatic fluctuations in the temperate zones of the northern hemisphere and in the high mountains of sub-tropical and tropical

¹³ Cf. J. B. Birdsell, "The problem of the early peopling of the Americas as viewed from Asia", *Papers on the Physical Anthropology of the American Indian* (W.S. Laughlin ed.), The Viking Fund, New York, 1951; C.S. Coon, S.M. Garn, and J.B. Birdsell, *Races*, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1950, pp. 65-75.

¹⁴ H. L. Movius, Jr., "The stone age of Burma", *Trans. Am. Phil. Soc.*, n. s., vol. 32, 1943.

¹⁵ van Heekeren, *The Stone Age of Indonesia*, 1957, pp. 37-54; Tom Harrison, "New archaeological and ethnological results from Niah Caves, Sarawak", *Man*, vol. 59, 1959, pp. 1-8.

¹⁶ Cf. Movius, *op. cit.*, 1955, p. 538.

South China, the lowlands of Southeast Asia probably experienced no major climatic changes other than the progression and retrogression of sea-water levels and the relative amount of rainfall. Studies of faunal remains from Southwest China and from the Niah Cave of Borneo have led Pei Wen-chung and Lord Medway to conclude, separately, that the present natural environment of Southwest China and Borneo has been in existence for more than a single geological period, and that the termination of Pleistocene did not leave any remarkable impressions in these regions.¹⁷

No matter whether these conclusions can or cannot be generalized for the entire area of Southeast Asia, or at least a large part of it, the fact remains that both of the Upper Palaeolithic traditions of Southeast Asia continued into the post-Pleistocene period. In mainland Southeast Asia and in scattered places in the archipelago region, the Upper Palaeolithic food-collectors persisted into the Recent period, and their industrial remains are known as the Hoabinhian and its related phases. The Hoabinhian artifacts are characterized by crudely chipped pebble tools, essentially a persistent expression of the palaeolithic chopper-chopping-tools, and their subsistence patterns were probably characterized by the hunting of small game and gathering of molluses.¹⁸ In the islands, the Recent period industries, as known in Java, Sumatra, Borneo, the Lesser Sundas, and the Philippines, are characterized by flakes and blades which are better made, more refined, and smaller in size than the Upper Palaeolithic flakes and blades, but are essentially the continuation of the same industrial traditions.¹⁹ Big land mammals did not become extinct in all places, though smaller land mammals were the main object of the chase. Human skeletons found in association with these Recent period industries show, however, that by this time a distinctly Oceanic Negroid population has been formed in this area and that the entire Southeast Asia region was probably occupied by peoples having physical features similar to the modern inhabitants of Melanesia and part of Australia.²⁰

¹⁷ Pei Wen.chung, "The living environment of the Chinese primitive men", *Vertebrata Palasiatica*, vol. 4, 1960, p. 41; Lord Medway, "Food bone in Niah Cave Excavation", *Sarawak Museum Journal*, vol. 8, 1958, p. 630.

¹⁸ Madeleine Colani, "La civilisation Hoabinhienne Extrême-Orientale", *Bull. Soc. Pre. Franc.*, vol. 36, 1939, pp. 170-74.

¹⁹ Van Heekeren, *The Stone Age of Indonesia*, 1957, pp. 86-106.

²⁰ P. V. von Stein Callenfels, "De immigratie van de Papoea-Melanesoiden", *Mensch en Maatschappij*, vol. 9, 1933, p. 339; "The Melanesoid civilisations of Eastern Asia", *Bulletin of the Raffles Museum*, vol. 1, 1936, pp. 1-51. See also: H.D. Collings, "Notes on a recent paper: 'The Melanesoid civilisations of Eastern Asia'", *Bull. Raffles Museum*, vol. 1, 1938, pp. 122-123; D.A. Hooijer, "Fossil evidence of Australmelanesian migration in Malaysia", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 6, 1950, pp. 416-22.

Beginning of Agriculture

Did agriculture originate in Southeast Asia? Culture historians are agreed that the neolithic revolution emerged independently in more than a single nuclear area in the world, and that the Near East and Nuclear America were two of these areas where the crucial transition in subsistence modes from food-gathering to food-producing has been well-documented. There are certainly other areas where such events could have happened independently, and one such area long and much favored by ethnologists is the tropical region of Southeast Asia. Ralph Linton states:²¹

A second and quite independent center of plant and animal domestication occurred in Southeastern Asia. The dividing line between this and the Southwestern Asia area of domestication apparently ran north and south through Central India and was directly-related to differences in ecology. The climate of the Ganges Valley and of much of Southern India resembles that of the coastal regions of Southeastern Asia from Burma to Indochina and of the large Indonesian islands. Its outstanding features are heavy seasonal rainfall and constant heat. Most of this territory was covered with dense jungle in ancient times. Seed bearing grasses, which require plenty of sun and light, were scarce here, but the jungle provided numerous wild roots and fruits upon which the ancient food-gathering economy of the region depended heavily. Throughout much of this region mountains run down fairly close to the coast and changes in altitude produce marked changes in environment. It seems highly probable that this led to the domestication of different crops in the lowlands and in the highlands.

Linton goes on to enumerate yam, taro, banana, breadfruit, and paper mulberry as having originated in the tropical lowlands of Southeast Asia, where they were associated with a coastal and riverine culture. Yams and certain varieties of rice he lists as crops first raised by the hill peoples of the same region.²² Such hypotheses as Linton's have been made on the basis of the botanical distribution of plant and animal species in this area, and according to their distribution among some of the primitive peoples of the ethnographic present in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific regions whose cultures in general may reflect conditions during the early neolithic periods.

There are two different perspectives pertaining to the problem of agricultural origins in Southeast Asia: one regarding the beginning in this area of the abstract idea

²¹ Ralph Linton, *op. cit.*, 1955, pp. 95-96.

²² Ralph Linton, *op. cit.*, 1955, pp. 96-102.

and actual knowledge of the cultivation of plants, and the other concerning the first domestication of certain plant species that grew wild here. These two aspects of the same problem are surely related, but are neither one and the same nor mutually determined. It is highly probable that the Southeast Asian tropics served as a new potential ground for carrying out successful experiments indomesticating new plant species growing wild in the natural habitat of the area, but this probability does not naturally lead to the conclusion that Southeast Asia was at the same time an original birth-place of agriculture where the idea and knowledge of plant cultivation came into being independent of external stimuli. To determine whether agriculture as a complex of ideas and techniques began in Southeast Asia independent of other agricultural centers, it is necessary to examine the stage in Southeast Asian culture history as established by archaeological evidence when agriculture was practised in a neolithic village context.

Archaeological investigations in Southeast Asia have been spotty. South China is beginning to be explored archaeologically, Indo-China and Malaya both have a considerable amount of field material, but the rest of the area remains little known. We cannot say that the stage of culture history in every region of Southeast Asia immediately after the mesolithic cultures is clearly understood. We can only say that all available data at our disposal point in the distinct direction of a cultural stage that can best be characterized as sub-neolithic. Excavated sites in Kwangtung,²³ the Bacson district of Tonkin,²⁴ and Sarawak of Borneo²⁵ all show that essentially

²³ Mo Chih, "The stone implements unearthed at Hsi-chiao-shan, Nan-hai county, Kwang-tung", *Archaeological Journal*, vol. of 1959, no. 4.

²⁴ See, for instance, Madeleine Colani's observation at the Sao-Dong cave in the Hoabinh district of Tonkin: "La division en périodes [with proto-neoliths appearing in the later periods] peut-être critiquée; dans ces dépôts très meubles où l'on ne voit pour ainsi dire aucune stratification, rien n'indique ces divisions. Elles sont basées sur des observations en quelque sorte morphologique: outillage excessivement grossier à une profondeur de 2 mètres, moins fruste et plus varié au voisinage de 1 mètre; de 70 à 80 centimètres jusqu'à la surface, les perfectionnements sont plus grands". ("L'Age de la pierre dans la province de Hoabinh", *Mem. Serv. G.Soi. d'Indochine*, vol. 14, fasc. 1, 1927, Hanoi, p. 18.)

²⁵ Tom Harrison, *op. cit.*, 1959, p. 5. The following statements are of special interest:

"There is virtually no overlap between the square tools - with a rich related ceramic and other artifact activity- in the subsurface layers, and the well defined underlying land in which no tools have flattened faces, but characteristically they are round in median cross-section. Moreover, the round tools have not been found connected with the many extended burials of men with pronouncedly shovel-shaped incisors of 'Mongoloid type', who continue on from later Neolithic. Skeletal material associated with the earlier 'round-axe neolithic', is still somewhat ambiguous; but body structure is distinctly slighter, possibly 'Negrito'.

Although no overlapping upward with the later neolithic, they [the round-axe neolithic] do merge downwards into and intermingle with the less securely defined mesoliths. We now have a fine series of transitional pieces, including three big round axes found together, almost polished at the cutting edge, partially edge-ground in adjacent parts, and heavily flaked off in crude manner towards the butt. The material used for these tools varies..... But in only one 'round axe' is the stone the same as that used for

mesolithic cultures persisted into the period when pottery and polished stone implements appeared in archaeological deposits. Ceramics and polished stone implements which occur in such nuclear areas as the Near East and North China in Neolithic village context appeared in Southeast Asia at sites whose total assemblages indicate continuing mesolithic cultures- in fauna, cultural debris, and stone inventory- where either agriculture is not evidenced, as for instance at the site of Somrong Sen in Cambodia,²⁶ or in their total cultural contexts the occurrence of agriculture appears extremely unlikely, as for instance at the site of Hang-Rao Cave in Annam.²⁷ A number of explanations may possibly account for such cultural associations, but the simplest, most straightforward, and most probable one is that the mesolithic cultures persisted in Southeast Asia for a lengthy duration of time, during which some neolithic technology- ceramics and polished stone tools- was introduced as a result of cultural contacts with other neolithic cultures which had *both* neolithic technology and agriculture.

Is it possible that neolithic technology emerged in Southeast Asia among the mesolithic hunter-fishers quite independently and prior to agriculture, and therefore that the appearance in this region first of neolithic technology and then of agriculture does not have to be explained in terms of cultural contacts? It is certainly possible-but not at all probable. Aside from the consideration that neolithic technology appeared here in a persisting hunting-fishing assemblage, which makes it appear intrusive rather than spontaneous, it is improbable because both polished stones and pottery- and more specifically the corded form which was the first pottery that appeared in Southeast Asia- were, along with agriculture and other characteristic features of neolithic cultures, *integral* parts of the neolithic culture in the area immediately to the north of Southeast Asia, and because overwhelming evidence of agriculture appeared in Southeast Asia during a subsequent stage of its culture history along with an entirely new horizon of culture which was definitely intrusive from the Huangho Basin of North China. Therefore, as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, we confront two sets of separate problems: the origin of neolithic technology in the sub-neolithic horizon of this area, and the origin of agriculture. The available archaeological evidence indicates that both of these origins can be found in North China during various stages of that area's culture history. After the introduction of agriculture into

any of the later, quadrangular tools".

²⁶ Eugene C. Worman, Jr., "Somrong Sen and the Reconstruction of Prehistory in Indo-China", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 5, 1949, pp. 320-321.

²⁷ H. Mansuy and J. Fromaget, "Stations neolithiques de Hang-Rao et de Khé-Tong", *Bull. du Service Géol. de l'Indo chine*, vol. 13, fasc. 3, 1924, p. 6.

Southeast Asia, new experiments were probably carried out with locally indigenous plants and a rich variety of new food crops began to be cultivated.

The evidence pointing to such conclusions is scanty, but its meaning is unequivocal. In North China, we know that before the stage of neolithic farming cultures- known widely in the western part of North China as the Yangshao Culture, and characterized archaeologically by painted pottery vessels- there was probably a ceramic horizon marked by pottery with cord and other textile impressions. In the Yangshao and the subsequent Lungshanoid, Shang, and Chou cultural stages, the corded-pottery had never ceased to be a prominent ceramic tradition. In these North China contexts, cord-marked pottery and polished stone axes occurred as integral parts of a full-fledged neolithic complex, including settled village life, the cultivation of food and fabric crops, and the domestication of animals.²⁸ In the Yangshao Stage, the southern boundaries of the Huangho Neolithic lay along the northern and eastern slopes of the Tsinling Mountains, but cord-marked pottery, partially polished-stone axes, and totally ground axes have been found continuing from the Tsinling slopes southward into the Greater Chinese Southwest and most of Southeast Asia south of China.²⁹ Moreover, in these regions- the Chinese Southwest and Southeast Asia south of China- these neolithic technological elements also occurred in a hunting-fishing cultural context in strata stratigraphically lower than fully neolithic complexes. The continuous geographical distribution of these neolithic technological elements tends to render improbable the possibility of independent inventions of these traits separately in North China and Southeast Asia, and the contextual associations favor North China as being the source and Southeast Asia as the recipient of these technological innovations. This hypothesis on the North China origins of neolithic technology in Southeast Asia has still to be confirmed or modified by a precise chronology for both North China neolithic and Southeast Asian sub-neolithic, which is completely lacking at the present. All things considered, however, I think that currently available information makes the hypothesis itself appear quite plausible.

Supposing that the persistent mesolithic hunter-fisher-collectors of Southeast Asia, possibly Negroid in racial affiliation, adopted neolithic technology from their Northern Chinese contemporaries, we confront still another problem which defies solution at the present time: Were basic ideas of food-cultivation as well as technical

²⁸ K.C. Chang, "Dating the neolithic culture of North China", *Bull. Inst. Hist. Philol., Acad. Sin.*, vol. 30, 1959, p. 279.

²⁹ K.C. Chang, "Chinese prehistory in Pacific perspective: Some hypotheses and problems", *Harvard Jour. Asiat. Stud.*, vol. 22, 1959, p. 133; "A working hypothesis for the early cultural history of South China", *Bull. Inst. Ethn., Acad. Sin.* 7, 1959, p. 86

knowledge of nonindigenous plants and animals also introduced among these people? In this connection one must constantly bear in mind the fact that in tropical forests of Southeast Asia where the recipient mesolithic peoples dwelt there were plenty of potentially domesticable food-plants, many of which have since been domesticated, particularly root and fruit plants. In being exposed to external influence of Neolithic technology these peoples must have been exposed to the knowledge of food-production at the same time, but the incipient cultivation of tropical crops is difficult to establish archaeologically. Archaeological assemblages belonging to this "sub-neolithic" phase of Southeast Asiatic culture history, to be sure, indicate plainly a predominantly hunting-fishing-collecting subsistence. There is, nevertheless, still the possibility that agriculture was introduced to some extent among the Negroid inhabitants who may have begun to experiment on certain root and fruit plants and some of whom at least had become "incipient cultivators." Solutions of these problems in the future will certainly depend upon more problem-oriented and scientifically conducted excavations.

Whatever crops and how much agriculture will prove to have appeared among the persisting Negroid hunter-fisher-collectors in Southeast Asia, we know for a fact that both cereal crops and full-time farming life were brought into Southeast Asia by Mongoloid immigrants from North China. This conclusion has been jointly established by physical anthropological, ethnological, and archaeological evidence.

Skeletal materials uncovered from the cemetery sites in North China of the Yangshao stage show that by the neolithic period the inhabitants of North China were Mongoloid in physical characteristics.³⁰ Studies of skeletons and skulls of the Pao-chi cemetery of the Yangshao Neolithic further indicate that the North China inhabitants during that period exhibited many distinctive features that are widely found among the so-called Southern or Oceanic Mongoloids.³¹ Physical anthropologists have long suspected that the explosive expansion of the Mongoloid race throughout Eastern Asia during relatively recent periods was an event intimately related to the diffusion of agriculture.³² Recent findings of neolithic sites in South China begin to bear this

³⁰ D. Black, "On the human skeletal remains from Yangshao Ts'un in comparison with recent North China skeletal materials", *Palaeontologia Sinica*, ser. D, vol. 1, fasc. 3, 1925; "A study of Kansu and Honan Aëneolithic skulls and specimens from later Kansu prehistoric sites in comparison with North China and other recent crania", *Palaeontologia Sinica*, ser. D, vol. 6, fasc. 1, 1928; Y. Yen, C. Z. Liu, and Y. M. Gu, "Report on the skeletal remains from the neolithic site at Bao Ji, Shensi", *Vertebrata Palasiatica* vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 103-111, 1960; Y. Yen, "A preliminary study of human skulls unearthed from Ch'ichia culture burials in Kansu", *Archaeological Journal*, vol. 9, 1955, pp. 193-97.

³¹ Y. Yen, C. Z. Liu, and Y. M. Gu, *op. cit.*, 1960.

³² J. Birdsell, *op. cit.*, 1951, p. 2; F. Barth, "The southern Mongoloid migration", *Man*, vol. 52, 1952, p.

out in demonstrating that Mongoloid skeletons in South China appeared on the top of a mesolithic-Negroid substratum in simultaneous association with (a) evidence of cereal agriculture, and (b) a distinctive style of culture that has been described as the Lungshanoid and is apparently derivative from the Lungshanoid stage of North China neolithic, a stage when the population pressure and increased subsistence potentials brought about an explosive expansion of village farmers toward the east and the south.³³ In the Pacific Seaboard of Eastern and South China, these Lungshanoid remains were found in contexts that can best be described as "site-intrusive units" and certainly point to the immigration of whole peoples and assemblages.³⁴ In the Southwest and in Southeast Asia south of China, Lungshanoid elements appeared in clusters or individually, indicating that the replacement was gradual and that it involved a certain amount of intermixture with the native population and the recipient culture.³⁵ It was a replacement nevertheless, because physical anthropological evidence shows that the neolithic remains in these areas were associated primarily and predominantly with Mongoloid skeletons, and that skeletal remains of the Negroid race rapidly diminished in the archaeological deposits.³⁶ Ethnographic evidence shows that Negroid and Negritoid peoples still persisted in certain pocket and marginal locales in Southeast Asia, but Oceanic Mongoloid peoples unquestionably predominate.³⁷

North China neolithic evidence indicates that the first Mongoloid farmers planted several varieties of food-crops, but millet was without question the leading staple.³⁸ When the Lungshanoid farmers migrated southward into Southeast Asia, millet was evidently brought with them. Ethnographers are agreed that millet was the oldest cereal crop planted in Southeast Asia; it is still cultivated by a number of ethnic

508.

³³ K.C. Chang, *op. cit.* (A working hypothesis.....) 1959, p. 94.

³⁴ For the definition of the term "site-unit intrusion", see G. R. Willey (*et al*), "An archaeological classification of culture contact situations", *Mem. Soc. Am. Arch.*, no.11, 1956, p. 7. Irving Rouse, in a more recent study ("The inference of migrations from anthropological evidence", *Migrations in New World Culture History*, University of Arizona, 1958, p. 64), has listed five criteria according to which a migration, he says, can be demonstrated. The Lungshanoid migration into South China meets these five conditions without exception.

³⁵ See Pearson's discussion on Southeast Asia neolithic pottery in this issue. Compare: W. G. Solheim, II, "The Kulanay pottery complex in the Philippines", *Artibus Asiae*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1957, p. 288.

³⁶ R. Verneau, "Les crânes humaines du gisement préhistorique de Pho-binh-gia (Tonkin)", *L'Anthropologie*, vol. 20, 1909, pp. 545-59; P. Huard and E. Saurin, "Etat actuel de la craniologie indo-chinoise". *Bull. Sen. Géol. l'Indochine*, vol. 25, fasc. 1, 1938.

³⁷ Fay-cooper Cole, *The Peoples of Malaysia*, New York, Nostrand, 1945, pp. 324-37; J. P. Kleiweg de Zwaan, "The anthropology of the Indian archipelago and its problems", *Science in the Netherlands East Indies*, Amsterdam, 1929, pp.192-208.

³⁸ K. C. Chang, *op. cit.* (Chinese prehistory...), 1959, p. 106.

groups, mostly of the interior, mountainous areas³⁹ In the new, tropical environment, however, the Lungshanoid cultures inevitably underwent adaptive changes, some of which were drastic. Archaeological evidence from all over Southeast- Asia indicates the prevalence of mound and pile dwellings, which were apparently environmentally oriented culture complexes.⁴⁰ Husks of rice have been found widely in a number of sites in North and South China which can be dated to the proto-Lungshan Complex, or the transitional stage from the Yangshao to the Lungshanoid.⁴¹ Wild rice still grows in the monsoon areas of southern and eastern Asia, and it is highly probable that it was one of the new plants that the Lungshanoid farmers successfully cultivated in the new, tropical habitat.⁴² With mature farming knowledge and techniques, the Lungshanoid farmers must also have been successful in cultivating certain other plants in Southeast Asia, particularly root and fruit crops. If the subneolithic Negroid population already had such knowledge, this knowledge may have been passed along among the new immigrants who may have added even more of the indigenous food plants to the existing inventory. In any case, aside from root and fruit crops, which are at present archaeologically unsubstantiable, the process of the first cultivation of cereal crops in Southeast Asia now appears to have been established.

Before direct evidence pertaining to prehistoric agriculture in many parts of Southeast Asia comes to light, archaeologists may find useful the studies of remains of stone implements, pottery, and other artifacts that might have been left by farmers in those areas, and which provide valuable information on the cultural context of the prehistoric farmers and on the historical relationships between them and the outside world. Thirty years ago, Robert von Heine-Geldern made a bold and brilliant attempt at classifying the seemingly orderless remains of stone- axes from South China, Southeast Asia, and Oceania into three major classes: round axes, shouldered axes, and rectangular axes.⁴³ This classification has served as a basic point of departure for subsequent efforts in postulating about the ethnic identities, linguistic affiliations, and physical anthropological associations of the stone axes, and a chronological

³⁹ Tadao Kano, "Various cereals cultivated in Indonesia, especially on the chronology of rice and millet culture", *Studies in the Ethnology and Prehistory of Southeast Asia*, vol.1, 1946, Tokyo.

⁴⁰ Y. H. Tai, "Kan-lan: a study of the primitive habitation in Southwestern China", *Inst. Southwestern Soc. and Econ., Lingnan University, Memoirs*, ser. A, no. 3, 1948, Canton; Y. Y. Li, "On the platform-house found among some Pingpu tribes in Formosa", *Bull. Inst. Ethn., Acad. Sin.*, no. 3, 1957.

⁴¹ K.C. Chang, *op. cit.* (Chinese prehistory...), 1959; *op. cit.* (A working hypothesis...), 1959.

⁴² Cf. Joseph Spencer. "The migration of rice from mainland southeast Asia into Indonesia", *Abstracts of Symposium Papers, Tenth Pacific Science Congress, Honolulu, Hawaii*, 1961, p.139. It may be significant to note that the appearance of cultivated rice in North China in the proto-Lungshan stage coincides with the expansion of Northern Chinese farmers into sub-tropical south China.

⁴³ Robert von Heine-Geldern, "Urheimat wd früheste Wanderungen der Austronesier", *Anthropos*, vol. 27, 1932, pp. 543-619.

framework of Southeast Asiatic neolithic cultures has thus been rendered possible."⁴⁴ Lacking tightly demonstrated contextual information, this framework of stone axes is certainly inadequate, but the paucity of excavated materials from the neolithic stage in Southeast Asia makes it as yet impossible for us to tie this scheme in neatly with events probably happening in this area in the spheres of culture and society in a broader sense.

Introduction of Irrigation and Metallurgy

The developmental concepts applicable to the temperate regions of the northern hemisphere and worked out according to the prehistoric sequences in such civilizational centers as the Near East and North China⁴⁵ cannot always be uncritically applied to the tropical monsoon sphere of Southeast Asia. In many regions here the amount of rainfall is not only abundant, it is even predictable, and thus in these regions the early practice of irrigation would not necessarily be as important as in the temperate zones to the north in terms of subsistence patterns. On the other hand, all places in Southeast are not such lazy man's paradises: the northern half of the area still has dry seasons, many regions on the wrong side of the mountains and at higher altitudes do not get as much rainfall as the latitude may suggest, and the many lowlands and river valleys were evidently marshy and unmanageable under primitive engineering conditions.⁴⁶ In fact, the social consequences following the application of irrigation techniques in many instances among the early Southeast Asian farmers cannot be exaggerated. To some scholars, the beginning of wet rice cultivation in Southeast Asia accounts for the breakdown of the village economy and the formation of the tribe and the state. The process involved in this connection is widely known, and it involves social control and social groupings as well as sheer productivity.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Heine-Geldern, *op. cit.*, H. O. Beyer, *op. cit.*, 1948.

⁴⁵ E.g., J.H. Steward, *Theory of culture change*. University of Illinois Press, 1955; R.J. Braidwood, "Levels in prehistory: a model for the consideration of the evidence", *The Evolution of Man*, The University of Chicago Press, 1960.

⁴⁶ E. H. G. Dobby, *Southeast Asia*, University of London Press, 1950.

⁴⁷ K. J. Pelzer, "Pioneer settlement in the Asiatic tropics", *Amur. Geog. Soc., Special Publication* no. 29, New York, 1945; R. Linton, "The Tanala of Madagascar", in: *The Individual and His Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1939, pp. 251-90; C. Geertz, *The development of the Javanese economy: a socio-cultural approach*, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956; K. C. Chang, "Some aspects of social structure and settlement patterns in Southeast Asia", *Bull. Inst. Ethn. Acad. Sin.*, no. 6, 1958. pp. 59-78.

The beginning of irrigation in a large part of Southeast Asia is, unfortunately, not archaeologically documented. Speculations as to its emergence and consequences can in most cases only be made on the basis of indirect evidence such as what is expressed explicitly in the cultural inventory. The early civilizations of South China, however, are sufficiently known to provide a number of instructive clues for the rest of Southeast Asia. The original inspirations responsible for the emergence of civilizations in South China apparently came from North China. North China influences during various stages of the culture history of Southeast Asia were more or less continuous, but for the sake of clarity it seems proper to specify in this connection the major waves of peoples and cultures that moved from the north to the south in the earlier segments of Southeast Asian culture history.

There is no need here to go into the palaeolithic and mesolithic periods, when the cultural relationships were manifold and the major cultural centers had a distribution different from that of later periods. After the beginning of agriculture, there were at least three well-delineated waves of cultural influence of varying intensity and different nature from the Huangho valley to Southeast Asia: the Lungshanoid migration and penetration; the Eastern Chou civilizational impact; and the Han and Ch'in political conquest. The Lungshanoid problem has been described above, and the Han and Ch'in political conquests will be mentioned below. At this point we are solely concerned with the Eastern Chou influence.

The Lungshanoid expansion was responsible for the population of most of South China by farmers, and probably for the introduction of cereal agriculture and village life into the rest of Southeast Asia. As far as South China is concerned, the Lungshanoid stage was the time when a number of regional cultural traditions became established. Civilization and urbanism subsequently appeared in North China, and the earliest phase is known archaeologically as the Shang. Shang was taken over by the Chou around 1100 B.C. During the Shang and the early Western Chou dynasties, neolithic farmers apparently continued their old ways of life in the south, but the contacts with the northern civilizations were presumably responsible for the emergence of the Geometric horizon-style and bronze metallurgy in the eastern part of South China. By the middle of the Ch'un-ch'iu period- the first half of Eastern Chou, from about 700 through about 500 B. C.- North China civilization underwent another explosive expansion toward both the north and the south. Into South China this North China civilizational wave brought iron metallurgy and, in certain regions, a state organization modelled after the Eastern Chou proto-types of North China. At least five parallel cultural traditions became discernable in South China and northern

Indo-China: the Yueh of the southeastern coast; the Ch'u of central Yangtze valley; the Pa and Shu of the Szechwan Basin; the Li-fan culture of easternmost –Tibetan Plateau; and the Tien of Yunnan and northern Indo-China. It is both impossible and irrelevant to characterize all five traditions here, but I might state that the emergence of these early civilizations in South China was clearly the result of North China influence. In material culture, art style, and burial customs, an essentially similar major culture tradition was exemplified throughout China. In each of the South China civilizations, there were highly distinctive original features and also cultural elements that show influences from elsewhere, such as the steppe nomadic characteristics among the Li-fan group which was probably directly in touch with the steppe nomads of Chinese Turkestan of the second half of the first millennium B. C. For the majority of cases, however, it is archaeologically clear and demonstrable that these early civilizations were based on agriculture and were established under Eastern Chou influence characterized by a highly developed iron metallurgy and probably intensified irrigation.⁴⁸

The earliest historic record relating to the technique of irrigation in South China appeared in Ssu-ma Chien's *Shih Chi* compiled in the first century B. C., in passages referring to the states of Ch'u and Yueh during the middle of the first millennium B. C. A technique of *huo-keng shui-ju* is mentioned in volumes 30 and 129 of *Shih Chi* as being characteristic of the cultivation techniques of South China. The meaning of this particular phrase is not altogether clear, but sinologues are agreed that it refers to a kind of irrigation technique.⁴⁹ How far back this technique was employed in this region is unknown both historically and archaeologically. In the region to the southwest of the Ch'u, archaeological evidence has appeared to indicate that irrigation and iron metallurgy began together when Ch'u's cultural influence had been heavily felt, probably some years before the late fourth century B. C. when a massive invasion force was sent by King Wei of Ch'u to crush the emergent Kingdom of Tien in the Yunnan area.

Such evidence was first brought to light during the late 'thirties by Wu Chin-ting and his collaborators of the Central Museum of China, who carried out an extensive archaeological survey in the territory of Ta-li county in northwestern Yunnan along

⁴⁸ For the archaeological evidence for the early civilizations of South China, see the author's forthcoming book. *The Archaeology of Ancient China*, chapter 9.

⁴⁹ Sadao Nishijima, "The system of rice cultivation in ancient China", *Oriental Studies Presented to Sei (Kiyosk) Wada*, Tokyo, Dainippon Yubenkai Kodansha, 1951, pp. 469-87; Amano Motonosuke, "A study of 'kuo-keng shui-non,'" *Shigaku-Zasshi*, vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 58-61, 1952; K. Yoneda, "The technique of rice cultivation in Ch'iang-huai at later Han", *Shirin*, vol. 38, no. 5 pp. 1-18, 1955.

the southern slopes of Tien-ts'ang mountain and around the shores of Lake Erh. They located no less than thirty-eight early cultural sites in this region, which have been grouped into four stages: Early Prehistoric, typified by Fo-ting A, Fo-ting B, and Ma-lung I; Middle Prehistoric, by Malung II and Lung-ch'uan; Late Prehistoric and Initial Nanchao, by Pai-yun; and Nanchao and Later, by Ch'mg-pi and Chung-ho B. The cultural sequences at Fo-ting and Ma-lung are of particular significance to the problems at hand. The Fo-ting sites are situated on the slope of a low hill and consist of scattered remains of cultural debris. A dispersed pattern of settlement has been recognized here, but terraces were built and some of these probably served as farming fields. Pottery and polished stone implements were found at these sites, but evidence of potter's wheel, irrigation, and metallurgy is completely lacking. During a later stage in the occupation of the Ma-lung site, significant changes occurred. In the first place, many larger terraces were built on the slopes of the hill, and some of those terraces were apparently used for cultivation. Secondly, water-ditches were excavated to direct waterflows into the fields. Thirdly, metal implements were used, as is indicated by fragments of bronze and iron appearing in the cultural deposits. In the fourth place, two concentric earthen walls were built surrounding the village. It may be important to note that the occupation of the Ma-lung site during its entire time span was continuous, which probably indicates that the above-mentioned changes occurred during the occupation of the site by the same cultural group. These changes indicate a decisive improvement in technology (irrigation and metallurgy) on the one hand, and an intensification of social specialization and warfare on the other. In other words, as far as the Ta-li region is concerned, a stage of neolithic village-farmers is seen to have been followed by an incipient formation of state and civilization as a further consequence of the agricultural development and as a direct result of the introduction of irrigation and the use of bronze and iron implements.⁵⁰

Wu's investigations in the Ta-li area are important because here the archaeological data documented in one continuous sequence the transition from one stage of cultural development to another. These two stages of cultural development, however, are found separately throughout the Chinese Southwest. The neolithic village-farmer stage has been mentioned earlier. The stage of the metal culture, on the other hand, is represented by a number of rich and significant finds in this part of Southeast Asia, among which are the cemetery site at Shih-chai-shan in Chin-ning Hsien in Yünnan⁵¹ and the habitation and burial site at Dong-son in Annam.⁵² These

⁵⁰ C. T. Wu, C. Y. Tseng, and C. C. Wang, "Report on an archaeological survey of the Ts'ang Erh district, Yünnan," *Memoirs of National Central Museum*, ser. B, no. 1, Lichuang, 1942.

⁵¹ Yünnan Museum, *Report of the excavations of the ancient cemetery at Shih-chai-shan in Chinning*

findings show a highly elaborate and sophisticated culture with tribal organization, intensive class stratification, much tightened industrial specialization, great artistic development, and the prevalence of warfare. A variety of crops were cultivated, including rice and millet, and water-buffalo was domesticated. Bronze and iron were locally founded, and not only utensils and ornaments but also farming and craft implements and weapons were made of metal. Ceremonialism was developed to an elaborate degree, and human sacrifice is in evidence.

I wish to emphasize at this juncture that the civilizations of South China and northern Indo-china during the late first millennium B.C. and the beginning of the first millennium A. D. are of extreme importance to the study of the culture history of Southeast Asia as a whole. In the past, these civilizations were known primarily from historical literature and only spottily from archaeology. Current archeological data on these civilizations have greatly increased our knowledge of them, and point to a number of important problems for future study, two of which are of special interest to us here. The first concerns a typology of the civilizations involved, and the second has to do with the specific problem of the pre-Hindu background of the Southeast Asian culture. Let us dwell upon these problems briefly.

The first problem raises the question of how civilizations are to be classified generally. For our purposes this is a question that we probably do not have to answer, and indeed I am not sure that it can be satisfactorily answered at all. The practical solution lies in taking a number of specific archaeologically known civilizations and placing them for various purposes into certain shifting categories according to certain specific criteria. Some possible criteria that can be used here are the raw material for artifact-making (bronze, copper, iron), city life (urban and non-urban), political system (tribal, state, and empire), art style, writing, and so forth. One set of these criteria is not necessarily "better" than any other, and the selection of one over the rest may depend entirely upon the specific purposes for which the classification is to be made. An over-all classification taking into account as many criteria as possible may be plausible, but seems impractical at the moment.

We might, then, state our purpose for making a classification here, a purpose according to which we might select our criteria. Since we have described these civilizations in connection with the appearance of intensive irrigation and metallurgy

Hsien, Yunnan, 1959.

⁵² O.R.T. Janse, *The ancient dwelling-site of Dong-son (Thanh-Hoa, Annam)*, Institut Belgedes Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Bruges, St. Catherine Press, 1958.

in Southeast Asia, it is apparent that we need a categorization of those civilizations in which the roles played by these technological innovations and their societal and cultural implications will be made instantaneously explicit. Again there may be a number of ways of achieving this purpose, but I think the following criterion will probably suffice: What was the interplay between the settlement patterns and the industrial specialization among these early civilizations in South China and northern Indo-China? We know for a fact that for the neolithic cultures preceding these civilizations in South China, the basic unit of subsistence and political autonomy was at the village level; within the village there may have been some differentiations as to status and role, both political and economic, but for the village unit as a whole no marked specialization has been evidenced. We must now ask to what extent this state of affairs was altered under the civilizational conditions resulting from the introduction of intensive irrigation and bronze and iron metallurgy.

Because the historical and archaeological data available for these civilizations varies widely, it is impossible to answer all phases of this question equally well in every case. We can, however, construct a pair of polar types, and the differential distance between them can thus serve as the possible range within which specific cases can be plotted. At one end of this spectrum there is the state of Ch'u, and on the other, the kingdom of Tien. The contrasts between these polar types in terms of settlement patterns and industrial specialization can best be expressed in the following table:

Ch' u	Tien
wet-rice agriculture	rice agriculture, probably irrigated
evidence of settlements' differentiation in basic economic and industrial activities-aristocratic center vs. industrial villages vs. farming hamlets	no evidence of settlements' differentiation in basic economic and industrial activities-aristocracy, industrialists, farmers, and priests constituted the populace of one and the same village-community
highly developed metallurgy of both bronze and iron in all aspects of the artifact inventory	highly developed bronze metallurgy for ceremonial artifacts, religious art, weapons and for agricultural implements, but iron developed to a

	much lesser extent
State organization; a differentiated group of settlements at the top of a political hierarchy including a number of such groups	absence of such state organization; there might have been multi-village alliance, but the basis of such alliances was probably laid out and reinforced by military power rather than through economic and political channels

In this contrast, the core of the difference clearly lies in the internal and external differentiation of the settlement-groups. In the case of Ch'u, settlements were differentiated both internally and externally. The capital group internally consisted of a number of settlements differentiated in function: a town serving as the aristocratic center in which administrative and religious functions were served and economic redistribution was probably concentrated; several areas of industry where specialized metallurgy and other handicrafts were practised; and some farming villages. Externally, the capital group served as the political, economic, and religious center of the entire state, which consisted of a number of similarly constituted groups of settlements. Such a society and culture as the Ch'u's then appears to be a civilization in the classical sense of the term, and can certainly be compared with the Shang and Chou civilizations of North China. In the case of Tien, settlements do not seem to cluster in groups in which each of them served a specialized set of functions. Single settlements seem to be the basic unit of economy, politics, and religion; internally the settlement's populace was apparently stratified, and there was a highly privileged aristocracy at the top. Externally, however, such single settlements do not appear to form a coherent and stable super-structure, and the alliance among them, if any, must have been based on military conquest and only to a lesser extent on trade. Such cultures and societies as the Tien can find analogies in the Lungshanoid villages of North China, the Yayoi stage of Japan, and the Circum-Caribbean cultures of South America. For this type of "civilization," the term of "stratified village-farmers" may be coined-*stratified*, to stress the internal differentiation, and *village-farmers* to underline the external autonomy.

In the culture history of North China, the stratified village-farmers' stage served as a transitional stage between the primary village-farmers and the urban civilization, and in Japan the Yayoi and the Kofun- a Yayoi type with intensified military conquests- served to pave the way toward the emergence of urban civilization during

the Nara stage which followed. In Southeast Asia, the stratified village-farmers of the Tien and the Dongsonian assemblages to the south of South China would seem to be an ideal transitional stage between the village-farmers and the state civilizations.

Was it actually, and did state civilizations occur in Southeast Asia after the Dongsonian? We shall discuss these problems below; but first let us see to what extent the Tien type of civilization can be traced in the rest of Southeast Asia.

A type of society and civilization does not necessarily concur with a style of culture and parts of culture that can be described as "Dongsonian." Dongsonian bronzes, iron implements, megaliths, and pottery have been discovered widely in Indo-China, Indonesia, and Malaya,⁵³ but more than one societal context can probably be inferred to account for their occurrence in each particular instance. Neolithic cultures quite probably persisted in many areas of the islands and in the interior of the mainland, and among them the occurrence of single traits Dongsonian in typological affiliation might have resulted from cultural contact having little societal consequence. To take an ethnographical example: bronze dagger handles with "Dongson-like" decorative motifs are still being kept as treasures and family heirlooms among the Paiwan group of southern Formosa, a group which has neither a developed local metallurgy nor a strong military alliance among settlements.⁵⁴ The distribution of Dongsonian artifacts in Southeast Asia is thus of importance primarily in delineating the sphere of influence of that culture, and inference concerning the local societies which possessed these cultural items must, be made in each particular case. Archaeological excavations of the Dongsonian sites of Southeast Asia, except for the classical sites of northern Indo-China and Yünnan, were not done sufficiently for such purposes, but the available data do give us some suggestive clues toward the kind of society some of these Dongsonian sites might have had. At some sites, the number of metal artifacts and the distinctive local style tend to suggest the local presence of developed metallurgy, which might have been associated with certain concomitant types of social institutions.⁵⁵ James Peacock's article in this issue is particularly relevant in this respect. I am convinced that more such studies can and should be made of Indonesia before well-planned and problem-oriented digs are carried out in that region to substantiate or refute such inference.

⁵³ O. R. T. Janse, *op. cit.*, 1958; H. R. van Heekeren, *The Bronze-Iron Age of Indonesia*, 'S-Gravenhage, 1958; see Pearson's article in this issue.

⁵⁴ Tadao Kano, "Dagger with bronze haft found among the Paiwan of Southern Formosa: An offshoot of the Dongson culture?" *Studies in the Ethnology and Prehistory of Southeast Asia*, vol. 1, 1946, Tokyo.

⁵⁵ van Heekeren, *op. cit.*, 1958, pp. 8-43, *passim*.

South China and northern Indo-China were incorporated into the Han Dynasty civilization in the last century or two B. C., and the first two or three centuries after that event witnessed the introduction of the Hindu religion and state concepts among the groups in the Southern part of Southeast Asia. Neither of these two civilizations, however, hit upon a "primitive" culture of a village-farmer level. The nature of the so-called pre-Hindu cultures of Southeast Asia has been a somewhat controversial problem,⁵⁶ and I think the archaeological evidence is beginning to throw some light upon it.

Into the Historic Period

After the first centuries of the Christian Era recorded history began to appear in some regions of Southeast Asia.⁵⁷ In the beginning, historic documents were still rare, and many of them depended upon eye-witnesses' reports in Chinese rather than the natives' own narratives. But at least the archaeologist begins to be aided from this point on by sources other than prehistoric artifacts and monuments. Most of South China became a part of cultural China, and the Han Chinese gradually out-numbered the natives.⁵⁸ In the rest of Southeast Asia, several parallel or successive civilized traditions appeared in Indo-China, Java, and Sumatra, taking a large part of their conceptual inspiration from India.⁵⁹ In South China as well as the rest of Southeast Asia, neolithic and Dongsonian traditions persisted in the interior of many regions and became the so-called minority or tribal peoples of Southeast Asia during its various historic periods.

Much has been written about the riverine and coastal civilizations of Southeast Asia, and their religious and political systems are relatively well-known.⁶⁰ On the

⁵⁶ Conrad Bekker, Justus M. van der Kroef, and Cora Du Bois, "Culture contact and cultural change in Southeast Asia: A symposium", *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 11. no. 1, pp. 3-34, 1951.

⁵⁷ G. Coedès, *Histoire ancienne des Etats Hindouïsés d'Extrême-Orient*, Hanoi, Imprimerie d'Extrême-Orient, 1944, pp. 19-23; Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, New York, E. Weyhe, 1927, p. 156.

⁵⁸ L. Auroseau, "La première conquête Chinoise des pays annamites (III^e Siècle avant notre ère)", *Extrait du Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient*, vol. 23, 1923, pp. 127-265; H.J. Wiens, *China's march toward the tropics*, Hamden, The Shoestring Press, 1954.

⁵⁹ G. Coedès, *op. cit.*, 1944; Lawrence P. Briggs, "The Hinduized states of Southeast Asia: A review", *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 4 pp. 376-93, 1948; Robert von Heine-Geldern, *Conceptions of state and kingship in southeast Asia*, Cornell University, 1956.

⁶⁰ For a recent discussion of the ancient Khmer civilization of wide theoretical interest, see Michael D. Coe, "Social typology and the tropical forest civilizations", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1961, p. 71.

other hand, a good deal of work remains to be done, particularly by archaeologists, to find out about social and subsistential life at the village level. For the peoples and cultures of Southeast Asia that were not intimately associated with the civilizations and for the remnants of bygone civilizations during later periods, problems are manifold. First, for those peoples who were not profoundly affected by the civilizations and who carried on an essentially neolithic way of life in pockets or marginal areas, there are the questions of why they were not affected and what the relationships between them and the civilizations were. Second, for those village communities that were politically, economically, or socially a part of the civilizations, their relations with the latter are of equal interest, and such theoretical topics as Redfield's typology of urban, peasant, and the great and little traditions may have a wide ground to cover in the Southeast Asiatic field. Lastly, ethnohistorians can never seem to get away from such questions as what modern tribal groups are descendants of what ancient cultural groups. It goes without saying that the ethnic identification problem is a very difficult one and that to tackle it for our area a number of different and related disciplines must make combined efforts to achieve an all-round interpretation.⁶¹

Final Remarks

The above outline may suffice in emphasizing and demonstrating the conviction that the achievement of a balanced interpretation of the culture history of Southeast Asia must necessarily depend upon the application of a multiplicity of approaches according to a holistic perspective.

In the study of culture history, for instance, physical anthropological evidence may not be particularly relevant, but consideration must be given to it in order to assure that it does not run counter against the cultural interpretation. The transition from food-gathering to food-producing in Southeast Asia, to take one example, was accompanied by a replacement of one race (Negroid) by another (Mongoloid). In considering the problem of the origin of agriculture in this area, this major event in the biological history of man in Southeast Asia simply cannot be ignored. Another instructive instance is the problem of the racial elements of the Lolo. As I have indicated above, in the early civilizations of the Chinese Southwest considerable

⁶¹ A great number of studies are available for the relationship of ancient Chinese (both northern and southern) civilizations with the prehistoric and modern Pacific cultures. See, for instance, various articles in the back issues of this Bulletin.

cultural influence can be discerned to have been derived from the steppe nomads of Central Asia.⁶² If this involved, as Lamberg-Karlovsky suspects, blood mixtures between different races, then the Lolo racial problem may be of great relevance to our culture historical studies.⁶³

In addition to physical anthropology, the possible contribution of other disciplines to culture historical studies is in most instances self-evident. The indispensable assistance of geologists, botanists, physicists, and palaeontologists to the archaeologist is obvious, but interdisciplinarily coordinated research in the field of Southeast Asiatic archaeology remains the exception rather than the rule. Botanists have long speculated about the origin of many domesticated plants in the Southeast Asiatic tropics, ethnographers have traced the distribution of these plants among modern peoples throughout the area, and archaeologists have been digging up artifacts left by the early farmers. Not a single excavation has thus far been carried out in which all disciplines concerned participated for the specific purpose of determining the problems of food-crops for a neolithic village.⁶⁴

Within the field of culture historic studies, there are a large number of possible approaches to the same problems and the same subjects, and I cannot help but imagine how fruitful it would be if these studies could be well-coordinated. Linguists begin to insist that the Malayo-Polynesians originated, as a linguistic stock, in the Pacific islands,⁶⁵ but archaeologists and ethnologists maintain that these peoples, as cultural entities, had the mainland for an original homeland.⁶⁶ If both true, cannot these be reconciled? Ethnohistorians have been saying for several centuries that the Thai as an ethnic entity originated in South China and then migrated southward. A critical

⁶² See T. K. Cheng, "The slate tomb culture of Li-fan", *The Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 9, no. 2, 1949, p.76.

⁶³ Cf. W. R. Morse, "Observations on the anthropology of the peoples of the West China-Tibetan border-land", *Lingnan Science Journal*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1928; P.H. Stevenson, "Notes on the human geography of the Chinese-Tibetan border-land", *American Geographical Review*, vol. 22, no. 4, 1932. Both authors have noted that, while the White Lolo, the lower class, are unquestionably Mongoloid, the Black Lolo, the upper class, contain a high percentage of Caucasoid elements.

⁶⁴ The excavations currently being carried out at the Niah Cave, North Borneo, may eventually become a rare exception to this rule. Under the leadership of Tom Harrison, Keeper of the Sarawak Museum, who is also in charge of the archaeological studies, the Niah excavations have enlisted the services of zoologists, palaeontologists, and physicists, as well as other archaeologists; see *The Sarawak Museum Journal*, vols. 8 and 9, 1958 and 1959. A recent team work of comparable composition is the Thai-Danish Expedition, which is currently working in Thailand.

⁶⁵ G. W. Grace, "Austronesian linguistics and culture history", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 359-68, 1961.

⁶⁶ This view is unanimously held by archaeologists and prehistorians. For a latest recapitulation, see: R. C. Suggs, *The island civilizations of Polynesia*, New York, The New American Library of World Literature, 1960.

review of the evidence and the relevant literatures would instantaneously reveal that the conclusion cannot be made unless linguists, physical anthropologists, archaeologists, historians, and ethnologists carry out a joint project of research over this particular problem.

Quite aside from the problem of cooperation among the various sub-fields of the culture historical studies, there is the problem of methodology and basic perspectives. Again, I am convinced that in our studies both static and dynamic points of view and both historical and functional approaches are indispensable if a balanced interpretation of cultural historic problems is our goal. It need not be said that cultures change and have changed, but we observe that published studies keep appearing in which "ancient Lolos," "ancient Thais," and "descendants of the Nanchao kingdom" are assumed as given without first making an effort to trace the process of change and the continuities that must be demonstrated before such terms can be applied. Again it need not be said that cultural elements both "originated" as stylistic isolates and "functioned" as structural correlates, but in too many instances we cannot fail to notice that the origin of an artifact or a cultural complex is given the paramount attention, while the contextual basis necessary for such an artifact or complex to appear at all is often ignored. Both Peacock and O'Sullivan whose articles appear in this issue are social anthropologists, and their contributions demonstrate, I think, that culture historic studies can greatly benefit from social anthropological approaches.

Some years ago Heine-Geldern stated that the most urgent matter in 'Southeast Asia anthropology was the preservation of the primitive cultural data.'⁶⁷ Today we might say that the most urgent matter in the culture historical study of Southeast Asia is a research approach both interdisciplinarily and intradisciplinarily coordinated. Specialized and unilateral studies are certainly still useful and indispensable, as always, but it is also high time for syntheses to appear, both in the field and in the library.

⁶⁷ Robert von Heine-Geldern, "Research on Southeast Asia: problems and suggestions", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 48, 1946, pp. 149-75.

「素可泰時期的美術」研究計畫簡介

嚴智宏

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫博士後研究學者

一、緣起

本研究是筆者去年的研究之延伸及拓深。從去年的研究中得知，泰國美術¹的形成與發展，有助於東南亞區域文化的交織與交融，也有助於泰國民族國家的形成。其次，從藝術社會學的角度來看，泰國美術由於受到地理、政治、宗教等因素的影響，因此，在不同時期中呈現不同的風貌。第三，在這些時期中，素可泰時期（Sukhothai，西元第 13 世紀中-1438）²的美術，可說是泰國文化至為重要的一環。當時，隨著泰人的獨立建國，它的文化（尤其是美術）也建立了主體性。同時，這種文化上的主體性也有助於建立泰人的民族意識，讓泰人自信、抬頭，昂然立足於世。簡言之，素可泰時期在泰國文化史上的地位舉足輕重；它的文化（尤其是美術）值得獨立出來，作進一步的深入探究。

站在第一年的基礎上，本研究將深入分析素可泰時期美術的特色，探討它與泰國歷史情境的關係。本研究將先分析素可泰時期的歷史情境，看它們如何形塑美術的特色。具體而言，第 13 世紀中在今天稱為「泰國」這個領域的中北部，有個新興的國家崛起，它的首都與國家名稱，都叫作素可泰。它打敗原本統治該地區的外族（也就是高棉），重挫高棉的吳哥帝國（Angkorian Empire）在該地的聲望。

¹ 這裡所指的美術，主要是指雕像、建築（木質以外的部份）；繪畫、陶土器物僅佔一小部份。泰國氣候炎熱、濕氣頗重（年均溫約為 29℃，濕度介於 66-83% 之間），因此，幾百年前的繪畫不易保存下來，除非刻在金石上面。其次，陶土器物多為日常用具，較少與宗教相關。

² 素可泰原本是首都的名字，後來也成為這個朝代（時間）及其疆域（空間）的名稱。

在正式獨立建國後，素可泰王室透過文化事業，來促進其民族意識的形成。例如，泰文就是由當時叱吒風雲的藍堪亨大帝（Ramkamhaeng，第 13 世紀下半葉在位）下令製作的。自此以後，泰國有了自己的書寫系統；雖然它脫胎於高棉字母，但兩者隨著時間的推移而分道揚鑣。又如，從這個時期以降，南傳上座部佛教（Theravada Buddhism）在王室的護持下，在泰國穩居主流的地位。當時的美術，也近乎全為南傳佛教美術。這大不同於高棉統治時期的美術。換句話說，素可泰時期不僅在政治上脫離了異族的統治，在文化（美術）上也擺脫舊日統治者的主流思維。接著，素可泰時期在文化（美術）上發展出的特點，不僅異於高棉的，在某些方面也異於其他信奉南傳佛教的國家（如緬甸、錫蘭），甚至建立獨樹一幟的特色，並傳揚至今。也就是說，從正式獨立建國以來，泰國就努力創造文化（美術）上的自我特色，這種特色為後世的泰人所珍視與傳承。至今，素可泰的文化（美術）仍是泰人引以為榮的文化財之一。

為什麼素可泰時期的美術會產生這種變化？為什麼素可泰時期的美術異於高棉統治時期的？在這種轉變的過程中，它受到哪些因素的影響？它如何擷取外來養分以豐富自我？又如何陶鑄新的藝品，建立美術上的自我？這些情形與歷史情境有何關連？這都是值得思考的問題。

二、文獻探討與理論

目前關於素可泰時期的研究，大多個別關注單一因素或單一層面的影響力。首先，有的研究以美術為中心。它主要的關注點，是藝品本身的風格。這類研究指出，素可泰時期雖然只有短短一百多年，但它是泰國文化史上最具創造力的時期，也為泰國後代的美術立下了典範。例如，當時出現了佛行像（Walking Buddha）。這類論述勾勒了素可泰時期美術的梗概；但是，它們對於可能影響藝品的歷史情境著墨不多。實則藝品的產製與歷史情境之間，能夠探討的議題很多。因此，本研究將致力於探討這種問題。

其次，有些研究以宗教為主軸。這類研究的焦點，是素可泰時期佛教不同部派變化的情況，及其對美術的影響。這些論述指出，當時錫蘭式南傳佛教在素可泰境內大為興盛。相對的，高棉統治時期所留下的印度教、大乘佛教等，都逐漸式微。因此，素可泰時期奠定了南傳佛教在泰國無可搖撼的地位。這類論述指出了當時不同部派的變化過程，因而有助於解釋素可泰時期美術主題改變的原因。但是，它們對於當時境內的主流宗教由大乘轉為錫蘭式南傳佛教的原因，則鮮少提及。本研究將試圖探索這些原因。

第三，有的研究以政治為中心。這類研究所關注的，主要是政治力的消長（如王朝的興亡盛衰、帝王世系等）。這些論述說明了素可泰王朝的獨立、強盛以及衰頹的過程，尤其是關於藍堪亨的部份，因為藍堪亨把素可泰提昇為一個富強的國家。但是，創業維艱，守成不易。樂泰王（Lerthai，第14世紀上半葉在位）、李泰王（Lithai，約1347-1374在位）時，國勢就衰微了。這些論述說明了素可泰時期的政治綱要。但是，政治、武功方面的論述，並不能解釋一切。君主設立的典章制度，以及當時的文化生態等，都是值得探討的。

再次，有些研究以社會經濟為中心。這類研究的重點在於素可泰時期社會經濟的興衰。例如，藍堪亨廢除了國境的關卡稅，並開放貿易，促進貨物流通，讓百姓自由貿易。可是，素可泰時期經濟並不富裕。它的土地貧瘠，交通不算便捷。相對的，在素可泰南部的阿瑜陀耶（Ayutthaya，約1350-1767），則坐擁昭披耶河流域的中心腹地，不僅享有肥美的土地，還有優渥的地利。這類以社會經濟為中心的論述，對本研究有重要的意義，因為社會經濟往往能影響藝品的產製。但是，這類研究並未分析一個本研究想探索的問題：究竟社會經濟的因素如何影響藝品？有鑑於此，本研究嘗試分析藝品與社會經濟之間的關係。總之，在關心美術與社會經濟之間的相關性時，需要更細緻的分析。

以上幾類研究，都有助於了解素可泰時期的各個重要面向，但是為了要更全面地探索素可泰時期的美術，必須再進一步、再深一層。一，它們已經提出各面向的要點。站在這些基礎上，本研究可以在許多細部方面深入探究。二，它們已經探討了個別的因素。但正如藝術社會學家所言，藝品的產生，受社會中多重因素的影響。因此，本研究可由較多的面向、更寬的角度來思考。三，這些不同的因素，應該不是單獨發生作用的；它們可能有互動，並產生作用，進而影響到藝術。因此，本研究將注重各因素之間的互動過程與互動的結果，及其交互影響的動態過程。

基於以上的討論，本研究計畫擬採綜合性的動態分析，以論述可能影響藝品產製的各種因素，並觀察這些因素如何交互影響、形成素可泰的美術風格。具體而言，本研究將關注以下問題。一，素可泰藝術的風格（特色）為何？它與過去（尤其是被高棉統治時）有何異同？二，哪些因素（歷史情境）形塑了這些風格？三，在歷史的過程中，這些因素如何互相影響？又如何影響素可泰時期美術的形成與轉型？

整個來說，本研究嘗試觀察不同面向之間互動、相互影響的動態過程。看它們一時的「結果」如何成為「因素」來影響下一個「結果」，這個「結果」又如何成為「因素」來影響下一個「結果」。簡言之，要看它們彼此之間怎樣層層相因、環環相扣。藉此，本研究將分析素可泰時期美術的來龍去脈，對它作一個較為全面的、綜合的研究。

三、可能意涵

素可泰時期是泰國文化史上公認的黃金時期。在這個時期中，泰人不只吸納鄰近各種文化的養分，融合各種風格於一爐，更創造出泰國文化的主體性。其影響之深遠，及今猶見。本研究以素可泰時期的美術為對象，其結果應有助於增進國人對泰國文化的理解。

其次，在文化發展的過程中，素可泰一方面與鄰近各種文化交流，另一方面也發展出獨特的自我。依此推論，則這段時期東南亞區域文化交流與交融的結果，可能使東南亞發展出某些特質，使它有別於其他區域（如東北亞）；但是，東南亞各國也個別發展出自我的文化。在這個區域化（regionalization）與在地化（localization）同時發生的過程中，東南亞區域的各文化之間，可能有異、有同。素可泰時期的美術，似乎就見證了這種過程。據此而論，本研究的結果，應可作為未來比較性研究的基礎，也就是了解東南亞區域的文化有何共通性？而個別國家又有何獨特性？

最後，由於本研究採藝術社會學的觀點來分析素可泰時期的美術，因此，研究結果應有助於回答以下問題：素可泰正式獨立建國後，各種因素如何影響其藝品的產製，又如何創造出泰國獨特的美術？另一方面，這種獨特的美術如何協助泰國境內的人建立起「想像的共同體」（imagined community），並為當代的泰人建立起「集體記憶」（collective memory）？由於嘗試處理這些問題，因此，本研究的結果，應有助於為美術及社會科學的相關理論提供一個角度、一些資料，以便再思考美術與社會的關係。

Islam and Politics in Malaysia: A Changing Scenario^{*}

Zambry Abd. Kadir^{**}

Islam and Politics

Islam is a monotheistic religion that emphasizes on the inseparability of religious and worldly domains. According to Muslim interpretation of religious teaching, the Prophet Muhammad stands an archetypal symbol of the Muslim's understanding of religious life. Therefore one might discern how the first Islamic state founded in Medina by the Prophet about 14th century ago become a model for interrelationship between Islam and state.

However as Muslim society developed progressively throughout centuries, it is noticeable that the relationship between Islam and state becomes complex. This is partly due to the rise of Islamic Empire covering various geographical locations and consisting a multifaceted Muslim society stemming from socio-cultural differences. Nevertheless Muslim society continues to be characterized by religious systems. Islam permeates all social institutions and states functionaries.

The inseparability of Islam and State is quite discernible in view of the continued religious force in reckoning the leadership of the Muslim countries. It is a fact that Islam functions as the major political and social forces in many Muslim countries, a result of which has challenged the Western secular bias of the separation of religion and state. This is a case of the modernization theory that stipulates as the nations

^{*} 本文發表於 2000 年 5 月 6 日於中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫所主辦之「馬來伊斯蘭政教運動國際研討會」。

^{**} Professor, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University.

develop, secularization, pluralism, and political differentiation would spread significantly and thus reduces the political significance of religion. Along with this idea comes the notion that with the spread of scientific knowledge and modern communication, a single community would be created and that would replace the diverse world, and the rise of Secular City is irreversible.¹

The post-colonial Muslim would however challenges the basis of the modernization theory. Instead of rejecting many presuppositions of modernization and development theory, the Muslim world, particularly the Islamist movement cooped modernization and development as essential component for understanding Islam in the modern world. Islam's political impact in this context is quite significant, for it being a catalyst for maintaining socio-political order. It does not only provide a meaning for political life, but also capable of maintaining its necessity in the political and economic modernization.

The prevalent ideas of the Islamist movement also include an attempt to restore an unsullied and authentic form of the religion cleansed from accretions, distortions, and misuse. They seek to revitalize the importance of religion in social and political actions. They recourse to the Qur'an and the hadith as the principles guidelines for individual and collective actions. Among their ideologues and activists, they are creatively deploying elements of Islamic traditions, combined with ideas and techniques of the present to cope with modern plights: globalizations, the world capitalist market, the domestic political puppets and authoritarian, the failures of economic development, and the hybridization of culture and identity in the course of cultural onslaught of the West.²

This theme of modernist movement also pervades the general attitude of the thinkers as well the activists in Malaysia. While the secular notion separation the state and religion is only a constitutional standing, the general will in Malaysia shows the trend of integrating moral and religious values as necessary conditions of the Muslim life. Therefore it is observable in Malaysia for instance that Islamist movement trend is not only conceptualized in the NGO-type, but also embraces the Muslim political parties, namely the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia.

Malaysia's experience of integrating religion and politics, while maintaining its economic growth, is the hallmark of the admixture between religion and state. The

¹ See for example, Harvey Cox, *Religion in the Secular City*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

² Joel Beinin, Joe Stork, *Political Islam*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p.5.

parliamentary system that Malaysia adopts since its independence further defines its character as a multi-ethnic nation in which Islam is the official religion of the federation.

The creation of a democratic ambience in Malaysia has led to the flourishing of many Islamic-based organizations and political parties. These Muslim organizations and political parties become active in their vocations.

This paper intends to provide a cursory observation on the relationship between Islam and politics in Malaysia. My basic argument is that the rise of religious consciousness has changed Malaysia's political terrain. I maintain that the Islamic trend movement in Malaysia should be seen in its impact on both the government and Islamic groups. While the Islamic groups espouse Islamic ideals, the government embarks on various Islamic projects.

Islam in Malaysia

Since 15th century, Islam assumes pivotal roles in the Malay world. The progress of Islam has changed and transformed the political culture of the Malay Archipelago. It is worthy of note that prior to the arrival of Islam, the Malay world, was under the influence Hinduism. Certain aspects of socio-political organization were formed after the Hindu's hierarchical order of power. The relation of the sacred and profane in the cosmological doctrine of the pre-Islamic teachings formed the basis of how the Malays conceived the distribution of power and authority, and their translation into everyday life. This is discernable for instance in the traditional Malay perception of the king, who is regarded as being sacred in relation to his subjects.³

The traditional Malay political structure was built upon the institution of monarchy (kerajaan). The king maintained the highest hierarchy imbued with sacred position. Loyalty to the king was accorded traditionally in a fixed system bound by custom. Tradition and custom became the rules, which were legitimated, in the daily relationship between the king and the subjects. The king was considered the holder of the absolute power and supreme power determining the laws of the state.

When the process of Islamization began certain aspects of the old political structure continued to exist. This includes the feudalistic political institution. However,

³ Zambry Abd. Kadir, "Religion and Politics: The Quest for political Legitimacy of the Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia", Ph. D thesis, Temple University, 1995.

the cosmological doctrine of the king (raja) was changed to the appropriation of Islamic teachings. The king was then called a *sultan*. This linguistic change symbolizes a remodeling of social perspective, which followed a shift in cultural and historical meaning. It also reveals a search for new meaning in legitimizing the position of Malay kings and their government. This may be seen in the proclamation other honorific title such as “God’s shadow on earth” (*zillullahi fi al-alam*), “Helper of the World and of the Religion” (*Nasir al-Dunya wa al-Din*).

This process of Islamization in political sphere also marks the new *habitus*. Makkah was then considered the center of religio-political image of the Malay government. The Malay rulers believed that Makkah was the symbol of Muslim governance consolidated under the banner of abode of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*). The Malay rulers regarded Makkah as the source of power and authority. Later, as the process continued, the subjects particularly among the Malay religious scholars began to flock to Makkah. In addition to visiting the Holy Site, they found Makkah was the center of Islamic political thought and where Islamic ideals found its expression. In the times of colonialism in the Malay world, Makkah and Egypt assumed central role for the Muslim reformists to equip themselves with the anti-colonial mode.

The above condition was later hindered by the intrusion of colonialism in Malaya in the nineteenth century. Although the Malay world was colonized as early as the sixteenth century, the British colonialism had an overarching impact on the formation of the new state, one that modeling after the Westminster type. However as far as the colonizer- colonized relationship is concerned, there was an unrelenting quest for liberation among the Muslims in Malaya. Priding themselves on their Islamic aspect of the struggle, they overtly challenged the British presence in the Malaya. The religious and nationalist group mainly carried on political struggle. The former used religious education through *pondok* and *madrasah* to instill anti-colonial spirit, and the latter used vernacular education and administrative privileges accorded to them to fight against British colonialism.

Sensing the religious influence in the political movement, the British later forced a new form of bureaucratization of Islam and its functionaries. This is because the British was afraid of the direct appointment of *imam* and *qadis* by the sultan might affect the British interest in controlling the power.

Further development in Malaysian political change was that of the emergence of the Muslim political parties formed after their desire to gain independence and to maintain the indigenous right. It was the direct effect of British colonialism whereby

the more organized and mass-based political organizations were introduced. In 1946, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) was formed in response to the British plan to introduce Malayan Union, which ideas were to unite the whole state in Malaya into one administration. Later the British also proposed a controversial issue of *jus soli* to the non-Malays and non-citizens. In the wake of national independence another Muslim political party, Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) was formed as an off-shot of UMNO in 1951. The party mainly focused on Islam and Malay nationalism during its inception.

Despite their differences, the Malay political parties forged their efforts for independence of the country. Ultimately in 1957, Malaysia achieved independence and the question of self-determination and the new character of the nation-state were defined. However, Malaysia still inherited some colonial legacy particularly in the areas of economy, politics, and legal systems. Given the priority of nation building, Malaysia has to accommodate certain foundations laid by the British. This does not mean that Islamic aspect was left from the perspective plan for national development.

The position of Islam was incorporated in the Constitution as stipulated in the Article 3, clause 1. It is stated that Islam is the federal religion but other religion also can be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. The Malay ruler is recognized as the Head of the Muslim religion, and thus all rights, privileges, prerogatives and powers enjoyed by him as Head of that religion should be unaffected and unimpaired. The main argument however remains on the position and interpretation of Islam in relation to the state. The diverse interpretations include secularism versus Islam, Islamic state versus secular state, Islamic laws versus Civil laws, the position of Muslims versus the position of non-Muslims.

It is noteworthy that the position of Islam in the Constitution also helps describe certain socio-political actions in Malaysia. It also explains how the Muslims mould their perspective and world-view. The Malaysia, who are considered as the indigenous group, are principally defined along the religious character. It is therefore understandably that the Malays is defined as one who speaks the Malay language, professes Islam and habitually follows Malay customs. In other words, despite the character of the nation being defined after the “secular” Constitution, the Malay psyche remains one that absorbs and internalizes Islamic tents and teachings. Although there is a varying degree of commitment to Islamic teachings, the acceptance for being a Muslim underscores other interests.

As far as the government is concerned, the policy on Islam is quite discernible

based on the government effort to promote certain Islamic institutions and building-up the mosques. This policy, in modern Islamist movement's analysis, did not constitute the true commitment to Islam. However it is only fair to notice that there were several obstacles faced by Malaysia in its maturing years of independence. During the time of the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Islamic agenda did not embrace a system of life. Being a nascent independent country, the Tunku had to resolve more pressing issues of intra-ethnic relation, the formation of Malaysia, the *Konfrontasi* Malaysia-Indonesia, and the Philippines threat. Later, when the Tun Abdul Razak succeeded the Tunku, he had to overcome social unrest of May 13, 1969 stemming from the problem of poverty and distributive justice. During the time of Hussein Onn, Islamic programs began to function. However, Hussein had to face an unprecedented rise of Islamic resurgence.

Mahathir and Islam

Of all the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir becomes the most avid student of Islam and its relations to Muslim life in the modern world. Although the critique tends to discredit Dr. Mahathir's perception of Islam, he remains the first Prime Minister if Malaysia ever to speak and write about the need to maintain Islam as a way of life. In addition, he believes that the Malays can remain prosperous by firmly holding on the true principle teachings of Islam. In affirming his Islamic tendency, Mahathir provides greater space for inculcation of Islamic values in his administration and allows better room for Islamic organizations to freely move. His general attitude seems supportive yet cautious on the so-called "deviant" Muslim groups which could threaten national security.⁴

In comparison to the earlier UMNO leadership, Mahathir seems to be more pronounced in his emphasis on the dialectical relationship between the Malay community and Islam. In Malaysia, Malay political leadership reflects Islamic leadership. Thus it is often to find in Mahathir's thought the issue of the politics of religion and the religiosity of politics. Mahathir is aware that the Malay politics could not depend on the legitimacy of the Malay political elite alone and devoid of any religious connotation. It is the world-view of the Malay community that religion is inseparable from politics, and thus no distinction between the spiritual and the secular.

⁴ Hussin Mutalib, *Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics*, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990, p.127.

Mahathir also believes that Islam is the basis of UMNO struggle. Although the party has opened its doors to non-Muslims' Bumiputra, its commitment to Islam has not faded. The struggle of UMNO, according to Mahathir, exemplifies the struggles of the Prophet Muhammad. He stresses that "UMNO is an instrument which has adopted the struggles of the Prophet as an example to change the fate of Malay Muslims and other Bumiputras in Malaysia. From a race proficient only in farming and light handicraft, UMNO has brought Malays and other Bumiputras to a world of knowledge and industry. From a race lacking in discipline and confidence, they have progressively transformed into a more disciplined and confident race. With that they are successful and can compete with others and are more willing to face challenge."⁵

However, Mahathir sees the long predicament of the Malays particularly in economy and education as *sine qua non* for the misapprehension of Islamic political domain. Thus in Mahathir's analysis the Malays must not be forever defined after their control of political dominance, but must extend into business and educational domains as well. Since the pre-independence period, polarization existed along the racial lines. The practice of the division of labor led to the economic disaster of the Malays since they were placed in the rural areas. Economic function was left to the non-Malays, while the Malays were accorded with the political role. As a result, Malay found themselves caught in political differences. This perception of the Malays backwardness was reformed in the aftermath 1969 May Riot, the cause of which culminated in the Malay's dissatisfaction of their economic condition vis-à-vis the Chinese.

The government later launched an affirmative action called the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the early 1970s. The policy which aimed at fulfilling two-prong objectives, i.e. to eradicate poverty and restructuring society has multiple effects on the formation of the new society. From political economy vantage, the NEP has provided a new political development that further impacted on the government attitude to the unprecedented rise of Islamic consciousness. This is resulted from the government's pro-Malay educational policy, which later saw the increasing trend of young educated and urbanized Malays. They began to embrace a more universal and humanistic principles of Islam. And this Malays later formed the backbone of the government affirmative action that paved the way for the rise of the new commercial and industrial bumiputera community.

The upshot of the NEP is that the Malays have achieved a higher level of

⁵ Mahathir Mohamad, *The Challenges of Turmoil*, Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1998, P.29.

education and they become key players in the economic sectors. In 1990, the Government launched the National Development Policy (NDP) to replace the NEP. The basic objective of poverty Eradication and national unity continued to be the hallmark of the national development plan. In addition, the Government also accelerated its aims to obtain the objectives of balanced development and a just society. Despite sustaining economic growth and maintaining the pace of rapid development, it also included a policy statement concerning the socio-economic transformation. The Mahathir's government is aware that transformation is inevitable as the new society grow up to an unprecedented degree. However that does not deter Mahathir's determination to espouse the Islamic agenda of change among the Malays and Bumiputra.

In Mahathir's analysis, social change among the Muslims must be addressed in terms of their ability to provide a complete framework that will successfully help the economic agenda of the Bumiputra. In ensuring better participation of the Bumiputra, Mahathir emphasizes a new dimension of addressing the poverty redressal and of increasing the Bumiputra employment in the professions and corporate management through the Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC). This agenda aims at promoting Bumiputra involvement in a competitive economy. Participation in the strategic industries such as aerospace, automotive, machinery and engineering, petrochemical and telecommunications become part of the BCIC agenda.

Mahathir's emphasis on this economic advancement of the Muslims is quite understandable. His persistent emphasis on the fate of Muslim life in the period of colonialism and the perceived uncivilized image portrayed by the colonial masters upon the Muslim countries enhance his spirit to change the Malay-Muslim predicament. To overcome the above conditions not by resorting to emotional means and confrontational manners. Instead of being reactionary, Mahathir urges Muslims to be more proactive and buildup a new sense of consciousness. Islam must be reaffirmed in its equilibrium combining the practice and spiritual, the mundane and the inner dimension, the worldly and the hereafter. Ignoring the present realities where Muslims could not even afford compete will not leave anything to strive for the hereafter. Without wealth and efficiency, discipline and hardworking, knowledge and skills, intellectuals and human resources, the Muslims will continue to be oppressed. It is, therefore, "important that the faithful must correct their narrow view of Islam and the Islamic way of life. Only a strong Islamic country with Muslim proficient in

many area of Knowledge and skills, can help defend the religion and its followers”.⁶

It is within this spirit that Mahathir seems to portray a new image of Muslims in Malaysia. The popular notion to this is the New Malay (Melayu baru). The new direction of the New Malays according Mahathir is that they must be able to set new value which enables them to compete in a global environment with a higher level of efficiency and self-discipline. He further notes that the Melayu Baru is someone “who has a culture that is suitable to the changing times, who is willing to face all challenges, who can compete without assistance, who is educated and learned, sophisticated, sincere, disciplined, trustworthy and efficient. The New Malay should be an all-rounder, with a wide vision, and capable of restoring the dignity of Muslims and be a model for other Muslims.”⁷

It is no surprise to find corporate culture has been a hallmark in the Muslim ascendancy to leadership in Malaysia. The model of BCIC that Mahathir envisions come along with their attachment to religious ideals. It is indeed a new phenomenon of corporate leaders who are well entrenched in Islamic faith that successfully position themselves well in the national economy. Many of them as Naisbitt observes are very young but remain steadfast to Islamic faith. They are “ambitious, articulate in English - many of them educated in the West - and are completely at ease with science and technology.”⁸

Islam and Cyber Politics

The information age marks an important development of human society. Information technology is advancing by leaps and bounds. Knowledge becomes more important than capital. It assigns a great discourse in determining correctly the era that post-modern humankind conducts their everyday life. It provides a new set of values and ideology. In terms of politics, the multiple TV channels, computers, telecommunication, and Internet, has created a borderless world that political thinkers could not have anticipated.

The impact of Internet is probably the most dramatic example of how computer technology is transforming everyday life in Malaysia. “Surfing the Web” has transformed the conduct of life, from socializing to searching information. It also

⁶ Hng Hung Yong, *CEO Malaysia*, p. 90.

⁷ Ibid., p. 95

⁸ John Naisbitt, *Megatrends Asia*, London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing Ltd., 1996, p.240.

helps tab various political organizations and political activities.

The Malaysian Government sees the important role of information technology. It is regarded as the main thrust in the national development agenda. The IT will provide a critical role in the investment decision making and global competition. It will also create a foundation for building a knowledge-based industrial economy and an information-rich society.⁹

The determination to build an information society has been further enhanced through the construction of Multimedia Super Corridor. The purpose is to equip the country with state-of-the-art communication technology and IT infrastructure, and to enable Malaysia to become a regional IT hub. In sum, the national IT agenda has made breakthrough in the reconstruction of the economy and society. The government made all possible efforts to expand the nation-wide information infrastructure, as its final goal is to build a knowledge-based society.

The reorientation in the national development agenda has come along with the vision of creating fully developed country in the 2020. The emphasis would be placed into nurturing a new generation of IT capable of facing all challenges brought about by the IT era. The young and middle-class Muslims are now being part of the IT agenda. In furthering their study, many young Malay-Muslims are geared to taking up courses in computer technology. Now, the fresh graduates among the young Muslim generations who are majoring in computer are increasing.

They are the new generations who are interacting with the cyber world everyday. Their dominant world-view has changed. Since they are loaded with information everyday, their political views are getting more sophisticated. They will quickly-learn to think and communicate in the midst of a tidal wave of information with greater ease.

After the political highdrama involving the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim and followed by the alleged bias of media coverage over the issue, more websites were created to provide alternate sources of news. And more websites dedicated to the struggle of Anwar were also created. This loaded information undoubtedly delivers a new challenge to the leadership, particularly the UMNO leadership. This Internet service was not available during previous political crises.¹⁰

⁹ The Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000, p. 22.

¹⁰ FEER, October 8, 1998.

This development has triggered a new political empowerment among the literate and opulence. The Islamic movements together moved into this project intensively. The new vigor for freedom and justice has created their voices in common. They take a new capacity through the Internet and websites to influence and transform. Their attitude towards the government has changed. They become disillusioned and disenchanted with the political process.

The increasing demand for political justice has been capitalized by the PAS. Through their official website, they launched the most unrelenting effort to deny the present government and its legitimacy. Other than Anwar's issue, the PAS also capitalizes issues of Islamic politics vis-à-vis the perceived corrupted National Front government. The number of subscribers are of course across the national border. It was reported that in the *Laman Reformasi* website alone, there was about 100,000 readers access to this website. The party's overseas networking through student organization like MISNA has doubled its efforts to address the PAS' position against the present government.

However, UMNO sees this development as an act of slander and lies perpetrated by the anti-government group. The party has also launched its Internet section to counter defamation and slanders. The UMNO finds it difficult to counter the speed of information posted by Malaysians world-wide. This development is against its integrity since the party has no experience of being embattled from all directions. Although the party members are reminded not believe the contents in the opposition Internet, members still browse the website since it provides various sensational and unedited news as against the mainstream media.

The Rise of Student Movement

In any developing countries, the role of university students is quite decisive. They commonly play role as the pressure groups. Issues pertaining to social dislocation and injustice have been seen as the relying force behind their movement. Malaysia began to experience the pattern of dissent and anti-establishment in a more radical way in the 1970s. The trend resulted from the increasing numbers of Malay students studying in the university after the implementation of the New Economic Policy. The opposition to the government and political elite become part of the campus ethos.¹¹

¹¹ Gordon P. Means, *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation*, Singapore: Oxford University Press,

The height of the students activism culminated in December 1974 when a large numbers of university students stage the biggest demonstration in Kuala Lumpur to protest the alleged starvation of the farmers in the Baling area of Kedah for the sharp drop of the rubber price. Hundred of students and demonstrators were detained. Among those were Anwar Ibrahim and Syed Hussin Ali (now the President of Parti Rakyat Malaysia). It is within this situation that the revivification of Islamic consciousness flourished. The formation of the Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam seMalaysia (Malaysian Muslim Student Union Association) in 1962 and followed by the establishment of Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 1972 spurred further the intense struggle for the Islamic *dakwah* movement in Malaysia. The members and the activists mostly were the university students and young Malay professionals. The aim was to espouse the Islamic ideal including the Islamic State.

The Islamic student movement gained its currency in their vocation (*dakwah*) and their critique against the social decay as brought about by the unheeded modernization. Their members grew tremendously. The government cautiously monitored their movement.

Since the co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim in the government in 1982, the student Islamic movement remained pacify for several years. This is probably due to the Anwar charismatic appeal in watering down student radicalism. Another reason was the immediate split in Islamic movement in response to the Anwar's move to join the government. Some radical members saw the Anwar departure for UMNO reflected the betrayal to the struggle of Islamist movement. Others felt that Anwar's decision must be respected as he was hoped to bring Islamic agenda in UMNO.

Another factor was that of the government attitude in undertaking reconciliatory approach to the Islamic movements. The government was accommodative in many ways. However it slowly generated a new social force, as the government aggressively moved towards modernization. The student movement becomes part of the new construction of the nation. They were the group of the privileges who received the government scholarship. While they were given educational opportunity, the government also equipped them with Islamic world-view. They were infused with a sense of mission. They were trained in Islamic way upon their departure to foreign and local universities. The direct social impact was that it created a fundamental change in social structure, including the creation of an extensive and diverse middle-class, which later exert pressure for political reform.

In the midst of the impending political crisis in Malaysia, they become more cynical to the existing government. They gradually develop certain attitude towards change. They expect a wider democratic freedom from the government. This is based on the campus life and social environment that shape their political outlook. Those who studied in the West have experienced how democracy and freedom being practiced. While those who studied locally found interaction with oppositions leaders were useful in shaping their political attitude. The absence of the UMNO leaders on campuses to interact with students have made the students' political attitude slanted towards the opposition. They become disillusioned with the whole political practices in the country, in which according to them the government fails to meet their expectation toward a construction of civil society.

The new vigor towards a civil society has been set in a political dissent. The university students focus their critique against the politicians who having won elections neglect large section of the community. As the country generates its economic growth speedily the students see the widening signs of alienation from the political process. As a result they call for the reform of governance within the societies. They also call for new forms of participation, and for wider involvement of the people than the traditional democratic system allowed.

The height of political entrenchment among the university students reflected in the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998. This ferment of campus later boils into anti-government political activism. Huge student demonstrations took place in Kuala Lumpur. They suddenly awoke from the long slumber and roiled political structure.

The development on campuses undoubtedly benefited the Islamic party, PAS. It has entrenched its hold throughout various the student bodies. In the campus elections the PAS-inclined student bodies managed to wrest control almost all universities. However the PKPIM, being the oldest Islamic student organizations, becomes the key player in the rise of student activism. In the climax of political uncertainty after the Anwar expulsion two of its leaders were detained under the Internal Security Acts (ISA).

This development sheds light on the new politics of university students. They become more concerted in their expression of politics. They formed a group called Malaysian Student Council (Majlis Pelajar Malaysia) comprising members of several universities and colleges students bodies. In order to make their voices heard they launched a newsletter called Suara Mahasiswa in 1998. This periodical later became

more active in the period of *Reformasi* movement led by Anwar Ibrahim. The content of the newsletter mostly touched on the issue of Anwar Ibrahim's sacking from the cabinet.

The question arises whether the unprecedented rise of student activism stemmed from the Anwar's episode. It poses a question whether the student unprecedented rise signifies the depth and permanence of the changes. This also alerts the nature of new politics in Malaysia "whether the current generation of young Malaysians really will lead the way to a new political system not rooted in ethnically based political parties."¹²

Islamization Agenda

Islamization Agenda appears to be a contesting issue in Malaysia for number of years. Since the Islamization drive began in 1980s Malaysia continues to experience a rather unique phenomenon of Islamization. It is not a monolithic description of Islamization as being equated with fundamentalism, radicalism, and militancy. Malaysia has its own characteristic of Islamization. Although there are two main Malay political parties, the UMNO and PAS, hold opposing views on the Islamic state and Islamic laws, the contest for Islamization in Malaysia does not contribute to instability. The non-Muslim positions are ensured constitutionally.

However the political friction between UMNO and PAS has largely contributed to the furtherance of Islamization. Both parties seem to embark on a serious drive of Islamization since the Malays are so entrenched in their religious identity. In addition, the Islamic resurgence earlier on had paved the way for revival of interest in Islam. This revival has contributed to the Malay's concern on the position of Islam in their personal and political lives. Islam also plays the key for understanding the state, economics, laws, politics, and education. Sensing this development the UMNO-led government later introduced various Islamization agenda such as the establishment of the International Islamic University, Islamic Bank, and reviewing the Shariah Laws in the 1980s.

This strategic move of accommodating Islamic agenda has given impact on the PAS popularity. The UMNO-led government constantly challenges the PAS legitimacy of proclaiming itself as the vanguard of Islam. UMNO describes the PAS

¹² FEER, November 4, 1999.

as fomenting religious radicalism and promoting the politicization of politics. In its challenge to the PAS' claim of Islamic legitimacy, UMNO rigorously embarks on Islamization agenda. It further claims that this Islamization is a sincere attempt to uphold the dignity of Islam.

The PAS insistence on Islamic law and Islamic State further eroded as UMNO continued to infuse Islamic universalism in its agenda. In the debate on the implementation of Islamic law, for instance, UMNO leaders brought some international scholars to counter the PAS insistence on the implementation of Islamic Laws. The UMNO members did not reject the notion of Islamic State and Islamic laws. But the questions being raised was its method and time-space factor.

However the PAS argued the UMNO Islamization drives were mere "cosmetic" and "lip-service". While the UMNO-led government promoted its Islamic image, more and more unIslamic activities were tolerable. Thus in the PAS perspective, UMNO was emblematic with secularism and nationalism. The move for the so-called Islamization, according to PAS, was intending to curb the resurgent of Islamic consciousness.

The UMNO leadership however dismissed the PAS claim. In his speech in the 1997 UMNO General Assembly, Mahathir reiterated that UMNO's struggle cannot be separated from the struggles of the Muslim and Islam, and "it is clear that when UMNO succeeds, when Malaysia succeeds, the world will acknowledge the success of Islam". Mahathir further argued that the Muslims are weak because of wrong priorities in addressing Islamic teachings. In an indirect criticism against the PAS, Mahathir further stated: "Islamic teaching on brotherhood, on not embarrassing and disappointing others, on defending the umm, on justice, on preventing chaos in society, on the happiness and prosperity of Muslims, are neglected. Thus, Muslims become weak, ignorant, and are ridiculed and belittled by the enemies of Islam. All this is not because the Islamic teachings are wrong, but because our emphasis is only on part of the teachings, that is, on method and not the true meaning and intention of Islam."

However the race for Islamization was thwarted in the 1998's Anwar expulsion. Suddenly the Islamic groups and Muslim generations that are bent on Anwar charisma led another movement and joined the PAS. It is no more an issue of the Islamization polemics between the PAS and UMNO. It turned into a new political discourse that embraces more universal issues such as Islam and justice, Islam and human right, Islam and the legitimization of government, Islam and morality, and Islam and the ulama.

The immediate effect of Anwar expulsion has given the PAS its advantage for Islamization. The party leadership found that the time was ripe for them to champion the Islamic cause in a broader scale. The agitated group later found PAS a new political vehicle for them carry on their struggle.¹³

The new political landscape in relation to Islamization agenda was further enhanced with the formation of the newly political party, Parti Keadilan Nasional in March 1999. The party struggle for total reform in Malaysia is instrumental to Anwar Ibrahim. Led by Anwar's wife, Azizah, the party has laid its principles of struggle towards creating a just society. In the Party's sixth agenda mentioned the aim to carry on and strive for Islam as a way life; Islam as an official religion of the Federation; and to maintain religious freedom and to emphasize on morality.

Although the party does not include the struggle for an Islamic state, the religious fervor continues to dominate the party's orientation. It is because the issue of justice especially on the case of Anwar Ibrahim is seen as religious obligation. Islamist groups for the first time joined the effort together under the reformation movement in which the Keadilan party became centrifugal. Members and workers of the Keadilan are mainly from the Islamist groups.

However, the debate ensues with regard to the Islamic orientation of the reform movement manifested in the Keadilan. It is the first time the party together with other political parties and NGOs formed a coalition movement called *Barisan Alternatif* - Alternative Front consisting of Muslim and non-Muslims members aiming at reforming socio-economic and political system of the country. This broad-based movement consists of PAS, Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), ABIM, JIM, Malaysian Ulama Association (PUM), Just World Trust (JUST), PKPIM, Consumer Association of Penang (CAP), and others.

In the wake of the 1999 General Election, the Barisan Alternatif produced its political manifesto entitled Towards a Just Malaysia (Ke arah Malaysia yang Adil). The manifesto mentioned the overall agenda of change including religion and culture. In religious and culture plans, the Front stated the need to form Syaria Judiciary Commission, to reduce political influence in the state's Religious Council, mosques and other religious institutions, to provide cemetery and worshiping places for non-Muslims; to allow more religious dialogues; to promote intercivilizational studies; and to spread Malaysian culture which is based on morality and conventional

¹³ Asiaweek, March 31, 2000.

wisdom.¹⁴

The debate on the extent of “Islamicness” in the Barisan Alternatif continues. It is argued that Islamist movements which join the Front have to reconcile with other competing forces within the Front. It is difficult to enhance Islamic programs and training that have become preconditions for Islamist movement. The self-realization (tarbiyyah) program has been shaped in a more issue oriented and emotive in nature, which is centered on the historical condition of Anwar Ibrahim. The epistemological doctrine and world-view of Islam have to be defined in a more general ways so as not to ridicule other religious adherents. Certain degree of tolerance has to be taken to different ideologies and ethnic.¹⁵

The above scenario has created a new orientation of the Islamist movement. The da' wah orientation has now changed to a more political methodology. Their attitude to the government becomes more confrontational. Although almost all of the movements continue to maintain their apolitical stance, direct involvement in Barisan Alternatif have made them inseparable from being political. In the 1999 General Election, several Islamist movements' leaders and members contested under the Barisan Alternatif. They include former ABIM president Muhammad Nur Manuty, Sheikh Azmi, Annuar Tahir, and Ghazali Basri.

Conclusion

The relation of Islam and politics in Malaysia remains crucial due to its pervasive nature in the Malay society. The recent general election further testifies the importance of Islam in Malaysia politics. The PAS victory in the two Malay dominant states of Kelantan and Trengganu shows that is a new wave of Islamic politics that may threaten the UMNO's dominant as the torchbearer of the Malay-Muslims in Malaysia. The UMNP did badly in the general election, although it maintains its power through the National Front. Nevertheless, UMNO begin to recapture the Malays supports in the by-election held recently in Sanggang, Pahang.

The question remains on the next generation that would shape a new political reality in Malaysia. In the next general election, the new voters would be approximately three millions. Should the new voters choose to vote for the Barisan

¹⁴ Ke Arah Malaysia yang Adil, Manifesto Bersama Barisan Alternatif, p. 39.

¹⁵ Muhammad Syukri Salleh, “Reformasi, Reradikalisasi dan Kebangkitan Islam di Malaysia”, PEMIKIR Bil. 20, pp. 41-2.

Alternatif, the UMNO's survival would be in question. However if they continue to support the UMNO as the sole representative of the Malays, UMNO will then have to make necessary adjustment to enhance its image as the protector of the Malays and to provide a conducive environment where Islam can flourish. The PAS upsurge however will be challenged in terms of the genuine supports its receive from the Anwar's episode. To the young generations Anwar remains the legacy and the role model for the new politics. Should anything happen along the political terrain particularly on Anwar's future, such as making his comeback to UMNO, the Islamist movement will once again face a daunting task ahead.

Islam in Southeast Asia at the Dawn of the New Millennium: Prospects and Challenges^{*}

M. Kamal Hassan^{**}

Introduction

The last century witnessed in Southeast Asia the rise of Islamic reformist (*islah, tajdid*) movements in the first three decades, in Dutch controlled Indonesia and British Malaya, as well as, the end of Western colonialism followed by the era of post-independence nationalism which pursued the goals of economic development and national integration. The region of Southeast Asia, particularly the Malay-Indonesian areas, witnessed, in the last century, the emergence of Islamic trends and developments which would presumably continue to play their respective roles in shaping the future of Muslim communities in the context of Muslim-majority countries and - to a lesser extent - that of Muslim-majority countries. These trends, since the emergence of the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the 70's, have impacted in varying degrees of intensity upon a broad range of issues involving politics, law, economics, education, administration, literature, media, art, music and inter-religious dialogues. As the contemporary Muslim reformist discourse expands the scope of Islamic religiosity and defines the meaning of worship of Allah to embrace then totality of human life, thereby furnishing an effective counter argument to the secularization theses underlying the developmentalist agenda of the post-colonial nationalist ruling elites, the relevance of Islam to the above-mentioned areas on national development is gradually being accommodated and gains wider

^{*} 本文發表於2000年5月6日於中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫所主辦之「馬來伊斯蘭政教運動國際研討會」。

^{**} Rector, International Islamic University, Malaysia.

acknowledgement, from the power holders notwithstanding the strong resistance they have put up from the outset.

It appears that the craving for spiritual contentment among the middle-class Muslims, the disillusionment with the unfulfilled promises of national development programmes, the search for alternatives to the secularist paradigms, the fear of the impact of Christian evangelization, the dismay with materialistic tendencies and life-styles in the consumerist economy and the influence of reformist/revivalist Islamic thought and movements have together reinforced the Islamically oriented trends and tendencies in the Muslim minority countries such as Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Kampuchea and Myanmar, factors related to the way the governments or regimes treat their Muslim minorities or respond to the economic and political demands of Muslim groups, may play a more decisive role at dawn of the new millennium. In addition, the issue of poverty will continue to plague the Champa Muslim communities in the Kampuchea, the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand and the Moros in Mindanao.

Muslim-Majority Country

The focus of this presentation, however, is on the role of Islam in the Muslim-majority countries of Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. It is interesting to note that despite having three different political systems, the demands in these countries for greater Islamic influence on public education, personal law status, economic and financial systems, government electronic media, the civil service, cultural activities and international relations have been on the rise since the last two decades, despite having to face opposition from several quarters.

Brunei Darussalam, with its ideology of “Melayu Islam Beraja” (Malay Islamic Monarchy) would probably witness a wider scope of socioeconomic and sociocultural Islamization in the next few decades as long as the political system is not adversely affected. With the prospect of declining oil reserves in the future, the emergence of a more educated populace, the strengthening of ties with other Muslim countries and the impact of globalization, it is not inconceivable that the monarchy would allow a greater participation of the people in the governance and decision making processes of the country. The well-known religious conservatism of the Muslim community may also become more open to constructive and innovative ideas coming from outside, as the old solutions or formulae may no longer be able to hold their own under rapidly changing circumstances. The gradual reform of the legal system, either towards

greater harmonization of the prevalent Common Law system inherited from the British period with Islamic shariah law or wider Islamization of the whole legal system, would also be a part of the future scenario. The planning and implementation of the strategy of Bruneization and Islamization are lending support to the above efforts. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, the process of Islamization of Bruneian society would continue in a peaceful and non-controversial way.

Malaysia, with its system of parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model, has also witnessed a greater impact of Islamic perspectives in public life, as a result partly of the government's own efforts in a) fulfilling the constitutional provision of Islam as the official religion of the state or b) responding to pressures from Islamist political and non-governmental groups or c) reinforcing the Islamic claims of the dominant Malay ruling party, U.M.N.O. (United Malay Nationalist Organization). Unlike the situation in Brunei, which is a predominantly Malay society and in which the Islamic identity is not a controversial issue, Islamization in Malaysia is a contentious political issue primarily because the political stability of the country depends on the sharing of power and wealth among the three largest ethnic groups - Malays, Chinese and Indians. With Malay nationalism currently experiencing a serious crisis of confidence and U.M.N.O. undergoing a severe erosion of Malay support (as indicated in the December 1999 general elections), Parti Rakyat Malaysia (P.R.M.) Democratic Action Party (D.A.P.) and the newly formed KEADILAN, has mounted a formidable opposition to the ruling National Front with P.A.S. now in control of two Malay dominated states in peninsular Malaysia, Islam as a religiopolitical discourse and a political force would assume a higher profile in the early decades of the new century.

The new phenomenon which emerged in the last general elections is changing the political landscape of Malaysia as it signifies a) the first ever rapprochement between two important Islamist NGO's, such as Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (A.B.I.M.) and Jamaah Islam Malaysia (J.I.M.) who agreed to cooperate with the Islamic political party, P.A.S. and b) a coalition never before achieved between a staunchly Islamic party (P.A.S.) a socialist Malay dominated party (P.R.M.), a staunchly secular Chinese-dominated opposition party (D.A.P.) and KEADILAN, the new party formed in 1999 by the multi-racial supporters of the ousted former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim.

This new religio-political landscape is bound to have moderating as well as far-reaching effects on the Malay Islamist discourse which has not come to grips with the realities of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society that contemporary Malaysia

has become. Similarly, the traditionally Chinese chauvinistic politics of the D.A.P. would have to accommodate Islamic thought and ideas hitherto treated with disdain or extreme suspicion. Assuming that the Malaysian politics of 2020 and beyond would finally be liberated from the historical bondage of ethnicity, feudalism and parochialism, there would be a growing need for Malay leaders and elites to articulate Islamic issues in a manner that would transcend the erstwhile tendencies of ethnocentricism. One would also expect that inter-religious dialogues would be on the increase and that those engaged in such dialogues would also be able to communicate in Chinese or Tamil languages. In the past inter-religious dialogues have been few and far between.

In the future scenario of a non-stoppable inflow of abundant information, ideas and thoughts from all over the world, a greater tolerance of democratic values and pluralism may permeate the Malay-Muslim community. Restrictions on the freedom of speech, publication and peaceful assembly would no longer be tolerated in the coming decades as the power of the nation-state will presumably be necessarily reduced and civil societies play important roles in forging a new Malaysian society. This requires the forging of a new political culture, not based on ethnicity, neo-feudalistic values and the mutual preservation of vested interests of ethnic elites, to be undertaken by future generation of Malay-Muslims. The new culture would have to be based on the supremacy of knowledge, virtue, justice, the complete separation of powers and the rule of law. How the New Malay elites are going to withstand the inroads of economic and information globalization is also going to be a crucial factor in moulding the new culture.

The Indonesian situation is admittedly the most complex of the three Muslim-majority countries and any number of scenario can be constructed based on one's assessment of the internal dynamics and the interplay of internal and external forces which shape the political future of this most populous Muslim country in the world. A new democratic Indonesia is definitely in the making after the collapse of Suharto's New Order and the necessary reforms in the political system are being undertaken to strengthen civilian rule, curb the power of the military and make the presidency more transparent and accountable to the people. With the restoration of the multiparty system, and the freedom of the press and free speech, the role of Islam in the new Republic is once again the subject of public debate. There is no doubt that Islam has reasserted itself as a spiritual and moral force in the last two decades. It could be argued that in the context of dominant military influence, that was the only avenue opened and allowed for Islam. The return of multi-party democracy, however, is also

witnessing the return of Islam as an influential sociopolitical force supported by several political parties, NGO's and Acehese Islamic groups. What has been most disconcerting and alarming is the return of violence. The outbreak of interethnic or interreligious violence in several parts of the archipelago, the latest being in Maluku, is also fueling latent militant tendencies among Muslim and Christian groups. The recent crisis of East Timor and the ongoing unrest in the province of Aceh, not to speak of the ailing economy, are issues of grave concern to the emerging democratic system in Indonesia. One is tempted to raise the question of how long can the democratic Republic contain the centrifugal forces, the separatist movements, the inter-ethnic rivalries and Muslim-Christian antipathy, and what role would Islam play in solving those issues? It is reasonable to believe that the majority Muslim community would be opposed to the prospect of gradual disintegration of the Republic or a protracted violent conflict between Christians and Muslims. The Muslim-world community, including Indonesia's Muslim neighbours, would like to see a stable and united Indonesia in which Islam plays a positive role in national life.

However, the shaping of Islamic discourses and the direction of Muslim thought within the Indonesian society has always drawn upon, and are dictated, by a variety of sources of inspiration, from within and from without, from the Middle East as well as from the West. Given the unpredictable nature of the future course of the Indonesian state, it would be prudent to surmise that all strains or tends of Muslim political thought and intellectual discourses would compete for popular support in the coming decades, although the PANCASILA state usually favours a discourse which advocates the separation of religion from political and harmonious relationship among all adherents of religions and mystical belief (aliran kepercayaan). As in Malaysia, the tension between the idealistic/ideological perspectives and the pragmatic perspectives within the Muslim community would presumably continue with both extremities pulling the social fabric in two opposite directions. How the new democratic Republic wants to position herself internationally will also have an impact on the new roles that Islam would play. If one were to use the nation state's relationship with the state of Israel as an indicator of elite Muslim position or state's submission to international pressure, then the optimistic gestures of the current President, Abdur Rahman Wahid, vis-à-vis Israel may be construed that, eventually, a normalization of relationship between Indonesia and Israel can be expected, particularly if the pragmatic Muslim political discourse prevails over the universalist Muslim discourse into the next two or three decades. It would be interesting to see how future Muslim thought and intellectual discourses would marshal the justifications and adduce the religious rationale to legitimize such a radical political direction.

At any rate, truly democratic Indonesian state in which the military is depoliticized and the rule of law is well entrenched - a possible scenario in the next couple of decades - will provide the golden opportunity for Islamist groups or movements to promote their respective views or perspectives in the free market of ideas, without the support of violent means nor the fear of repression or persecution as was the case in the New Order era. A truly enlightened and authentic Islamic discourse which does justice to the demands of immutable and the mutable in the religion of Islam could well emerge from a free and democratic Indonesia of the future.

The Muslim Minority Situation

The situation of Muslims as a minority community in Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Kampuchea, Myanmar and Vietnam obviously varies from that of the Muslim-majority countries in a variety of ways. Except for the Philippines where the Moros in Mindanao and the Sulu islands are still fighting for independence through military means, the Muslim minority communities elsewhere are mainly concerned with their economic survival, the educational future and religious identity of the younger generation, and the search for a more stable and acceptable role in the national political system.

The Muslims of Singapore have learned to live peacefully in an avowedly secular state in which Chinese economic and political dominance prevails. Having to rely upon their own internal resources in a highly competitive economy, Muslim groups have given top priority to educational advancement, developing their professional skills and acquiring the necessary Islamic religious knowledge. The Muslims of Thailand may be divided into two groups; the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand who are in the majority and the smaller multi-ethnic Muslims of the north concentrating in Bangkok. With greater democratization in the last decade, more Muslims choose to participate in the democratic political process with the prospect of getting the recognition and goodwill of the government. The temptation to resort to violent means of resolving their grievances would most likely be non-existent if the democratic reforms and benevolent civilian rule continue into the early part of the next millennium. The rise into political prominence of Muslim leaders from the south such as Dr. Surin Pitsuwan and Wan Muhammad Noor and the positive role they played in a Buddhist society may prompt more Muslim intellectuals to opt for participative Muslim politics than that of the separatist and violent tendencies of

the past.

In Myanmar, the Muslim minorities have been enduring the difficulties and tribulations of living in a very poor country under a repressive military regime. Meanwhile the Rohingya Islamic movement continues to struggle for the survival of a Muslim community in the Arakan region, while the other two smaller communities have made their own forced adjustments to the cruelties of the ruling junta. Without the prospect of return to civilian rule of a democratic system, the future of the Muslim communities remain somewhat bleak. The Kampuchean Muslim minorities, particularly the Champa Muslim community, are now desperately trying to improve their abject economic situation with the return of peace and a degree of political stability. Under the circumstances of extreme poverty and a crisis of identity, the community has to rely upon the material assistance of Muslim countries and philanthropists as well as their more affluent relatives who have escaped the tyranny of Pol Pot regime in the early 70's and are now residing in Malaysia and U.S.A. The reconstruction of the Muslim community, after the devastation and ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Pol Pot regime, has begun but it would take the Muslims a few more decades to regain their economic and cultural vitality that they once had.

Conclusion

Islam in Southeast Asia at the dawn of the new millennium is bound to play a more expanded role as the nations in the region become more democratic, more open, and more tolerant of minorities. Islamic educational, economic and professional bodies and institutions would be called upon to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the region while Islamic spiritual-ethical worldview would be further elaborated to address the future issues of corrupt political leadership, widespread financial scandals, serious environmental degradation, information-communication-technology pollution, the increase in cybercrime, and a host of new problems arising from the phenomenon of rampant globalization, and the advent of k-economy. What China will be in the next millennium and how she will spread her influence in the Asia Pacific region and in Southeast Asia will also affect the Malay-Indonesian countries development of Islam. Similarly the role of United States of America and her allies in this part of the world will have an impact on the region's Islamist movements. The way Christian regional or international organizations spread the message of the Gospel and penetrate Muslim communities in Southeast Asia may be another crucial factor of the future of Muslim-Christian relations in the region. If, however, the new millennium is going to

herald the renaissance of spiritual values and world religions will experience a new vitality and relevancy, then the respective proponents of the religions have to learn to live and co-exist, without having the need to resort to violence, in a more plural culture and civilization of the future.

Islam Issues in the Present Malaysian Political Movement*

Ibrahim Abu Bakar**

Introduction

This paper is a short discussion on Islamic issues in the contemporary Malaysian political movements. It will focus on some of the Islamic issues which are presented and discussed in the Malaysian newspapers. The political movements in Malaysia are innumerable and this paper refers to four political parties namely UMNO, MCA, PAS and DAP. UMNO and MCA are the ruling parties in Barisan National (BN) or the National Front (NF) which has accommodated 14 political parties. PAS and DAP are the opposition parties in Barisan Alternatif (BA) or the Alternative Front (AF) consisting of four political parties. PAS, UMNO, DAP and MCA were reported to have their own views on Islamic issues. To have some clear understanding about the present political movements in Malaysia, it is important to briefly survey Malaysian socio-religious and politico-historical backgrounds.

Malaysian Socio-religious Background

Socially and religiously Malaysian society is made up of different ethnic groups and religion is Islam according to Malaysian constitution. Other main ethnic groups are Chinese, Indians and Natives. The Natives in Malaysia are the natives of Sabah, Sarawak and Malay Peninsula or Malaya. The Malay word “Bumiputera” is used to

* 本文發表於 2000 年 5 月 6 日於中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫所主辦之「馬來伊斯蘭政教運動國際研討會」。

** Professor, Department of Theology and Philosophy, Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia.

refer to the Malays and the Natives in Malaysian economic perspective. Other religions in Malaysia are Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Animism, Confucianism, Taoism and Sikhism.

“Islam was the most widely professed religion in Malaysia.... In 1991, some 10.3 million persons belonged to this faith, consisting 59 per cent of the total population. This represents an increase of 6 percentage points over the 1980-1991 period.” (Department of Statistics Malaysia 1995: 72) In 1991, there were some 3.3 million Buddhists and some 1.4 million Christians in Malaysia. The percentage of Buddhists and Christians rose from 17.3 and 6.4 percent in 1980 to 18.4 and 8.1 percent respectively in 1991. (Department of Statistics Malaysia 1995: 72). Muslims formed the majority of the population in most states in Malaysia. The states with the largest Muslim proportion were Kelantan and Terengganu with 94 and 95 percent respectively in 1991. The largest proportion of Buddhists in Malaysia was in Penang and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, they were about 34 percent. The largest proportion of Christians in Malaysia was in Sabah and Sarawak and they formed 37 and 27 percent of the total populations of Sabah and Sarawak respectively in 1991. (Department of Statistics Malaysia 1995: 73-74) The non-Muslims in Malaysia have formed “the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism” which is abbreviated as MCCBCHS. (New Sunday Times, Nov.28, 1999).

Malaysian Politico-historical Background

Politically Malaysia is a federated, democratic independent nation. Malaysia attained her independence from the British Government on September 16, 1963. The Federation of Malaysia consists of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. However, two years later Singapore decided to be independent from Malaysia. “On 9 August 1965 the Malaysian House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) passed a Constitutional Amendment Bill enabling Singapore to secede from the Federation.” (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 275). Thus Malaysia, after August 1965, comprised Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak.

Malaya, referring to Tanah Melayu which literally means the Malay land, gained her independence from the British Government on August 31, 1957. The 31 August is remembered and celebrated as the Independent day in Malaysia every year. Malaya was the Federation of the states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Kedah, Perlis, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Johor, Pulau Pinang (Penang), and Melaka

(Malacca). All the states in Malaya have Malay rulers except Penang and Malacca. Both states had no longer Malay rulers after the western colonizers occupied them. Many Malay rulers in Malaya were from the Malay kingdom of Malacca. The first western power who took control over Malacca was the Portuguese in 1511 and then the Dutch who defeated the Portuguese in Malacca in 1641. The British took over Malacca from the Dutch in 1795. “Melaka continued under British rule from 1795, except for a brief period of Dutch control from 1818 until 1824..” The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 legitimized the British occupation and rule of Malacca and Singapore. (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 114)

Under the British rule, Malaya was divided into three administrative units namely the Federated Malay States (FMS), the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) and the Straits Settlements (SS). The FMS were the states of Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan. The UMS comprised the states of Johor, Kedah, Perlis, Terengganu and Kelantan. The SS were Penang, Malacca and Singapore. (Paul 1975: 1-2)

The Japanese invasion and occupation of Malaya from 1942 to 1945 made the Malays aware the fact that the small eastern power, the Japanese, was able to defeat the great western power, the British. The Japanese also encouraged Malay nationalism. “In this period Malays increasingly began to see themselves as belonging to a Malay-wide entity, rather than to their individual states.” (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 248). In July 1945 the Japanese in Malaya openly supported and promoted the formation of a new political and nationalist organization named Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS) led by Ibrahim Yaakub and Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy. The main aim of the organization was to unite Malaya and Indonesia which were under the Japanese rule. However, the organization abruptly came to an end after the Japanese surrender to the British in Malaya on August 15, 1945. (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 250)

The Malays in Malaya began to protest against the British political and administrative plan to establish a Malayan Union which intended to provide the equal rights and opportunities to all races living in Malaya under the British rule. There were two Malay political parties formed before 1957 and both parties have survived to the present time. The first party is the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), formed in 1946, to fight against the proposed Malayan Union. UMNO was led by “Onn Ja'afar from its founding in 1946 until 1951, and by Tunku Abdul Rahman from 1951 to 1970. The initial success of party among the Malays was due to its ability to harness Malay opinion in the fight against the Malayan Union.” (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 266).

Tunku Abdul Rahman was asked to step down from being the leader of UMNO after the ethnic disturbances took place on May 13, 1969 in Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Ipoh. Tun Abdul Razak Hussein led UMNO until his death in January 1976. "His death on 14 January 1976 arose some fears that the new leadership would be less successful in balancing confliction groups within UMNO and the society at large." (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 293-294). Hussein Onn, the son of the first UMNO leader, led UMNO until his resignation in July 1981. "In July 1981 Tun Hussein Onn formally resigned as Prime Minister of Malaysia following a slow recovery from complicated heart surgery. He was succeeded by former UNMO 'radical', Dato Seri Dr. Mahahir bin Mohamad." (Mauzy 1986: 3).

All UMNO national leaders, except its first leader, are also the Prime Ministers of Malaysia. Hence, UMNO dominated Malayan and Malaysian politics. The special edition of Utusan Malaysia, a Malay daily newspaper, was issued on May 11, 1996 in conjunction with the celebration and commemoration of UMNO 50 years old. It portrayed and honored Tunku Abdul Rahman as Bapa Kemerdekaan (the Father of Independence). Tun Abdul Razak as Bapa Pembangunan (the Father of Development), Tun Hussein as Bapa Keamanan (the Father of Peace), and the present Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as Bapa Malaysia Modern (the Father of Modern Malaysia).

Another political party formed by the Malays in Malaya before 1957 was the party based on the religion of Islam by the name Persatuan Islam Se Malaya (PAS) or the pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). It was registered on June 15, 1955. In December 1958 the name of the party was called Persatuan Islam Se Tanah Melayu (PAS) or the pan-Malay Land Islamic Union, and later on in 1971 it was changed to Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) or the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP). (Safie 1981: 62-63).

UMNO was able to become the ruling party in Malaya because it had formed the political alliance with the Chinese and Indian political parties namely the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). The representatives from UMNO, MCA and MIC were invited by the British Government to negotiate the terms and conditions for an independent Malaya which was declared independence on August 31, 1957. In every general elections in Malaya, UMNO, MCA and MIC entered the elections with the name Parti Perikatan (PP) or the Alliance Party (AP) whose symbol was Dapal Layar or the sailing boat. The symbol of PAS was Bulan dan Bintang or the Moon and the Star and then Bulan Purnama Putih or the White Full Moon.

In order to accommodate more political parties especially those from Sabah and Sarawak, the Alliance Party was changed to Barisan Nasional (BN) or the National Front (NT) in October 1974 and the new symbol Dacing or the scale of justice replaced the sailing boat symbol of the Alliance Party. In October 1999, BN celebrated its 25 years old. BN has 14 political parties, the largest in UMNO and the second large in MCA. GERAKAN is another Chinese party in BN. (Utusan Malaysia, Oct. 23, 1999). GERAKAN is very influential in Penang. The Penang Chief Minister is GERAKAN. According to the MCA secretary general Dr. Ting Chew Peh, "The MCA has projected its membership to hit the one million mark by the end of the year." (Sunday Star, April 2, 2000). However, unlike GERAKAN, the MCA members are not appointed to become the Chief Minister or Menteri Besar in any state in Malaysia.

PAS was supported for "its appeal to Islam as the basis of a Malay-dominated society and in its demands for the preservation of Malay privileges. The principal PAS stronghold has been in Kelantan and Terengganu, two levels of modern economic development." (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 267).

In the 1990 Malaysian general elections, PAS won 7 Parliamentary seats and 32 State seats. For the 1995 Malaysian general elections, PAS gained 7 Parliamentary seats and 33 State seats. (Utusan Malaysia, 27 April 1995). The tenth Malaysian general elections which took place on November 29, 1999, granted PAS the power to rule Kelantan and Terengganu and to win 27 Parliamentary seats. PAS was also able to win few Parliamentary and States seats in Kedah, Pahang, Perak and Perlis. (Utusan Malaysia, Dec.1, 1999). It was the largest Parliamentary and State seats given by the Malaysian voters to PAS. Thus, the PAS President, Datuk Fadzil Noor, was appointed the Opposition Leader in the Malaysian Parliament by the opposition parties. He took over the post from Lim Kit Siang who had been the Opposition Leader since 1978. Lim was from DAP. "Currently, the Opposition Leader is provided an office in Parliament House, a RM2, 000 monthly allowance, and a place in the Select Committee which appoints MPs to the various sub-committees of the Dewan Rakyat." (New Straits Times, Dec. 9, 1999).

In Kelantan, UMNO was able to win only one Parliamentary seat and two State seats in the 1999 general elections. The Parliamentary seat was Gua Musang, secured by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. He had been appointed the National Front leader for Kelantan few months before the general elections. He was the national leader of Parti Melayu Semangat 46(S46) or the 46 Malay Spirit Party during the 1990 and 1995 Malaysian general elections. In both elections, PAS worked together with S46 to

defeat BN in Kelantan. Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah had unsuccessfully challenged Dr. Mahathir in the 1987 UMNO general election for the post of UMNO President. S46 claimed that UMNO under the leadership of Dr. Mahathir had deviated from the UNMO original spirit of the 1946. However, Tengku Razaleigh gave up S46 and dissolved the party on October 6, 1996 and many members of S46 including Tengku Razaleigh joined UMNO. (Utusan Malaysia, January 1, 2000). S46 won 6 Parliamentary seats and 12 State seats in Kelantan in the 1995 general elections. S46 took part in the general elections for the first time in 1990 and won 8 Parliamentary seats and 19 State seats. (Utusan Malaysia, April 27, 1995).

Democratic Action Party (DAP) claims that it is a multi-ethnic political party but many Malaysians consider it as a Chinese opposition party. It won 9 and 10 Parliamentary Seats in the 1995 and 1999 Malaysian general Elections respectively. (Utusan Malaysia, Dec.1, 1999).

For the 1999 Malaysian general elections, PAS, DAP, Keadilan (Parti Keadilan Nasional or National Justice Party) and PRM (Parti Rakyat Malaysia or the Malaysian People Party) came together to form BA (Barisan Alternatif or the Alternative Front) to struggle against BN or the National Front. According to Kamaruddin Jaafar, BA was officially formed on October 24, 1999 when the four opposition parties agreed to issue their own manifestos devoting to moving forward a more just Malaysia. (Kamarudin 2000: 12). The BA manifesto also promises to strengthen Malaysian economy, to upgrade administrative accountability and transparency, to establish a new social contract, to foster national solidarity, to form a genuine democracy, and to rectify Malaysian image and position on the world stage. (BA Manifesto).

In the 1999 Malaysian general elections, the number of the Parliamentary seats was 193. Out of those seats BA won 148 and BN won 42 seats respectively. Other three seats were obtained by PBS from Sabah. Among the BA parties, UMNO won 72, MCA, 28, MIC, 7 and GERAKAN, 7 respectively. The other seats were secured by other parties in BN. Among the BA parties, PAS won 27, DAP, 10 and Keadilan, 5 seats respectively. (Kamarudin 2000: 29)

The Islamic issues are always vividly present in the Malaysian political movements for many reasons. First, Islam is the religion of Malaysia. The Federal Constitution of Malaysia states in Article 3 as follows: "Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation." Secondly, the Malays are religiously and legally Muslims in the

Federal Constitution of Malaysia. It says that “Malay means a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and (a) was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore, or (b) is the issue of such a person.” (Legal Research Board 1998: 153). The Merdeka Day refers to August 31, 1957. Thirdly, the view that Islam covers every aspect of Muslim activities including politics is dominating the Malays. In other words, the great majority of Malays still hold that politics and religion are inseparable. Finally, PAS always claims that it always bases on Islam meanwhile UMNO bases on Malay nationalism. Both parties have to tackle the Islamic issues for political reasons especially for winning the Malay voters in Malaysian general elections. Although the Islamic issues in the present Malaysian political movements are innumerable only four of them are presented here. They are Muslim faith, Muslim ulema, Muslim and non-Muslim political alliance and Islamic state.

1. Muslim faith

The issue of Muslim faith or belief is discussed on relation with the political movements in Malaysia. The issue at stake is the status of Muslim faith if Muslims support certain political parties. Amir Sarifudin Mansor who interviewed Wan Mokhtar Ahmad, who had been Menteri Besar of Terengganu for 25 years before he was defeated by PAS in the November 1999 general elections, stated that Wan Mokhtar, the head of Terengganu UMNO, was still needed to answer and refute the PAS attacks in its campaigns especially in isu-isu agama (the Islamic religious issues). Amir Sarfuddin asked Wan Mokhtar if he was aware that PAS said that if someone does not vote for PAS, his religious deeds for five years will not be accepted by Allah. Wan Mokhtar replied that such action of PAS indicates that PAS tries to sell cheap the Qur'anic verses for cheap rewards and PAS forgets Allah's punishment for those who sell the Qur'anic verses. Wan Mokhtar said that PAS prefers material gains in this world over Allah's rewards. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 27, 1999). In other words, if what Amir Sarifuddin claims about PAS is true, the Malays who do not vote for PAS do not have Muslim faith or belief. Therefore, their good deeds are not accepted by Allah.

In Kelantan, Ahmad Che Kob, an independent Islamic religious missionary but supporting UMNO, said that there is nothing wrong with the faith of Muslims if they vote for BN on November 29, 1999. Voting for BN is not wrong and it does not impair or damage the Muslim faith. He stated that PAS and Islam are two different

things. He told his audience in the *ceramah* (the Islamic religio-political talk) gathering held at Tama Perumahan Mas, Rantau Panjang, Kelantan on 27th Nov. 1999. (Mingguan Malaysia, Nov. 28, 1999). This indicates that Ahmad Che Kob did not want the Malays to go against UMNO on the basis of Muslim faith. For him supporting BN is not wrong from Islamic legal and theological perspectives.

Aziz Ishak, a journalist of Utusan, claims that PAS promised Paradise for those who vote for it. He said that due to political ignorance and fanatical attitudes regarding the Paradise promised by PAS for those who vote that party, Datuk Shahnnon Ahmad, the writer of *SHIT* won the Parliamentary seat of Sik in Kedah and defeated the BN candidate Datuk Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman. (Utusan Malaysia, Dec., 1, 1999). Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was reported to have said that PAS, in its efforts to win the support from the Muslims, did many things contrary to Islam. For example, PAS guaranteed Paradise for those who vote for PAS although no human being was able to guarantee it. (Mingguan Malaysia, Nov. 28, 1999)

On the reason why the Terengganu BN or UNMO was defeated by PAS, Dr. Mahathir Monahmad pointed out to the PAS promise of Paradise. He said “We lost in Terengganu because PAS made efforts to frighten the people and to assure them that those who voted for PAS would go to Paradise had influenced certain people including those working with the Government agencies...” (Utusan Malaysia, Dec.1, 2000)

In Pahang, Zulkefli Hamzah reported that its Menteri Besar, Datuk Seri Adnan Yaakob told the press that BN was defeated in eight constituencies because the oppositions especially PAS spread the deviant teaching saying that whoever supported PAS would enter Paradise. That teaching was able to influence the Malay voters. (Utusan Malaysia, Dec.1, 1999).

Rosi Zakaria said that PAS did not make efforts “to stop party members from calling other Muslims who do not support PAS as apostate, or if other Muslims do not vote for PAS, they would not go to heaven.” (New Sunday Times, April 9, 2000). Wan Mokhtar Ahmad said that the PAS leaders must be responsible for their judgment that the UMNO members are unbelievers supposedly they become unbelievers because they are in good terms with the Chinese and Indians in this country. (Utusan Malaysia, March 25, 2000).

Idris Umar from PAS who won the State seat in Pahang denied that PAS promised Paradise for those who voted for PAS. Hashim Jasim from PAS won the

State seat in Perlis was also in agreement with Idris Umar. On 8 March 2000 the State Assembly of Perlis passed “the Islamic Aqidah (Faith) Protection Enactment law ... empowering the Syariah courts to prosecute Muslims practicing deviate teachings. The three PAS assemblymen did not support the law as it contradicted true Islamic teachings in terms of penalties for apostates. PAS assembly member Hashim Jasin ... hoped that the enactment would not be used against political adversaries. The ruling coalition which also governs Perlis often accuses PAS of abusing Islam to serve its political agenda. It says PAS has issued religious decrees setting a place in heaven for its supporters which PAS consistently denied.” (Harakah, April 16-30, 2000).

2. Muslim ulema

The issue of Muslim ulema is their leadership in the Malaysian political movements. The UMNO leaders and supporters consistently asked Malaysians not to support PAS and its ulema leadership because the PAS ulema are not qualified to become the Muslim ulemas as well as the Malaysian political leaders.

Saroji Mokhtar, the Utusan journalist, for example wrote that the 10th general elections on 29th November 1999 made Kelantan the focus because it was the PAS strongest base, led by those who were called the ulema headed by Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat who saw the best opportunity for PAS to give UMNO and BN in Kelantan a crushing defeat. Meanwhile UMNO and BN determined to seize Kelantan from PAS. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 27, 1999).

Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the UMNO Deputy President and the Deputy Prime Minister, said that PAS failed to nominate the ulemas as its candidates for the 1999 general elections because PAS had problem in selecting them. He hoped that the PAS members would realize the internal problems in PAS. He stressed that the PAS struggle was indeed a loss to the nation and Islamic society in comparison with BN which always gave priority to the people interest and security. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 23, 1999). Tengku Razaleigh wanted the Kelantanese to stand up against unprofitable conservatism under the PAS political leadership. He considered the PAS leadership Kelantan very conservative. The PAS hard core consisting of the Pondok people and the imams did not heed to the call of UMNO but to the call of their PAS leaders who claimed to struggle for Islam. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 25, 1999). In other words, the PAS ulemas and their followers in Kelantan were presented as conservatives and their conservatism was a loss fore the Kelantanese.

The Arabic word ‘*ulama*’ is a plural noun means the learned. If someone refers

to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, New Edition 1983, he find that “ulema...the body of professional theologians, expounders of the law, in a Muslim country: a member of such a body.” In Malaysia, the Malay term *ulama* is frequently used for those who graduated in Islamic studies from the Muslim universities in the Middle East such as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Among those who are regarded as the ulema in UMNO are Wan Mokhtar Wan Ahmad, Dr. Mohd. Yusof Nor and Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman. They were defeated by the PAS candidates in Terengganu and Kedah in the November 1999 general elections. Their defeat is deplorable according to Aziz Ishak who wrote “the Defeat of Wan Mokhtar, Hamid Othman and Yusof Noor also unconsciously indicates these three leaders who are the UMNO ulema disappear from the people election power platform.” (Utusan Malaysia, Dec. 1, 1999). What is said by Aziz Ishak turns to be true in the case of the UMNO leadership in Terengganu. Idris Jusoh who graduated not in Islamic studies was appointed the UMNO leader of Terengganu to replace Wan Mokhtar who had resigned after his defeat in the 1999 general elections. The UMNO in Kedah is led by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysian Prime Minister and the UMNO President.

Meanwhile some of those who are regarded as the ulema in PAS are Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, Abdul Hadi Awang, Dr. Sanusi Daeng Mariok, Dr. Haron Din, Harun Taib and Fadzil Mohd. Noor. They graduated in Islamic studies from the Muslim universities in the Middle East like the three ulema in UMNO. One of the PAS slogans was “Bersama Kepimpinan Ulama” (Together with the ulema leadership). The poster which has that slogan also lists 14 PAS leaders representing 14 states in Malaysia for 1999/2001. The poster was placed in the Kelantan PAS headquarters in Kota Bharu. I read the poster when I visited that office on January 6, 2000.

Dr. Rais Yatim, who rejoined UMNO after the dissolution of S46 in 1996, exhorted the ulemas who supported UMNO and Malaysia Government to speak up against the Islamic teachings spread by the PAS ulemas. After he won the Parliamentary seat in Negeri Sembilan in the 1999 general elections, Dr Rais Yatim was appointed the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department. He was reported to have said “PAS is teaching Muslims to hate other Muslims. This kind of teaching may end up as a belief. By then it will be too late for the country. The problem has to be arrested immediately”. (Sunday Star, April 2, 2000).

Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the PAS General Advisor or Mursyidul Am PAS, argued that the ulema are capable of being the Malaysian political leaders since they have acquired higher knowledge in various fields and many of them graduated from higher learning institutions and supported by academicians and professionals. Due to

many ulema in PAS, its opportunity nowadays is very clear in the meantime the opportunity of UMNO is darken, and darken. If the ulema do not know the administrative matters, they would easily learn them in a three-month course. (Utusan Malaysia, August 12, 1999). Nik Aziz has advocated the positive view regarding the Muslim ulema and their political participation in PAS. His positive view is contrary to the negative view from those who see that the PAS ulemas are unqualified to become Malaysian political leaders as well as Muslim ulema.

Wan Ramli Wan Muhamad interviewed Prof. Dr. Abdul Hamid Abdullah and asked his opinion about Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the PAS General Advisor and the PAS leader of Kelantan. The Professor was reported have said that Nik Abdul Aziz was not qualified to become the Malay and Islamic leader because he did not understand the reality of his own race. The Malays especially those in Kelantan should reject his leadership. He did not want to protect the Malay privileges after PAS had cooperated with DAP. Moreover, that Professor was reported to have suggested that PAS should be banned and only UMNO should be kept alive. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 27, 1999).

Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah discredited Nik Aziz on the subject of Paradise and Hell. He was reported to have said “Why is Nik Aziz forever harping on heaven and hell? He if not the guardian of heaven gate. Even Nik Aziz himself cannot be sure that he will go to heaven. Only the Almighty will decide.” (New Sunday Times, Nov. 28, 1999).

As regard to Abdul Hadi Awang who is regarded as the Islamic religious scholar by PAS, the UMNO members do not see him capable in politics and administration. Jaceline Tan wrote, “The Umno side likes to portray Abdul Hadi as little more than a skilled preacher with scant understanding of the art of government.” (New Sunday Times, April 9, 2000).

UMNO is said to have neglected its ulema due to “the influx of corporate leaders into UMNO since the early 1990s”. Since then UMNO “had alienated teachers and religious-minded grassroots leaders who had been the party's traditional source of support. What made matters worse was those corporate people tried to put on an Islamic image to win the hearts of the kampung-level party members. That gave PAS another reason to portray Umno as being capitalist-infested and thus making a mockery of the religion.” (Sunday Stat, April 2, 2000). UMNO is called to handle the issue of Muslim ulema “as PAS leaders have convinced some Malays that their *ulamak* are the only true leaders that Muslims ought to follow.” (Sunday Stat, April 2,

2000). For Kr. Rais Yatim, "PAS leaders masquerading as *ulamak* have been issuing *fatwa* (religious edict) on their own even though such a role is solely reserved for state mufti (head of religious department or council) and the National Fatwa Council, a non-political religious body whose members are *ulamak* and *mufti*." (Sunday Stat, April 2, 2000).

I tend to agree with Wan Hamidi Hamid about the important role played by the Muslim ulema in Malay society. He wrote "The *ulamak* have played an important role in Malay society for the last 500 years and will continue to do so." He further stressed that "In reality PAS *ulamak* are as much politicians as Umno's, but the Malays seem to be more attracted to the political rhetoric of people with religious credentials." (Sunday Stat, April 2, 2000). The standard Malay spelling for ulema is *ulama*, not *ulamak* as in the quotations. (DBP, 1998).

In order to attract Muslim ulema, Islamic religious teachers and imams to support UMNO and BN in Kelantan, the BN manifesto for Kelantan promised to defend and look after their interests. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 26, 1999). What was clear what the Kelantanese voters did not pay much attention to the BN manifestos for Kelantan. Therefore, BN was unable to seize Kelantan from PAS in the 1999 general elections.

Iskandar Astar blamed the UMNO ulema for the serious defeat of the UMNO candidates in the 1999 general elections. He stressed that the ulema in UMNO did nothing to counter attacks the PAS propagandas against UMNO and the Government. (Mingguan Malaysia, Jan. 2, 2000).

3. Muslim and non-Muslim political alliance

The issue of Muslim and non-Muslim political alliance is still prevalent in Malaysian politics. PAS used to ask the Malay voters to reject UMNO for its alliance with MCA, MIC and GERAKAN, three non-Muslim parties. In the booklet published for the 1995 general elections, it was written that it is unreasonable for the Kelantanese people to change the dogma to support Barisan Nasional which is openly dominated by the secular and fanatical party UMNO (Malay) together with MCA (Chinese), MIC (Indians) and GERAKAN (Chinese). Because all we know that those parties from Barisan Nasional especially UMNO clearly reject any effort to implement Islam (including *hudud*) in nation administration. (Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah 1995: 66).

However, the booklet published for the 1999 general elections does not have such political thought regarding the political alliance between Muslims and non-Muslims. (BPPNK 1999). This is due to the new attitude of PAS towards DAP. Zin Mahmud wrote that the opposition alliance was formed between PAS, DAP, KEADILAN and PRM. It was the first time in history, PAS supported. This indicated a new thought among the PAS supporters for their willingness to cooperate with DAP. The 1999 general elections granted PAS the great victory since PAS was able to consolidate in Kelantan, won Terengganu and penetrated into the traditional UMNO areas in Kedah, Perak, Penang, Selangor and Pahang. (Utusan Malaysia, Dec. 1, 1999).

Regarding the aim of the opposition political alliance, Lim Kit Siang stressed “Alternative Front parties have come together not to share the spoils of power, but to break the Barisan Nasional political hegemony to restore justice, freedom, democracy and good governance in Malaysia.” (Kamarul Zaman 1999: 123). PAS did not see any wrong from Islamic law as regard to its alliance with DAP. To legitimize and justify his agreement with DAP, PAS referred to the *al-fudul* agreement between the Prophet Muhammad and the non-Muslims in the classical Muslim history. (Kamarul Zaman 1999: 122). Moreover, PAS justified that its alliance with non-Muslims in political matters does not transgress any Islamic law. The Legal Committee of the Kelantanese Islamic Religious Council issued the religious ruling permitting Muslims to associate with infidels, to negotiate, discuss and compromise with them for the purpose of governing a nation. That religious ruling was issued on September 14, 1963. (Kamarul Zaman 1999: 124-125). PAS considered its alliance with DAP as a political agreement or *al-tahaluf al-siyasi* to push down the National Front. (Kamarul Zaman 1999:123).

UMNO and other parties in BN did not like the political cooperation between PAS and DAP. Datuk Seri Kr. Ling Liong Sik, the MCA President, urged “Chinese Malaysians to vote for the Barisan Nasional”; and his consistent message delivered to his audiences especially in places which were considered DAP strongholds” was “A vote for the DAP is a vote for Nik Aziz”. The cooperation between PAS and DAP was used by MCA to “create some uneasiness, if not outright fear” among the Chinese voters. (New Sunday Times, Nov. 28, 1999). Lim Kit Siang, the DAP Secretary-General, was reported to have said that his party would lose greatly due to the PAS factor and some of the PAS leaders were aware that some of the Malays would reject PAS due to its cooperation with DAP. (Mingguan Malaysian, Nov. 28, 1999). Finally Lim Kit Siang lost to the GERAKAN candidate Chia Kwang Chye, the

GERAKAN Secretary-General, in their political contest for the Parliamentary seat of Bukit Bendera in Penang in the 1999 general elections. According to Norzahizan Ismail, the number of the registered voters for Bukit Bendera Parliamentary seat was 70,818 consisting of 10,822 Malays, 51,976 Chinese, 6,164 Indians and 1,145 other ethnics. (Mingguan Malaysia, Nov. 28, 1999). Lim Kit Siang became the DAP Chairman after his defeat in the 1999 general elections, following the resignation of Dr. Chen Man Hin from the DAP chairmanship.

Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah was reported to have said that Nik Aziz legitimized the PAS-DAP relationship. He said that the Kelantanese voters would reject PAS due to its coalition with DAP. (Mingguan Malaysia, Nov. 28, 1999). Prof. Datuk Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas saw the opposition alliance was formed solely to win the general elections and the marriage between PAS and DAP was a *mut`ah* marriage for the sake of the general elections. They surely would soon separate after the general elections since both parties had different political goals. (Mingguan Malaysia, Oct. 31, 1999).

According to Joceline Tan, "Malaysians were not ready for the prospect of PAS Keadilan, DAP and PRM being in charge." Their loose coalition could not compete with BN in forming and managing a government although they pointed out the faults and shortcomings of BN, the ruling party. (New Sunday Times, Nov. 28, 1999).

4. Islamic state

The issue of Islamic state is another point of contention between PAS, UMNO, MCA and DAP. UMNO and MCA exhorted and appealed to Malaysians not to lend their support to PAS and DAP because both parties planned to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia or to make Malaysia an Islamic state. It was a crucial, provocative and controversial issue for the 1999 Malaysian general elections.

In 1980 Funston wrote "A more fundamental difference, however, centered on PAS' s advocacy of an Islamic state and UMNO' s rejection of this concept. UMNO leaders repeatedly declared that Malaysia could never become an Islamic state,.."(Funston 1980: 145).

Datuk Hishamuddin Tun Hussein, the deputy leader of UMNO youth, challenged PAS to explain its stand on the hudud law and the Islamic state and asked Malaysians not give their support to the opposition parties namely DAP, PAS, KEADILAN and PRM because they had different dreams. Their sole purpose was to destroy the Government, the harmony, the peace and stability and the Bumiputeras' special

privileges. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 16, 1999). Datuk Mustafa Muhamad, the second Minister of Finance, said that the Government of National Front was more Islamic than PAS because the Government had implemented many development projects for Muslims, and unlike the oppositions who know only talkings. Some of the projects were Islamic bank and Islamic insurance. (Utusan Malaysia, Nov. 16, 1999). In its manifesto for the 1999 general elections, BN made mention the two Islamic projects namely Islamic bank and Islamic insurance. (Kamarudin 2000: 66).

Although the manifesto issued by BN did not include the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia, BN fully and intentionally exploited the issue of Islamic state. According to Joceline Tan, the opposition parties in the 1999 general elections cried “foul about the way the BN has played up their divergent stand on the Islamic State issue.” DAP unequivocally rejected the Islamic state issue but PAS in Kelantan and Terengganu did not reject it. “The argument that PAS would not have the clout to amend the Constitution in favour of an Islamic State does not cut any ice with many non-Malays.” (New Sunday Times, Nov. 28, 1999). MCA asked the Chinese voters to reject DAP for the reason that DAP support PAS and the Islamic state in Malaysia. “Thus, in non-Malay areas, the MCA has been campaigning along the line of ‘A vote for DAP is a vote for an Islamic State’”. (New Sunday Times, Nov. 28, 1999).

In Kelantan, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, the Kelantan UMNO leader, was reported to have said that PAS insisted on the formation of an Islamic state but Nik Aziz was continuously vacillated because he wanted to captivate the Chinese whom he thought had sided with PAS. Tengku Razaleigh was commenting on the report saying that Nik Aziz said that the PAS constitution does not target an Islamic state, but an Islamic society. Therefore, Tengku Razaleigh called on the Kelantanese voters to reject PAS since its leader's stand was easily changeable. (Mingguan Malaysia, Nov. 28, 1999). Tengku Razaleigh called on Nik Aziz “to stop insulting the intelligence of the people over the Islamic state issue. He was commenting on Nik Aziz's statement yesterday that Pas's objective was actually an Islamic society and not an Islamic state.” Tengku Razaleigh dismissed Nik Aziz's explanation and stressed that “Nik Aziz and Pas had often declared to all and sundry they would never compromise on the matter.” (New Sunday Time, Nov. 28, 1999).

DAP did not deny that it supported PAS but it did not support the Islamic state. Lim Kit Siang was reported on October 30, 1999 to have said that “DAP has made it very clear that the coming-together of DAP, PAS, Keadilan and PRM is not to establish an Islamic state, but to restore justice, freedom, democracy and good

governance, and the DAP has made it very clear to PAS leaders that the DAP opposition to an Islamic state in Malaysia is constant and consistent.”(Kamarul Zaman 1999: 123). Lim Kit Siang expected Islam to bring moderation, tolerance and democracy to Malaysians. He was reported as saying “Political Islam in Malaysia represents the face of moderation, tolerance and democracy.”(Sunday Star, April 2, 2000). Dr Chen Man Hin, the DAP chairman prior to Lim Kit Siang, was reported to have said that the defeat of the DAP leaders including he, himself, Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh was due to the issue of Islamic state advocated by PAS. The issue frightened the Chinese voters. (Utusan Malaysia, Dec. 1, 2000).

Joceline Tan reported that “The average Chinese Malaysian, rightly or wrongly, has come to associate an Islamic State with restrictions on alcohol, gambling, entertainment outlets, women’s attire and inter-mingling between the sexes.... Many Chinese women, for instance, find PAS attitudes too feudalistic and retrogressive for their liking.” Joceline Tan also said that “During the 1999 general elections, the MCA exploitation of the concept of an Islamic state “to the fullest against its arch-enemy, the DAP, ..”(New Sunday Times, April 16, 2000).

The issue of Islamic state in Malaysia helped the National Front especially the Chinese parties namely MCA and GERAKAN to frighten the Chinese voters from giving their votes to the opposition parties especially the Chinese party DAP.

Conclusion

In conclusion we may say that the Islamic issues especially the four issues mentioned above are very influential for the political movements in Malaysia to exploit them for their own sides and benefits.

References

Andaya, Barbara Watson and Andaya, Leonard Y. 1986. *A History of Malaysia*. Houndmills: Macmillan Education Ltd.

Angkatan Perpaduan Negeri Kelantan. 1995. *Kelantan Membangun Bersama Islam[:]* Program Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah Negeri Kelantan Pilihan Raya Umum 1995. Kelantan: Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah Negeri Kelantan.

BA Manifesto refers to Ikhtisar (Ringkasan/Petikan) MANIFESTO BERSAMA Barisan Alternatif. It has four pages.

BPPNK= Badan Perhubungan PAS Negeri Kelantan. 1999. *Program PAS Negeri Kelantan Pilihan Raya Umum 1999*. Kelantan: Badan Perpaduan PAS Negeri Kelantan.

DBP= Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. 1988. *Daftar Ejaan Rumi Bahasa Malaysia*. 2nd Edition. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

Department of Statistics Malaysia. 1995. *Laporan Am Banci Penduduk* (General Report of the Population Census), Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia.

Funston, N.J. 1980. *Malay Politics in Malaysia [:] A Study of the United Malays National Organization and Party Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd.

Harakah, April, 16-30, 2000, "Perlis State introduces Islamic 'Faith' law".

IPBN= Ibu Pejabat Barisan Nasional. [1995]. *Barisan Nasional Berwawasan Adil Efisien*. Kuala Lumpur: Ibu Pejabat Barisan Nasional. This brochure was issued and Distributed by BN for the 1995 Malaysian general elections. It contains BN promises to Malaysian voters.

Kamarudin Jaafar. 2000. *Pilihanraya 1999 dan Masa Depan Politik Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: IKDAS.

Kamarul Zaman Haji Yusoff. 1999. *Perjuangan Penuh Cabaran*. Kota Bharu, Kelantan: Qamar Publishing.

Legal Research Board. 1988. *Federal Constitution (As At 5th May 1988)*. Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services.

Mauzy, Diane K. 1986. "The 1982 General Elections in Malaysia: A Mandate for Change?" In *Readings in Malaysian Politics*, pp. 3-24. Edited by Bruce Gale. Peatling jaya: Pelanduk Publications.

Migguan Malaysia, October 31, 1999, "Pakatan Pembangkang untuk memenangi pilihan raya Pas, DAP kahwin mutaah", by Prof. Datuk Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas.

Migguan Malaysia, November 28, 1999, "Pembangkang semakin cemas bila ramai ahli bertukar arah Rakyat telah Buktikan kewarasan", by Aziz Ishak.

Migguan Malaysia, November 28, 1999, "Undi BN tidak jejas akidah", by Wan Ramli Wan Muhamad..

Migguan Malaysia, November 28, 1999, "Chia tidak gentar hadapi Kit Siang", by Norzahizan Ismail.

Migguan Malaysia, November 28, 1999, "Buatlah pilihan tanpa dikuasai emosi dan rasa benci-PM".

Migguan Malaysia, November 28, 1999, "Nik Aziz halalkan hubungan Pas-DAP".

Migguan Malaysia, January 2, 2000, "Mencari kekuatan di dalam kemerosotan sokongan UMNO perlu direkasasa", by Iskandar Astar.

New Straits Times, December 9, 1999, "Fadzil Noor appointed Opposition Leader", by Abdul Razak Ahmad.

New Sunday Times, November 28, 1999, "MCA not taking chances as it swings into full gear to woo voters", by Leong Shen-li.

New Sunday Times, November 28, 1999, "An election full of issues for issues for voters", by Joceline Tan.

New Sunday Times, November 28, 1999, "religious panel declines comment on current political developments".

New Sunday Times, November 28, 1999, " Stop insulting intelligence of people, Nik Aziz told".

New Sunday Times, April 9, 2000. "Double standards by Kelantan, Terengganu governments in tudung issue".

New Sunday Times, April 9, 2000. "Pas' two gurus --- Nik Aziz vi Hadi", by Joceline Tan.

New Sunday Times, April 16, 2000. "Ambiguity of concept a problem".

Paul Chang Ming Phang. 1975. *Perkembangan Pelajaran Dalam masyarakat Berbilang Kaum Kajian Kes Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.

PBNNK= Pejabat Barisan Nasional Negeri Kelantan. [1995]. *Barisan Nasional membangun Kelantan Negeri Contoh*. This brochure was published and distributed for the 1995 Malaysian general elections in the State of Kelantan. It contains BN promises for the Kelantanese voters if they vote for BN to rule Kelantan.

Safie bin Ibrahim. 1981. *The Islamic Party of Malaysia [:] its Formative Stages and Ideology*. Pasir Puteh, Kelantan: Nuawi bin Ismail.

Sunday Star, April 2, 2000. "Lim: Show world Political Islam works in Malaysia".

Sunday Star, April 2, 2000. "MCA membership to rise one million".

Sunday Star, April 2, 2000. "Alleyes on PAS as rulers step in", by Wan Hamidi Hamid.

Utusan Malaysia, August 12, 1999. "Nik Aziz dakwa ulama punyai tahap pengetahuan lebih tinggi".

Utusan Malaysia, November 16, 1999. "Pas dicabar nyatakan pendirian".

Utusan Malaysia, November 16, 1999. "BN lebih Islamik daripada Pas_Mustapa".

Utusan Malaysia, November 23, 1999. "Pak Lah sifatkan Pas gagal kemuka calon ulama".

Utusan Malaysia, November 25, 1999. "Bangkit tentang kekolotan".

Utusan Malaysia, November 26, 1999. "BN Kelantan lancar manifesto

tambahan”.

Utusan Malaysia, November 27, 1999. “Pembangkang tiada isu untuk tawan Terengganu”.

Utusan Malaysia, November 27, 1999. “Nik Aziz tidak layak jadi pemimpin Melayu”.

Utusan Malaysia, November 27, 1999. “Mampukah Pas pertahankan Kelantan?”

Utusan Malaysia, December 1, 1999. “Pemimpin DAP tidak akan letak jawatan”

Utusan Malaysia, December 1, 1999. “Dimensi baru politik”, by Aziz Ishak.

Utusan Malaysia, December 1, 1999. “Pas wadah perasaan tidak senang Melayu”, by Zin Mahmud.

Utusan Malaysia, December 1, 1999. “trend politik di Pantai Timur mula berubah angin”, by Zulkefli Hamzah.

Utusan Malaysia, December 1, 1999. “PM: Kita akan rampas kembali Kelantan, Terengganu”.

Utusan Malaysia, March 25, 2000. “Perbezaan ajaran Islam dengan ajaran Pas”, by Wan Mokhtar Ahmad.

*Chinese Business in South-East Asia: Contesting
Cultural Explanations, Researching
Entrepreneurship**

嚴智宏

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫博士後研究學者

本書旨在為東南亞華人企業的經營模式釐出一個清晰的輪廓，並對過去的相關論述提出質疑。這是本計畫於 1997 年 11 月在本院所舉辦的「東南亞華人企業研討會」(Chinese Business in Southeast Asia: Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship) 後結集而成的論文專書。

本計畫之所以舉辦這場研討會，原因如下：第二次大戰以後，華人資本對於東南亞區域的發展貢獻良多；但是，長期以來學界與政界對這種現象不甚關心。1990 年代早期，許多人認為來自東南亞、台灣、香港的華人資本家，攜手並進對中國大陸投注大量資金。從那個時候開始，很多關於亞洲華人企業的著作相繼問世。那些著作大都把華人在東南亞經商成功的原因，歸結到文化方面的因素。那些著作認為，世上存在著特殊的華人經營模式、華人機構、華人資本以及華人資本家。那些著作又認為，以華人認同為基礎所建立的企業網路，在發展華人企業時扮演了關鍵性的角色；而且，華人資本家主要是依靠這種網路來經商、發展企業。某些論述甚至懷疑東南亞華人企業對居住國的忠誠度，認為華人企業投資於中國大陸，是為了建設他們共同的「祖國」。

* *Chinese Business in South-East Asia: Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship*, 編者：Edmund Terence Gomez and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, 年代：2001, 出版者：Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 除目錄與前言外共二百零五頁。

那些論述是正確的嗎？那些論述能獲得實證資料的支持嗎？許多人認為，華人企業之間由於種族相近因而形成一種網路關係、一個同種內的（intra-ethnic）組織網。此一論點經得起嚴肅的（實證、學理的）檢驗嗎？

由於體認到那些論述可能含有的種種問題與限制，所以，本計畫邀請一群研究東南亞華人企業的學者來參加研討會。研討會的目的之一，是為東南亞華人企業研究指出一個核心領域，並且試圖找出一些途徑，鼓勵學者（在從事華人企業研究時）蒐集實證資料，以實證資料來檢驗過去的相關論述。

在研討會中，學者們對過去的論述提出質疑。他們認為，那些論述缺乏實證資料的支持，而且在東南亞企業界的實際情況，遠比那些論述所講的更為複雜。他們認為，既存的文獻大多沒有正確掌握到華人資本發展的形式，也沒有留意到華人企業模式正在產生的變化，更沒有理解到華人資本隨時都在改變的事實。他們還認為，華人企業在不同的國家有不同的情況；而且時代不同，情況也不同。

與會的學者們之所以這麼說，根據何在？根據在於他們由新加坡、馬來西亞、泰國、菲律賓、印尼等國蒐集到的實證資料。這些經由實地查訪所蒐集到的資料說明了一件事：東南亞華商在企業的網路、資本、組織和形式上，採取各種不同的策略。這與許多既存文獻的看法不同，尤其不同於沒有實證資料佐證就提出的論述。

基於這些原因，所以與會的學者們相信，實證研究是很重要的。依據實證研究所得到的資料，將能使大家對華人企業的實況，有更加清楚而透徹的了解。尤其是對華人企業其中較為核心的議題，如華人網路、資本家、組織與公司行號的發展等，將會有更加正確的認識。實則，這也是本研討會與本書的另一個目的，那就是嘗試讓理論與方法兩者結合起來，以便使大家在理解華人企業時能夠更接近真相。

在探討這些相關的問題後，研討會的論文經審查修改，結集為本書，並且甫於日前出版。在結構上，本書除了導論以外，共有六篇文章，末尾還附了相關書目。首先，導論把既存的相關文獻作了回顧與檢討，並為新加坡、馬來西亞、泰國、菲律賓、印尼等國家華人企業的歷史發展作了簡明扼要的交代。這讓讀者了解東南亞華人企業個別走過的路程，也讓讀者在閱讀後續各章（探討晚近東南亞五國的華人企業）之前，先有一些背景知識。接著，第一到第五章分別詳細討論一個國家的華人企業的情況。第六章則是把台灣納入討論，以便相互參照，看看台商在東南亞（尤其在馬來西亞）是否由於種族與文化相近的關係而找華人合作？最後，書末有非常詳細的書目、參考文獻（共廿七頁），臚列了探討東南亞各國華人企業的相關著作。這對有興趣深入研究的人來說，是既方便又有用的資訊。

這裡必須說明，本書每章由一到三人執筆，全書的作者總共十一人。裡面有華人，也有非華人；有西方人，也有東方人；有東南亞人，也有非東南亞人。這可以說是跨國、跨種族合作的一個例子。其實，這也是本計畫的一個期望，就是要讓這樣跨界的、比較性的合作計畫，能夠激發或鼓勵同樣或類似模式的研究。其次也希望類似的研究，能夠拓展到其他種族（例如印度人、日人、韓人、猶太人等）的企業，看看他們是否有特殊的經商模式。這種跨界的、比較性的合作計畫，有助於檢驗對特定族群既存的假設。而且，這種比較性的合作計畫，對於理解華人企業而言，會有正面的意義。

整個來說，本書在實證資料的蒐集、在相關學理上的新意，以及在理論與方法等方面的整合，都有助於讓讀者更深入了解東南亞的華人企業。

《華裔東南亞人》^{*}

嚴智宏

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫博士後研究學者

這本書是 *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians* 的漢譯本。原書於 1997 年由新加坡的東南亞研究院（Institute of Southeast Asian Studies）出版，編者為新加坡國立大學政治系教授廖建裕（Leo Suryadinata）。它是東南亞研究院在 1996 年舉辦的「華裔東南亞人」研討會的論文集。

為什麼會有這個研討會？這要從幾個相關名詞說起。很多西方人用「華僑」（Overseas Chinese）及「海外華人」（Chinese Overseas）來稱呼中國大陸以外的華裔人士。不少東方人也亦步亦趨，跟著使用這些名詞。這種稱呼，其實是以中國為中心的觀點。因為，這幾個名詞背後有一種意涵：東南亞華裔人士是海外的中國人，而不是東南亞人。¹這種觀點，扭曲了東南亞華裔人士的立場和身份認同。

其實，東南亞為數大約兩千多萬的華裔人士，在第二次大戰之後已經有一種觀念上的改變，就是要從昔日的「落葉歸根」轉變為「落地生根」。這種轉變，跟二次大戰以後東南亞各國頒佈的國籍法有關。因為這些戰後獲得獨立的國家，把他們的百姓區分為本國人與外籍人士；他們對外籍人士採取差別待遇的政策，在很多方面設下種種限制。華裔人士在這種情境中，必須在身份（國籍）上做一個抉擇。他們可能選擇入籍當地，也可能由於不入籍而成為無該國國籍的人士。入籍當地的，可劃歸為「落地生根」這一類。這一類的人愈來愈多。

^{*} 《華裔東南亞人》（*Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians*），譯者：國立暨南國際大學東南亞研究中心，審訂者：陳鴻瑜，年代：1998，出版者：國立暨南國際大學東南亞研究中心，除序言與目錄外共三百一十九頁。

¹ 這本書所說的「東南亞人」，是指長年住在東南亞各國的人，而非一個集體的地域性身份認同。

但是，在某些國家中這一類的人即使入籍當地、「落地生根」，卻仍然不足以解決他們所面對的難題。因為，他們可能遭到在地人士的排擠。這是今天某些東南亞華裔人士所面對的問題。

為此，新加坡的東南亞研究院舉辦了這場國際研討會。會中，數篇論文對東南亞華人問題作了深入的探討。它們從各種角度，針對華人認同問題進行討論。它們討論東南亞華裔人士對他們在各自的國家的立場、他們的自我認同、他們與中國的關係之看法，以及東南亞在地人士對於其國內的華裔人士的認知。會中，論文發表人都談論到幾個議題：

一、民族國家（nation-state）是什麼？在這種國家中，華裔人士的立場為何？這種國家是由種族，或是文化，還是種族與文化兩者來界定的？

二、華裔人士與中國之間的關係為何？在華裔人士的整合，或是在各自國家的國家建構（national-building）過程中，這種關係會是一種問題嗎？

三、華裔人士在各自的國家所呈現的文化與所佔的經濟地位，對於華裔人士的整合來說，是一種問題嗎？目前，族群意識在全球各地抬頭，那麼東南亞國家是否因此分裂了（而未必是整合了）？這種趨勢有沒有影響到華人社群？

四、在國家整合的願景上，未來，這些華裔人士會是「東南亞人」或是「華僑」？

在研討會之後，這本書出版了。在結構上，它一共有八章。除了編者的論文綜觀全局、置於首章之外，其他七章分別談論印尼、馬來西亞、緬甸、菲律賓、新加坡、泰國、越南等國家。這八章的每一章都附有一位評論者的短評。本書最後還有一篇簡短的附錄，談論女性在形塑華人身份認同時的角色。這些作者有的是華裔人士，有的不是，但他們都是東南亞人。本書藉由這種華裔與非華裔學者的理性對話，為讀者提供了一個較為清晰的畫面，讓讀者容易明白本書所探討的主題。這種作法，在過去的文獻中是少見的。

整個來說，這本書是以東南亞人的眼光，來看所謂的華人認同的問題。由於它是一部由東南亞當地的學者以自己的立場所提出來的研究心得，所以它不同於大多數非東南亞當地的學者之觀點。這是本書的一大特點。

《東南亞政府與政治》^{*}

嚴智宏

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫博士後研究學者

本書論述東南亞十個國家政治發展的過程，尤其是各國近來政治發展的概況。本書除了緒論以外，共有十章，每章論述一個國家。這十個國家個別都有一個主題（如政黨、種族、民主發展、軍人、共產主義等）。這些主題具體而微地點出了該國的特色，讓讀者能夠迅速掌握到該國政局發展的情況與特點。

在論述這些國家與主題之前，本書先在緒論中分析了東南亞國家的異同。緒論指出，各國之間共同點不少。例如，他們大都曾經淪為殖民地，並於二次大戰後紛紛獨立；他們在 1950 到 1960 年代中，大都有過共產黨的問題；自 1980 年代中期開始，他們的經濟快速成長；但是各國的種族泰半複雜，而且華人在某些國家中由於經濟的關係，不時成為問題。另一方面，各國之間的相異點也很多。例如，他們的宗教不同，政治意識型態互異，政治制度分歧，經濟發展的速度與程度也各不相同。

雖然往日有這些異同，但是，日後這些異同會一直維持下去嗎？除了已經發生的事情（如曾經被殖民）不能予以改變之外，隨著時代演進的急促腳步，以及全球各地往來的便利與頻繁，那些數十年前的異同未必能夠再維持下去了。例如，大多數國家的政治情勢很可能會產生變化，經濟狀況也很可能忽起忽落、瞬息萬變。東南亞各國的政治、經濟等情況變化愈來愈甚；時代愈晚，變化愈快、愈多。其實，這也正是本書的重點所在（論述各國近來政治發展的概況）。

從以上兩段文字可知，東南亞國家各有各的歷史淵源，也各有各的特性，近年則各有各的發展。從他們個別的淵源、特性與發展情況中，可以理出一些頭緒，

^{*} 《東南亞政府與政治》，作者：顧長永，年代：1995，出版者：五南圖書出版公司，除序言與目錄外，共四百六十頁。

作為觀察個別國家政局發展的角度，也可以作為分析各國政府與政治時的切入點。有了這些基本的認識與了解之後，讀者可以明白，為何本書每個國家的主題不同。例如，為何有的以軍人為主，有的以政黨為重。

在緒論的引導下，本書各有主題與重點的十章逐一呈現。這十章是：印尼，以軍人政治與蘇哈托為主題；馬來西亞，以種族緊張的政治與經濟發展為主題；新加坡，以人民行動黨為主題；菲律賓，以坎坷的民主與政治發展為主題；汶萊，以政治與經濟為主題；泰國，以軍人控制為主題；越南，以共產主義為主題；高棉，以戰爭扭曲為主題；寮國，以世襲王室與共產主義為主題；緬甸，以軍人干政為主題。

雖然主題因個別國家的特性而有不同，但是它們都圍繞在一個範圍之內，就是政府與政治。這也就是本書的書名所揭示的範圍。另外，在論述這些個別國家的最新變化時，作者自國內外的專書和期刊徵引當時最新的資料，並採用東南亞研究知名學者的學說。

這裡應該說明本書出版時的時空背景。本書出版於我國的東南亞研究起步未久之時（1995年）。¹當時，我國的學界開始有較多的人注意到東南亞研究。這多少與1994年前後政府倡導的「南向政策」有關，也與當時的經貿氣候有關。當時政府基於種種考量，捨「西進」而就「南向」。台商也一波波前進東南亞，不斷在東南亞各國投資，一時雙邊經貿關係頗為密切。為此，政府與商界需要學術界從事相關研究，並提供訊息、知識與諮詢服務。

一時之間，國內幾個東南亞研究機構陸續誕生。中央研究院率先在1994年9月成立「東南亞區域研究計畫」。接著，國立暨南國際大學於1995年8月成立全國第一個「東南亞研究中心」，淡江大學也在1996年8月成立全國第一個「東南亞研究所」。緊接著，暨南國際大學於1997年8月成立「東南亞研究所」，台灣經濟研究院在1998年1月成立「東南亞研究所」，國立成功大學、國立中山大學也相繼於1998年通過成立「東南亞研究中心」。由此可知，幾個以東南亞為名的專責機構，連續在五年裡出現，一年一到三個；而且，大多數是設在國立的機構中。這顯示東南亞研究在此時大受重視。

但是，當時國內的中文專書裡，少有剖析東南亞國家政府、政治發展及其最新演變局勢的。本書則是一本這樣的專著。在這種時空背景下，本書的出版可說是為國內的東南亞研究提供一本適時的專門著作。

¹ 之前，國內沒有以東南亞區域為名的專責研究單位；幾個屈指可數的區域研究單位，也不甚受到重視。只有少數學者基於個別的興趣或因素，對東南亞幾個國家作了研究。

《東南亞政治與發展》^{*}

戚常卉

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫博士後研究學者

《東南亞政治與發展》一書作者 Michael R.J.Vatikiotis 是遠東經濟評論駐東南亞地區資深記者。本書是一位記者以其十年來在新聞第一現場觀察經驗，思索東南亞政治是否會形成一種亞洲模式，還是走向西方自由主義民主模式。本書讀起來像是長篇的新聞分析加上一些學院香料。學術界討論政治變遷和民主化，選舉結果、分析、問卷調查、民意調查、政治領袖訪談等是基礎資料。一位記者的筆觸和學者不同，Vatikiotis 讓事件、他的觀點、不同階層人物聲音交織，匯出一幅他所謂的水墨東南亞政治文化。

水墨畫意指本書是大處著眼，不是編年史記錄細微枝節。這本書不是入門的導讀，譯者因此很貼心將五個作者主要討論國家政情和東協時國政經型態附於卷首，幫助不甚瞭解東協現況讀者進入 Vatikiotis 所描述的東南亞世界。Vatikiotis 撰寫本書時，寮國、柬埔寨、緬甸尚未加入東協，東協國成員只有七國，譯者則將十國都列在表上。

本書副標題是修剪榕樹（trimming the banyan tree）。榕樹是東南亞區域的聖樹，常見於佛教和印度教寺院。樹蔭下生命需要滋潤才能茁壯，Vatikiotis 以此譬喻東南亞獨特政治文化和其菁英壓抑人民自由，但經濟穩定成長的弔詭。作者認為東南亞的獨特的政治文化是傳統的再生。東南亞政治家汲取傳統，援引歷史以正當化他們的權力結構，如印尼的建國五原則（Pancasila），馬來西亞國家原理（Rukun Negara）。傳統權力和權威模式被再造以支撐政府權威和鞏固領導權。

民族主義是對抗西方價值的武器。東南亞國家承襲西方憲政體制，但領導形

^{*} 《東南亞政治與發展》（Political Change in Southeast Asia），Michael R. J. Vitikiotis 著，林若雱譯，1999。台北：韋伯文化事業出版社。

式和西方不同。東南亞強硬的領導文化是從本土的王權模式演化而來。君主政體和現代領導階層有隱形臍帶。東南亞國家賦予社群領導者神聖地位，他們是神聖和世俗世界之間的傳達者。殘存君主政治影響，泰國是最佳例子。一九七〇年代，浦美蓬國王個人魅力恢復以往泰王的威望和權力。一般學者認為王權勢力恢復是軍方政客利用君主以正當化的們政治權力。不過 Vatikiotis 認為浦美蓬國王因勢利導，造就個人威望。柬埔寨也有君王專制復甦徵兆，施努亞國王被形容為唯一能讓國家安定的關鍵人物。印尼蘇哈托總統巧妙將古老權威和現代政治容於一爐。馬來西亞瑪哈迪總理作風訴諸精神權威，他為自己樹立現代革新的領導者形象，然而又有意無意用傳統手法運用權力。新加坡李光耀利用中國儒家價值合理化他的威權統治。

Vatikiotis 認為源自君權體制的威權統治在後殖民時代有強化傾向。西方價值在東南亞是選擇性的接受。東南亞政治菁英捍衛他們所謂的核心價值，並標榜亞洲價值和西方扞格不入，西方無權從其自由主義價值批評東南亞政治。

東南亞政治向來是國家與宗教無法完全分離，宗教和民族主義又有微妙關係。傳統上東南亞政治菁英非常留意伊斯蘭教士對社會基層的影響力，防範他們對國家權威構成威脅。現代伊斯蘭思想促成殖民時期民族主義發展。政治領導者發現他們處在接近或避開極端宗教主義之間的兩難。八十和九十年代印尼伊斯蘭教復興浪潮起源於中產階級，作者認為經濟發展所產生的混亂現象只是解釋之一，政治面才是問題根源。世俗民族主義者認為將伊斯蘭教訂為國教會造成國家分裂。印尼政府至今仍然堅守這個信念。

冷戰的分裂造就東協於一九六七年成立，以降低區域內衝突為目的。東協十國，各有各的難題。如果更密切合作，是否會形成一個東南亞政體？這要看榕樹是如何修剪。更密切區域整合主要動力是外部威脅——西方與中國。這條路如何走下去，時間是唯一的答案。

《台灣與東南亞的政治經濟關係：互賴發展的順境與逆境》^{*}

戚常卉

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫博士後研究學者

中山大學顧長永教授所著《台灣與東南亞的政治經濟關係》一書有兩條平行主題。一是從歷史是從觀點分析台灣和東南亞的雙邊關係；另一主軸是以台灣和東南亞的經濟政治關係檢討互賴理論。全書可分為三部分。第一章介紹互賴理論。第二至第三章分析東南亞政經變貌。第四至第十二章是全書重心，探討台灣與東南亞從國民政府遷台至今外交政策、「南向政策」如何影響我國與東南亞政經關係。

作者將台灣對東南亞外交政策與經貿關係演變分為三個時期：蔣中正時期（1950-1975）、蔣經國時期（1976-1987）、李登輝時期（1988-1990年代）。台灣外交是互賴發展的對外關係，但是美國與北京外交政策是影響台灣外交敏感度的指標。蔣中正時期，中華民國是聯合國會員，外交敏感度不高。台灣和反共東南亞國家仍維持正常外交關係，當時關係是以政治關係為主。雙方因意識型態相近，共同對抗另一不同的意識型態。第二時期，意識型態對抗隨著區域政治局勢改變，而趨緩和。台灣退出聯合國後，和東南亞國交沒有邦交，台灣開始以經貿關係為主軸進行實質外交。到了第三時期，前總統李登輝提出務實外交口號對付北京在國際上的打壓。台灣經濟成長成為對外發展的最大籌碼，經濟實力促成台灣國際地位提昇。雖然是突破性嘗試，顧長永教授悲觀地認為海峽兩岸關係不能改善，北京必然繼續阻撓台灣的國際活動空間，台灣和東南亞政治實質關係很難進展。

台灣在 1950-1975 期間與東南亞貿易大都享有出超，但是台灣在東南亞投資

^{*} 《台灣與東南亞的政治經濟關係：互賴發展的順境與逆境》，顧長永，1990。台北：風雲論壇。

金額甚少，反而是靠華僑在台投資，其中又以菲律賓華僑資本額最高。這時其政治牽動經濟，雙邊政治關係終結，經濟關係就結束。但是 1976 年後，台灣在與東南亞國家沒有邦交情況下，經濟仍持續發展，投資增加。印尼是台灣投資最多的國家。東南亞對台灣投資仍以華僑資本為主。到了九十年代，台灣與東南亞雙邊經濟關係加深。此時期台灣在東南亞投資資本超過東南亞國家在台投資。台灣對外投資對象已有明顯的改變，以東南亞為投資中心，而馬來西亞是台灣投資最多的國家。這時期也是台灣採「經濟連結外交」策略的最佳時機。台灣經濟實力是對外擴展外交的籌碼。

台灣的「南向政策」就是利用經濟資源換取政治地位的提昇。從互賴理論來看，東協國家在經濟上需要台灣的援助。東協可以協助台灣參加東協的正式活動，如東協區域論壇。「南向政策」受挫，主要原因就是北京的干預。

作者認為如要堅持「南向政策」必須注意五件事。首先，雙邊經濟和社會關係可以提攜政治關係。第二，民間企業配合加強與東協經貿關係。第三，「南向政策」必須得到人民支持。第四，北京的阻礙無法避免，政府必須理性推動兩岸關係，以解決台灣孤立地位。第五，東協是台灣亞太地區發展的踏腳石，「南向政策」應是長期政策，而非短程計畫。

冷戰結束後，台灣以互賴合作精神與東南亞國家建立更密切關係。北京也同時積極與東南亞國家建立關係。顧教授認為這是台灣最大的挑戰。台灣和東協十國沒有正式外交關係，面對北京干預毫無招架之力。北京不干涉台灣與東南亞國家發展經濟關係，但是對雙方政治互動，則是打壓不遺餘力。

未來的隱憂是中共非常瞭解台灣的經濟連結政治策略。近年來，北京加強對東南亞國家貿易、技術合作、及對外經濟援助，以斧底抽薪之計對付台灣的政策。中國大陸是實力愈來愈強的經濟體，如今也有能力對東南亞提供經濟援助。這是台灣發展東南亞關係所面臨的最大挑戰。作者認為台灣與東南亞國家政經關係之發展最後要回歸到兩岸關係的發展。

越南國家人文社會科學中心

(National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities of Vietnam, NCSSH)

本刊曾於第三期(1997 年年底)詳細介紹過越南國家人文社會科學中心。¹由於事隔三年多，情況已經有了變化，而且本計畫即將與該中心的幾個單位簽訂合作協定，因此在核對最新資料後，對該中心的近況作如下的簡要說明：

該中心的基本組織架構維持不變。它可分為三大類，就是研究單位、研究服務單位、行政單位。

首先，在研究單位方面，它可以再分為三種，一是研究所，二是研究中心，三是博物館。這和 1997 年時的情況一樣。但是，目前該機構有十七個研究所，比 1997 年時多了一個。多出來的是人類研究所 (Institute of Human Studies)。其他原有的十六個為哲學研究所、社會學研究所、經濟學研究所、世界經濟研究所、國家與法律研究所、歷史學研究所、考古學研究所、民族學研究所、文學研究所、語言學研究所、民俗文化研究所、漢喃研究所、心理學研究所、東南亞研究所、宗教研究所、胡志明市社會科學研究所。

在研究中心上，目前有六個，比 1997 年時少了三個。少掉的三個是發展研究與諮詢中心、越南百科詞典編撰中心、人口與發展中心。原有的幾個是中國研究中心、日本研究中心、歐洲研究中心、北美研究中心、人文地理研究中心、家庭與婦女研究中心。其中，「歐洲研究中心」在 1997 年時稱為「前蘇聯 SNG 與東歐研究中心」。

在博物館上，同樣是一個，名為民族學博物館。

其次，在研究服務單位方面，情況和 1997 年時一樣，共有三個：社會科學資訊所、越南社會科學評論 (*Vietnam Social Sciences Review*)、社會科學出版社。

其次，在行政單位方面，目前共有四個，比 1997 年時少了一個，少掉的是清查處。其他繼續存在的四個為國際合作處、行政處、幹部培訓處、計畫與預算處。

該中心目前的人員總數為一千三百卅五人；其中，研究人員的數目在七百六十以上，這比 1997 年時多。1997 年時，該中心共有一千三百一十五人，研究人員的數目為七百六十人。

¹ 許文堂，越南國家人文社會科學中心，《東南亞區域研究通訊》第三期（1997），頁 78-89。

目前，該中心的主席為阮維貴教授，副主席有三位，分別是杜懷南教授、黎有層教授、胡玉海教授。除了胡教授是新增加的以外，其餘都和 1997 年時一樣。

本計畫即將與該中心的東南亞研究所、社會學研究所、中國研究中心等三個單位建立合作關係。

聯絡方式

地址：National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities of Vietnam (NCSSH)

36 Hang Chuoi Str., Hanoi, Vietnam

電話：+84 4 9719067

傳真：+84 4 9719071

電子郵件：ir-ncss@netnam.vn

香港大學亞洲研究中心

(Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong)

一、宗旨

香港大學於 1967 年成立亞洲研究中心。成立中心的宗旨，在於讓校內各單位關於中國研究、香港研究、東亞研究、南亞研究、東南亞研究的師生、研究計畫案等，能在跨領域的研究討論中碰面，藉此切磋琢磨。其次是吸引各地、各國學者前往研究訪問。再次是獨資出版或資助出版各種相關領域的刊物，並從事有助於提昇東亞研究、南亞研究、東南亞研究的其他活動。

二、教學研究旨趣

亞洲研究中心的研究旨趣為中國與香港的歷史與政治，中國與香港的經濟，中國、香港與東南亞的財政、企業、技術、電訊傳播、教育、語言學、考古學，以及中國傳統音樂等。

該中心招收研究生，並對畢業的學生授予博（碩）士學位。學生可就上列的研究旨趣擬定研究計畫書，向該中心提出入學申請。在申請時跨學門的研究計畫書比單一學門的計畫書容易受到青睞，因為該中心鼓勵這種跨界的研究。

指導研究生的，都是該中心的研究人員，或是該中心的分支計畫主持人。分支計畫主持人是其他系所的教師，但參與該中心的研究計畫案。

三、相關研究計畫案

該中心近來進行不少研究計畫案，其中與東南亞較為相關的是「中國與東盟」計畫（China-ASEAN Project）。¹ 該研究計畫的主旨是：（一）蒐集在中國與東南亞區域內關於亞洲研究、政治研究、策略研究的機構名稱，以及那些機構中的研究人員名錄，和那些研究人員的研究興趣與計畫名冊，然後將這些資料予以編纂、出版；（二）舉辦「中國與東盟」研究的學術年會；（三）出版《中國與東盟評論》季刊（*China-ASEAN Review*）；（四）推動香港的東南亞研究。

四、出版品

該中心的出版品包括不定期的研究小冊、研究論文系列（Occasional Paper Series）、研究書目彙編系列，以及《東方文化》（*Journal of Oriental Studies*）半年刊等。這些出版品的內容，大多是來自該中心的研究計畫案的成品。

¹ 依照我國的習慣用法，「東盟」稱為「東協」。

五、聯絡對象與方式

地址：Centre of Asian Studies,
The University of Hong Kong,
Pokfulam Road,
Hong Kong

電話：(852) 2859 2460

傳真：(852) 2559 3185 , 2559 5884

電子郵件：casgen@hkucc.hku.hk

網址：<http://www.hku.hk/cas>

東南亞區域研究計畫辦公室報導

壹、九十年度碩士論文獎助

1. 官泰發 (暨南大學東南亞所): 檳城及麻六甲華人選民投票行為之研究 - 以 1999 年大選為例
2. 吳岳融 (中山大學中山學術所): 新加坡住宅政策之研究
3. 鄭曉昀 (暨大東南亞所): 寮國親越政策之研究, 1975-88 年
4. 陳怡蓉 (淡江大學東南亞所): 印尼國家機關在經濟發展過程中角色之分析: 以石油產業為例
5. 林哲瑋 (暨南大學東南亞所): 海外台商供應鍊管理模式-以馬來西亞電子業為例
6. 章少棠 (淡江大學東南亞所): 泰國境內外籍勞工對泰國勞工輸出的影響
7. 張書銘 (淡江大學東南亞所): 新興跨國服務產業:「越南新娘」仲介研究
8. 謝偉倫 (淡江大學東南亞所): 馬來西亞另類媒體的形成與發展 - 以《激流月刊》(*Aliran Monthly*) 為例
9. 余月美 (南華大學教社所): 華商在馬來西亞華文教育發展中的定位
10. 潘婉明 (暨南大學歷史所): 一個新村, 一種華人? - 重建馬來(西)亞華人新村的歷史與生活面貌
11. 陳佩瑜 (暨南大學東南亞所): 台灣想像與越南新娘: 跨界女性的現實與差異

貳、出版品

(一) 東南亞研究論文系列

- No.45 Lau-Fong Mak: The Management of Islamization in a Malay Society
- No.46 Peter J. Marcotullio: Globalization and Urban Sustainability in the Asia Pacific Region
- No.47 Ishak Hj. Omar, Mad Nasir Shamsuddin, Fatimah Arshad, Kusairi Mohd Noh and Zainal Abidin Tambi: The Impact of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) on the Palm Oil Industry of Some ASEAN Countries
- No.48 Kriengsak Chareonwongsak: Evaluating Government Policy in Response to the Thai Economic Crisis
- No.49 H. H. Michael Hsiao & Hong-Zen Wang: Ethnic Resources or Capitalist Logic? - Taiwanese

- Investment and Chinese
Temporary Migrants in Vietnam
- No.50 Sue-Ching Jou, Dung-Sheng
Chen & I-Chun Kung: Trans-
nationalization and Overseas
Investment: The Case of Large
Taiwanese Electronics Com-
panies in Malaysia

(二) 東亞研究論文系列

- No.10 魏樂伯、蕭新煌、關信基、呂
大樂、陳健民、丘海雄、楊國
楨、黃順力：當代華人城市社
會的民間社會組織：台北、香
港、廣州、廈門的比較分析
- No.11 Tak-Wing Ngo: Developmental
Imperative and Spoliatory
Politics: A Comparative Study
of Mainland China, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong

(三) *Chinese Business in South-East Asia: Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship*

這是本計畫於 1997 年 11 月在本
院所舉辦的「東南亞華人企業研討會」
(Chinese Business in Southeast Asia:
Contesting Cultural Explanations,
Researching Entrepreneurship) 會後集
結而成的論文專書，日前剛剛出版，
它可說是本計畫的成果之一。它的編
者為 Edmund Terence Gomez and
Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (本計畫主
持人)，出版者為 Curzon Press，除目
錄與前言外共二百零五頁。

參、合作機構

本計畫近期新增簽約合作機構
如下：

1. 早稻田大學亞洲太平洋研究中心
暨同大學大學院亞洲太平洋研究
科 (日本)
2. Hong Kong Institute of Asia-
Pacific Studies, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong
3. Centre of Asian Studies, The
University of Hong Kong
4. Asia-Pacific Studies Institute
(APSI) , Duke University
(USA)

肆、會議

本計畫於 2001 年 7 月 26-30 日
(星期四 - 星期一) 與看守台灣協會
等機構合辦「清淨亞洲 2001 台灣年會
廢棄物管理國際研討會」。

伍、午餐研討會

1. 2001 年 6 月 26 日
戚常卉博士 (本計畫博士後研究
學者)：英殖民統治下新加坡社
會：一些初步想法
2. 2001 年 7 月 5 日
吳德榮博士 (荷蘭萊頓大學漢學
研究所)：兩岸三地之分贓政治與
經濟發展 (本計畫與本院社會學
研究所合辦)

陸、活動預告

1. 九十年度午餐研討會系列(四)
時間:2001 年 9 月 28 日(星期五)
麥留芳博士 (本計畫訪問教授):
海洋東南亞的伊斯蘭化
2. 殖民歷史、土著地權與經濟發展:台灣與砂勞越的比較國際學術研討會
時間:2001 年 10 月 30 日 (星期二)
附註:與本院民族所合辦
3. 2001 年亞洲原住民組織國際性自治論壇及文化交流活動
時間:2001 年 9 月 25 日 - 10 月 1 日 (星期二 - 星期一)
附註:與邵族文化發展協會等機構合辦

2001 年 6 月 · 香港大學亞洲研究中心

本計畫主持人蕭新煌教授 (左起第五) 前往訪問, 並與該中心簽訂合作協定



6月26日・午餐研討會
戚常卉博士：英殖民統治下新加坡社會：一些初步想法



7月5日・午餐研討會
吳德榮博士：兩岸三地之分贓政治與經濟發展

奠定基礎、向上提升： 本院東南亞區域研究計畫舉辦之研討會及出版成果 1995-2001

蕭新煌

中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫主持人

本計畫成立伊始，即以（一）奠定本院各人文暨社會科學所（處）對東南亞區域研究之基礎；（二）加強本院與東南亞及歐美各國研究本區有成之學術機構及學者之合作關係，並推動更具互惠效果之交流；（三）培養國內東南亞研究之新進人才，為主要任務。依此原則，本計畫在「分支計畫」、「合作計畫」、「博士後學者及博碩士論文獎助」之外，並積極舉辦重要課題之研討會，邀請國內外重要學者發表論文，與國內學者、學生做即時且深入的討論。

在兩年前由本院學術諮詢總會和楊前副院長國樞主持所做之評估中，對本計畫上述之發展方向已給予相當程度肯定。以下所列本計畫過去六年來在「制度建構」（institutional building）中舉辦研討會此一方向之努力成果，一方面可昭信於本院同仁和全國學術界，另一方面可供各界公評，更可做為本計畫未來擴大、提升為「研究中心」之學術基礎。

設置區域研究中心之目標是李遠哲院長長期以來對本計畫之期許，日前李院長也已再次重申他對進一步發展和落實本院東南亞區域研究政策之決心。

關於本計畫六年多來在奠定基礎、向上提升的不同努力與各項成果也將陸續在周報公佈，敬請各位同仁指正。

壹、台灣的東南亞區域研究年度研討會

1. 1999 年 4 月 16-17 日：中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫主辦，淡江大學東南亞研究所、暨南大學東南亞研究所協辦。其中二十篇論文經審查後由本計畫於 2000 年 10 月出版「東南亞的變貌」專書。

2. 2000 年 5 月 12-13 日：淡江大學東南亞研究所主辦，中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫、暨南大學東南亞研究所協辦。

3. 2001 年 5 月 3-4 日：暨南大學東南亞研究所主辦，中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫、淡江大學東南亞研究所協辦。

貳、本計畫單獨舉辦之研討會

時間	活動名稱	出版情形
1995/6/26-28	東南亞社會轉型與中產階級的興起 國際工作計畫研討會	
1997/6/6-8	東南亞中產階級比較國際研討會	H. H. Michael Hsiao, ed., <i>Exploring the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia</i> , PROSEA, 2001 (出版中)
1997/11/17-18	東南亞華人企業研討會	Edmund Terence Gomez and H. H. Michael Hsiao, eds., <i>Chinese Business in Southeast Asia- Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship</i> , Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001
1997/11/29	馬來回教世界觀的實踐	論文刊登於本計畫出版之「東 南亞研究論文系列」No.11-15
1998/4/10	全球化衝擊下的東南亞	論文刊登於本計畫出版之「東 南亞研究論文系列」No.20, 21, 37
1998/4/16	東南亞及東亞地區經濟成長、貧富 不均、貧窮問題與社會變遷之研究 工作計畫研討會	Yun-Peng Chu and Hal Hill eds., <i>Social Impact of the Asian Finacial Crisis</i> , London: Edward Elgar. (出版中)
1999/8/20-21	International Workshop on East Asian Land Reforms Revised (II)	

1999/12/3	東南亞研究教學座談會	會議紀錄刊登於本計畫出版之「東南亞區域研究通訊」第10期
2000/5/6	東南亞伊斯蘭政教運動研討會	論文分別刊登於本計畫通訊第13, 14期
2000/11/3-4	東亞區域研究成果發表會 (國科會人文處委託, 本計畫承辦)	集結出版三冊論文集
2000/12/8	台商在東南亞:資本、勞動與族群小型國際研討會	將出版專書
2001/3/26-27	Parties, Leadership, and Governance in East and South-East Asia: A Comparative Study	將出版專書

參、與院內各所合辦之研討會

時間	活動名稱	合辦單位	出版情形
1998/6/28	近代海外華人與僑教研討會	近史所	
1998/11/4-7	第四屆國際客家學研討會	民族所	有關東南亞部分論文, 刊登於本計畫通訊第6, 7期
2000/4/7	東南亞考古小型研討會, 並邀請 Journal of Siam Society 之榮譽主席 Dr. Ian Glover 來訪	史語所	論文審查修改後, 將刊登於本計畫通訊或「東南亞研究論文系列」
2000/9/6-7	被殖民都市國際研討會	台史所	有關東南亞及東亞論文審查後, 將刊登於「東南亞研究系列」, 「東亞研究論文系列」
2000/9/15-16	中國與越南的關係研討會	近史所	許文堂主編, 「中、台與越南關係的轉變: 從十九世紀到一九九〇年代」, 東南亞區域研究計畫, 2001 (即將出版)
2000/10/17-18	東南亞之區域經濟與人力發展研討會	經濟所	論文審查修改後, 刊登於「東南亞研究論文系列」No.46-50, 並陸續出版中
2001/2/5	台灣與南海地區之衝突管理圓桌學術討論會	歐美所	論文審查修改後, 將刊登於本計畫通訊或「東南亞研究論文系列」

2001/4/26-29	第四屆世界海外華人國際學術研討會	社科所	論文審查修改後，將出版專書
2001/10/30	殖民歷史、土著地權與經濟發展：台灣與砂勞越的比較國際學術研討會	民族所	

肆、與國內院外機構合辦研討會

時間	活動名稱	合辦機構	出版情形
1998/9/25-26	東亞經濟發展之回顧與展望	台大經濟系等	相關論文出版於本計畫通訊第 7 期
1999/4/16-17	家庭、社會政策及其財務策略國際研討會	中華民國社會福利學會	相關論文出版於「東南亞研究論文系列」No.28
2001/7/26-30	清淨亞洲 2001 台灣年會廢棄物管理國際研討會	看守台灣協會等	
2001/9/25-10/1	2001 年亞洲原住民組織國際性自治論壇及文化交流活動	邵族文化發展協會、Asia Indigenous People Pact 等	

伍、與國際研究機構合辦之研討會

時間	活動名稱	合辦機構	出版情形
1998/6/18-19	當代越南研究研討會	法國 Provence 大學東南亞研究所	本計畫通訊第 5, 6 期
1998/8/28-30	International Workshop on East Asian Land Reforms	East and West Center, Hawaii	相關論文刊登於本計畫出版之「東亞研究論文系列」No.2-7
1998/11/24-25	亞洲價值之辯 - 東南亞的國家價值、華人價值、回教價值研討會	澳洲國立大學亞太研究學院	論文審查修改後，出版於本計畫通訊或「東南亞研究論文系列」No. 30-34, 39

2000/7/27-3	第十六屆亞洲史學家會議 (IAHA)，本計畫有十位分支計畫主持人發表論文	馬來西亞沙巴大學主辦	本計畫通訊第 11 期有系列報導
2001/2/15-16	International Conference on Chinese Business and Culture in Global and Local Contexts	英國 ESRC (經濟與社會研究委員會)	將出版專書(在國外出版)
預訂 2002 年 2 月	International Conference on Women, Families and Labor Movement: Asian Perspectives	荷蘭 IAS (國際亞洲研究院)	

陸、本計畫出版品 (2001 年 8 月底為止)

一、東南亞研究論文系列

1. Rueyling Tzeng: Foreign Direct Investment in Southeast Asia Since the 1980s: The Implications of Regional Economic Integration
2. Chin-fen Chang: Exports, Growth and Dependency: A Preliminary Study of ASEAN-5
3. 蕭新煌：亞太轉型、區域成長圈與永續發展
4. Chin-Ming Lin: Southeast Asian Countries' Service Industries in Globalization of the World Trade
5. 龔宜君、張景旭：發展中的東南亞中產階級：對馬來西亞、印尼、泰國與菲律賓中產階級形成之評析
6. 龔宜君：東南亞華人經濟成就與跨國商業網絡初探
7. 林滿紅：印尼華商、台商與日本政府之間 日治初期台商的東南亞經貿活動 (1895-1919)
8. Lau-Fong Mak: Between Materialism and Post-Materialism: The Addicted Middle Class of Singapore
9. Kenneth Christie: Liberal vs. Illiberal Democratization: The Case of Southeast Asia
10. 陳慈玉：初論日本南進政策下台灣與東南亞的經濟關係
11. Lau-Fong Mak: The Malayo-Islamic World in Southeast Asia
12. Liaw Yock Fang: The Religious Life of Malay-Muslims

- 13.Wazir Jahan Karim: Shifting Cosmologies of Culture and Religion in Malaysia:
Adat, Islam and Modernity
- 14.Masykuri Abdillah: Islamic Legal Thought and Practices in Contemporary
Indonesia
- 15.Jaran Maluleem: The Coming of Islam to Thailand
- 16.覃怡輝：新加坡住宅政策的探討
- 17.蕭新煌、龔宜君：東南亞台商與華人之商業網絡關係
- 18.蔡宏進、蔡明璋：東南亞勞工對台灣僱主與台灣社會的觀感:初步的分析
- 19.Laurids S. Laurisen: The Financial Crisis in Thailand: Causes, Conduct and
Consequences
- 20.Yue-man Yeung: To the Precipice and Back: Asia's Financial Turmoil
- 21.Henry Wai-chung Yueng: Under Siege? Economic Globalization and Chinese
Business in Southeast Asia
- 22.Shigeto Sonoda: In Search of a 'Synergetic' System of Promotion in Southeast Asia:
The Japanese Multinationals in Comparative Perspective
- 23.林正義：東南亞區域安全體系的研究:理論與實際
- 24.黃蘭翔：越南會安與臺灣鹿港傳統店屋建築之比較
- 25.Edmund Terence & H. H. Michael Hsiao: Ethnic Chinese Business (Research) in
Southeast Asia
- 26.Lau-Fong Mak & I-Chun Kung : The Overseas Chinese Network: Forms and
Practices in Southeast Asia
- 27.黃蘭翔：蘇門答臘島上的 Batak 族與 Minangkabau 族之民族建築
- 28.Sven E O Hort & Stein Kuhnle: Growth and Welfare? A First Look at the Recent
East and Southeast Asian Experience
- 29.Lau-Fong Mak: Modeling Islamization in Southeast Asia: Brunei and Singapore
- 30.Craig J. Reynolds: Icons of Identity as Sites of Protest: Burma and Thailand
Compared
- 31.Mab Huang: Debating Asian Values: Saying Too Little or Saying Too Much?
- 32.Yi-Huah Jiang: Asian Values and Communitarian Democracy
- 33.David G. Marr: Concepts of Statecraft in Vietnam
- 34.Anthony Reid: Chinese and Malay Identities in Southeast Asia

- 35.Lau-Fong Mak: The Rules of the Name Game In Insular Southeast Asian Societies
- 36.覃怡輝：東南亞國家社會福利政策的比較研究：以社會安全為主
- 37.Lee Boon-Thong: Globalisation, Tele-revolution and Cyberurbanisation in Malaysia
- 38.My- Van Tran: Vietnam's Caodaism, Independence, and Peace: The Life and Work of Pham Cong Tac (1890-1959)
- 39.Anthony Milner: ASEAN +3, 'Asia' Consciousness and Asian Values
- 40.Gerard A. Persoon & Manon Osseweijer: Small Islands and Small Island Societies in Theory and Practice: Two Indonesian Cases Compared
- 41.Judith Nagata: Is Islam Compatible with Democracy? The Role of Religion in Civil Society and Human Rights Movements in Malaysia since 1990
- 42.Anthony Reid: Aceh and Indonesia: A Stormy Marriage
- 43.Robert R. Reed: In Quest of a Sustainable Livelihood: Conditions Underlying Ilocano Migrations in the Philippines and Beyond
- 44.Jomo Kwame Sundaram: What's Different about Southeast Asian Capitalism?
- 45.Lau-Fong Mak: The Management of Islamization in a Malay Society
- 46.Peter J. Marcotullio: Globalization and Urban Sustainability in the Asia Pacific Region
- 47.Ishak Hj. Omar, Mad Nasir Shamsuddin, Fatimah Arshad, Kusairi Mohd Noh and Zainal Abidin Tambi: The Impact of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) on the Palm Oil Industry of Some ASEAN Countries
- 48.Kriengsak Chareonwongsak: Evaluating Government Policy in Response to the Thai Economic Crisis
- 49.H. H. Michael Hsiao & Hong-Zen Wang: Ethnic Resources or Capitalist Logic? - Taiwanese Investment and Chinese Temporary Migrants in Vietnam
- 50.Sue-Ching Jou, Dung-Sheng Chen & I-Chun Kung: Transnationalization and Overseas Investment: The Case of Large Taiwanese Electronics Companies in Malaysia

二、東亞研究論文系列

1. H. H. Michael Hsiao, Alvin Y. So: The Making of the East Asian Middle Classes: The Five Propositions

2. Shih-Jung Hsu, H. H. Michael Hsiao: The Impacts of Class Differentiation and Cultural Construction on Post-War Land Reform in Taiwan
3. Sonoko Kumagai-Matsuda: From Tenant to Owner Cultivator: through an analysis of the diary of NISHIYAMA Kouichi
4. Noriaki Iwamoto: Domestic and Social Origins of Land Reform in Japan: Landlord System, Village Community, and Bureaucracy
5. Hanhee Hahm: Land Reforms and Korean Tenants
6. Seung Woo Park: Land Reform in Korea Revisited: A Preliminary Report of Field Survey Results in Three Villages in Southeastern Korea
7. Kyonghee Min, Jin Chae Yoo: The Relationship between Tenants and Their Religious Landlord in the Process of Land Reform: A Case Study of Sa-Ha Village in Poun-Gun, Chungchong Buk-Do, Korea
8. Hui-yu Caroline Ts'ai: Politics of Memory and History: Shōsen in Japanese "Apologetic" Historiography
9. Anita Chan: Chinese Factories and Two Kind of Free-Market (Read Bonded) Workforces
10. 魏樂伯、蕭新煌、關信基、呂大樂、陳健民、丘海雄、楊國楨、黃順力：當代華人城市社會的民間社會組織：台北、香港、廣州、廈門的比較分析
11. Tak-Wing Ngo: Developmental Imperative and Spoliatory Politics: A Comparative Study of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

三、書目彙編系列

1. 東南亞研究書目彙編
2. 中國南海地區考古學研究相關書目
3. 東南亞之國際勞工移動書目及摘要彙編
4. 臺灣時報東南亞資料目錄（一九〇九—一九四五）
5. 韓國研究書目彙編
6. 日本研究書目彙編 I，日本研究書目彙編 II

7. 東南亞、日本、韓國研究博碩士論文彙編
8. 大南實錄清越關係史料彙編
9. 當代中國大陸研究書目彙編

四、專書系列

1. 東南亞的變貌

八十三年到九十年度分支計畫題目一覽表

一、南島語族的歷史（包括考古）

臧振華 (史語所)	台灣與東南亞古代文化關係的考古學考察和研究	83.9- 86.6
臧振華 (史語所)	菲律賓呂宋島北海岸考古調查（第一年）	86.7- 87.6
臧振華 (史語所)	菲律賓呂宋島北海岸考古調查計畫（第二年）	88.7- 89-12
臧振華 (史語所)	菲律賓呂宋島北海岸考古調查計畫	90.1- 90.12
陳仲玉 (史語所)	台灣與中國南海區域關係的考古學考察和研究	83.9- 86.6
陳仲玉 (史語所)	台灣與中國東南沿海文化關係的考古學考察和研究	87.7- 88.6
陳仲玉 (史語所)	台灣與泰國古文化關係的考古學考察和研究	88.7- 89.12
陳仲玉 (史語所)	中泰古代海上交通史的研究	90.1- 90.12
陳維鈞 (史語所)	亞洲東南沿海地區考古調查	88.7- 89.12
陳維鈞 (史語所)	越南北部沿海地區考古調查	90.1- 90.12
陳國棟 (經濟所)	三佛齊人（室利佛逝）之研究：回顧與展望	87.7- 89.12
黃蘭翔 (台史所)	越南古代城市形成之歷史與其城市特徵之研究	85.7- 87.6
湯熙勇 (社科所)	清代中國救助東南亞國家難船的方法	90.1- 90.12
許文堂 (近史所)	十九世紀清、越外交關係之演變	88.7- 89.12
許文堂 (近史所)	法國殖民時期的中越關係	90.1- 90.12
周婉窈 (台史所)	台灣總督府在日本南進政策中的地位	83.9- 86.6
陳慈玉 (近史所)	日本南進政策下台灣與東南亞的貿易和資源分配	83.9- 85.6

林滿紅 (近史所)	日治時期台商的東南亞經貿活動	83.9- 85.6
鍾淑敏 (台史所)	俘虜收容所-日治時期台灣與東南亞關係之研究	86.7- 88.6
蔡慧玉 (台史所)	日軍佔領下印尼的軍事動員,1941-1945:從戰時協力到戰後補償	86.7- 87.6
蔡慧玉 (台史所)	從戰時協力到戰後補償：以印尼的「墓參團事件」(1974)為例	87.7- 88.6
蔡慧玉 (台史所)	日日本帝國「內外地行政一元化」下的印尼(1944-1945):以「爪哇奉公會」為比較研究	90.1- 90.12
李宇平 (近史所)	從僑匯緊縮看世界經濟大恐慌對中國與東南亞間經貿關係的衝擊(1929-1937)	88.7- 89.12
李宇平 (近史所)	集團經濟與東南亞新秩序：1930年代上海、香港、新加坡之間商貿網絡的變化	90.1- 90.12
趙綺娜 (歐美所)	1950年代東南亞華僑在美國東亞外交政策中之地位	83.9- 85.6

二、東南亞區域的語言、宗教及本土文化

李壬癸 (史語所)	東南亞地區南島語言調查研究計畫	83.9-86.6
羅仁地 (史語所)	東南亞地區藏緬語族獨龍語調查研究計畫	83.9- 86.6
孫天心 (史語所)	東南亞地區南亞語系語言研究計畫	83.9- 86.6
朱榮貴 (文哲所)	越南的孔廟	86.7- 88.6
朱榮貴(文哲所)	越南當代的宗教：以高臺教為主	88.7 89.12
黃蘭翔 (台史所)	越南、柬埔寨、爪哇島的印度教及佛教建遺跡調查研究	87.7- 89.12
黃蘭翔 (台史所)	麻六甲都市的文化多重性與其歷史的形成過程	90.1- 90.12
江日新 (文哲所)	融合與反融合：以印尼穆罕默迪亞運動為例	87.7- 89.12
蔣 斌 (民族所)	砂勞越伊班族的兩種稻作農業及其社會經濟史研究	87.11- 89.12

三、脫離殖民統治後東南亞區域的政治、經濟、社會等各方面之發展

林正義 (歐美所)	東南亞區域安全體系的研究：理論與實際	83.9- 86.6
林正義 (歐美所)	東南亞信心暨安全建立措施:以南海爭端為個案研究	86.7- 88.6
朱浚源 (近史所)	國家的理論與實際重觀：新加坡經驗	85.7- 87.6
徐正光 (民族所)	經濟再結構與東南亞的農業問題：以 GATT 的衝擊為中心的探討	83.9- 86.6
蕭新煌 (民族所) (社會所)	東南亞發展過程中階級結構轉型與中產階級的興起：泰國、馬來西亞、菲律賓、印尼與越南的比較研究	83.9- 86.6
蕭新煌 (社會所)	東南亞與東亞中產階級的比較	86.7- 89.12
金 玫 (歐美所)	企業精神與社會經濟轉型：泰國與東南亞	83.9- 84.6
覃怡輝 (社科所)	東南亞國家社會福利政策之研究：印尼、菲律賓、緬甸、越南	83.9- 86.6
蔡青龍 (經濟所)	區域經濟整合趨勢下東南亞與台灣的經貿發展	83.9- 86-6
蔡青龍 (經濟所)	國際勞工移動與經濟結構調整:東南亞國家之研究	86.7- 88.7
蔡青龍 (經濟所)	泰國的勞工輸出及其受經濟風暴之影響	88.7- 89.12
黃登興 (經濟所)	東南亞之人力資源、經濟整合與國際勞工移動	83.9- 86.6
黃登興 (經濟所)	戰後東南亞的產業發展與貿易型態	88.7- 89.12
黃登興 (經濟所)	日本、台韓與東南亞的產業發展與貿易依存關係的比較研究	90.1- 90.12
傅祖壇 (經濟所)	東南亞國協自由貿易區域組織對我國農產貿易之影響	87.7- 89.12
張靜貞 (經濟所)	國際貿易秩序下台灣與東南亞的農產經貿關係	90.1- 90.12
張晉芬 (歐美所)	台灣與東南亞地區與西方區域經濟整合的關係	83.9- 84.6
陳新民 (社科所)	新加坡法治主義的實證研究	86.7- 88.6

陳新民 (社科所)	菲律賓違憲審查權制與聯邦最高法院的角色	88.7- 89.12
朱雲鵬 (社科所)	東南亞及東亞地區經濟成長、貧富不均、貧窮問題與社會變遷之研究	86.7- 88.6
楊文山 (社科所)	歸鄉 - 菲律賓海外勞工返鄉後本土生活調適策略之研究	88.7- 89.12

四、東南亞華人與當地族群及社會的互動關係

張存武 (近史所)	菲華商總領袖群之研究	85.7- 87.6
宋光宇 (史語所)	新加坡與馬來西亞華人社會的宗教變遷	85.7- 87.6
許文堂 (近史所)	當代越南經濟改革與華人社會的變遷	86.7- 87.6
朱浚源 (近史所)	融合或衝突？馬華伊斯蘭近代發展初探（一）	88.7- 89.12
朱浚源 (近史所)	融合或衝突？馬華伊斯蘭近代發展初探（二）	90.1- 90.12

五、合作計畫

蔡源林（佛光大學生死學研究所）	馬來西亞伊斯蘭國教化歷史起源及其對國家政策影響之研究	87.7- 89.12
麥留芳（淡江大學東南亞研究所）	宗教適應模式：建構東南亞弱勢回教徒與優勢回教徒模式	87.7- 88.6
林水檉（馬來西亞華社研究中心）	歷史與人物：馬來西亞華人歷史研究	87.7- 89.12
魏維賢（新加坡南洋學會）	新加坡華文教育之研究	87.7- 89.12
龔宜君（淡江大學東南亞研究所）	馬來西亞的族群企業 - 中小企業台商、華商與馬來商之比較研究	88.7- 89.12
龔宜君（淡江大學東南亞研究所） 王宏仁（淡江大學未來研究組） 張翰璧（義守大學公共政策與管理學系）	攜手並進的市場與國家力量：變遷中的東南亞台商勞資關係	90.1- 90.12
游謙（慈濟大學宗教與文化研究所）	印尼「教士復興會」發展史	90.1- 90.12

八十七年到九十年度博士後研究及博（碩）士論文獎助題目一覽表

一、八十七年度博士後研究及博（碩）士論文獎助題目（86.7-87.6）

1. 博士後研究計畫

龔宜君	東南亞華人資本的創業與發展、東南亞華商與台商之關係
姚朝森	現代化、意識型態與國家安全 - 新加坡「亞洲價值」的分析

2. 博士生論文獎助

李毓中	菲律賓與古巴兩地華人移民史-移民型態及其與當地社會融合過程之比較
李道緝	泰國華人國家認同問題（1910-1949）
林開忠	殖民主義、政治與族群意識-砂勞越伊班族之研究

3. 碩士生論文獎助

張光仁	Socio-political Change and Long-distance Trade Network in Maritime Southeast Asia before c.1500: A Preliminary Examination within World System Perspective
顏佩如	「中星 90 年代初期教育改革之比較研究」-教育改革報告書之剖析
張曉威	「馬來西亞華人公會」與馬來西亞華人社會之研究

二、八十八年度博士後研究及博（碩）士論文獎助題目（87.7-88.6）

1. 博士後研究計畫

龔宜君	東南亞華人資本的創業與發展
-----	---------------

2. 博士生論文獎助

李明峻	東南亞領土爭端的國際法處理
郭俊麟	李光耀的人格、思想與行為-新加坡領袖研究

楊聰榮	1930 年代到 1950 年代東南亞華人意識與土著民主義的互動關係-以印尼與馬來亞為例
藍佩嘉	家務勞動的跨國分工與日常實踐-菲律賓籍家務勞工與台灣雇主

3. 碩士生論文獎助

洪曉純	台灣、華南及菲律賓的石鏵-一個東南亞史前文化特質的比較研究
齊偉先	馬來西亞的新興伊斯蘭教運動-伊斯蘭文化「智庫」之研究
張凱勝	亞太安全多邊對話機制-東協區域論壇之研究
潘永強	馬來西亞的國家機關與公民社會之研究
廖書賢	戰後泰國外交政策
周怡君	荷屬時期爪哇華人甲必丹研究
許壬馨	從菲律賓華文文學看華人認同的轉變
陳美萍	馬來西亞華巫兩族關係

三、八十九年度博士後研究、博（碩）士論文獎助題目（88.7-89.12）

1. 博士後研究計畫

麥留芳	1.宗教適應模式 - 建構東南亞伊斯蘭教徒的宗教行為模式（馬來西亞） 2.信仰皈依與認同更替 - 汶萊與新加坡華人伊斯蘭教徒
嚴智宏	泰國的佛教藝術與社會 - 以釋迦牟尼佛像為例
王宏仁	台商投資對東南亞勞動形構的作用

2. 博士生論文獎助

陳宗仁	十六、十七世紀閩南商人的崛起及其海外發展 以台灣、呂宋為中心
王遠嘉	印尼「官僚資本階級」的形成 - 「國家機器」、「階級」和「資本」的歷史結構分析

3. 碩士生論文獎助

陳中和	馬來西亞伊斯蘭國教化政策推行研究 以吉蘭丹州和森美蘭州為個案比較探討
類延峰	馬哈迪時期馬來西亞外交政策之研究
翁俊桔	新加坡多元種族政策之成效評估 集選區（GRC）制度的個案研究
黃鈺翔	印尼新秩序時期政黨政治之研究
陳丁輝	人格特質對威權國家政治繼承之影響 馬哈地、李光耀個案研究
蘇世岳	泰銖危機之政治因素探討
孫友聯	台灣、馬來西亞及新加坡健康照護體制比較研究
李志賢	馬來西亞華文獨立中學歷史科「統一課本」中的族群意識
鄒秀明	中小企業台商在越南投資之經營模式研究

鄭雅雯	台南市的東南亞外籍新娘女性處境之探究
-----	--------------------

四、九十年代博士後研究、博（碩）士論文獎助題目（90.1-90.12）

1. 博士後研究計畫

麥留芳	東南亞的馬來社會和伊斯蘭化
嚴智宏	素可泰時期的佛教美術
戚常卉	1.國家、宗族和新加坡金門人的國家認同 2.殖民主義與文化 - 新加坡金門人殖民遭遇 1819-1902

2. 博士生論文獎助

吳鯤魯	亞洲金融中心的形成與變遷：日本、香港、新加坡金融中心政策的政經分析
呂秋遠	東南亞金融危機的政治經濟學分析

3. 碩士生論文獎助

陳秋平	移民與馬來西亞佛教的發展（1786-1957）
蘇俊翔	馬來西亞外資政策研究
鄭安貴	泰國經濟發展轉型之研究：以 1997 年金融危機之處理為例
張喬博	泰國民主化過程中非政府組織之角色 - 以草根性團體為個案研究
徐鴻馨	緬甸族群之研究 - 個案研究卡倫族分離活動歷程
李建柔	印尼分離主義形成與發展 - 西巴布亞與東帝汶之比較研究
李永傑	1990 年代馬來西亞華語本地創作歌手的主體構成
官泰發	檳城及麻六甲華人選民投票行為之研究—以 1999 年大選為例
吳岳融	新加坡住宅政策之研究
鄭曉昀	寮國親越政策之研究,1975-88 年
陳怡蓉	印尼國家機關在經濟發展過程中角色之分析：以石油產業為例
林哲瑋	海外台商供應鍊管理模式—以馬來西亞電子業為例
章少棠	泰國境內外籍勞工對泰國勞工輸出的影響
張書銘	新興跨國服務產業：「越南新娘」仲介研究
謝偉倫	馬來西亞另類媒體的形成與發展—以《激流月刊》（Aliran Monthly）為例
余月美	華商在馬來西亞華文教育發展中的定位
潘婉明	一個新村，一種華人？—重建馬來（西）亞華人新村的歷史與生活面貌
陳佩瑜	台灣想像與越南新娘：跨界女性的現實與差異

2002 年台灣東南亞區域研究年度研討會

徵求論文

主辦單位：國立中山大學東南亞研究中心

協辦單位：中央研究院東南亞區域研究計畫

淡江大學東南亞研究所

國立暨南國際大學東南亞研究所

研討會日期（暫定）：2002 年 5 月 4、5 日（星期五、六）

研討會地點：高雄市國立中山大學

研討會主題：新世紀的東南亞：政治、經濟與社會

論文摘要與截稿日期：2002 年 2 月 1 日前將 300~500 字左右之摘要寄至主辦單位。內容需包括論文題目、姓名、單位職稱、聯絡地址、電話、E-mail。

論文收件截止日期：2002 年 4 月 15 日前寄至主辦單位。

研討會聯絡事宜：

地址：804 高雄市鼓山區蓮海路 70 號國立中山大學東南亞研究中心

電話：07-525-2000 轉 5542

傳真：07-525-5511

電子郵件：cseas@mail.nsysu.edu.tw

聯繫人：翁俊桔先生

2001 年 9 12 月

東亞及東南亞研究相關會議時間表

九 月		
日期	會議名稱	相關訊息
6-8	3rd EUROSEAS Conference	地 點：London, United Kingdom 主辦單位：The European Association for Southeast Asian Studies (EUROSEAS) 聯 絡 人：Ms. Hilga Prins 聯絡地址：c/o KITLV, P.O. Box 9515 2300 RA, Leiden, The Netherlands 電 話：+31 71 527 2639 傳 真：+31 71 527 2638 電子郵件：euroseas@rullet.leidenuniv.nl 相關網址： http://ias.leidenuniv.nl/institutes/kitlv/euroseas.html
9-12	IV European Conference on Philippine Studies: The Philippines in Southeast Asia and Beyond	地 點：Alcala, Spain 主辦單位：University of Alcala & the Spanish Pacific Studies Association 聯絡地址：Universidad de Alcala Oficina de Protocolo, Pza. San Diego, s/n, Alcala de Henares 28805 Spain 電 話：+34 918854089 傳 真：+34 918854126 電子郵件：europhil@aep.es 相關網址： http://www.aep.es/europhil/
14-15	IPEF 2001 Internet and Development in Asia Conference: Panel on intellectual property an piracy issues in East and Southeast Asia	地 點：Singapore 主辦單位：Information & Communications Management Programme, National University of Singapore 聯 絡 人：Randy Kluver, Ph.D. 聯絡地址：Information and Communication Management Programme, National University of Singapore, AS 3, #04-16, Singapore 117570 電 話：+65 874-8755 傳 真：+65 874-8755 電子郵件：info@ipef.org 相關網址： http://www.ipef.org/events/ipef2001/

14-15	Transnational Activism and Problems of Democracy in East and Southeast Asia	地點：Stockholm, Sweden 主辦單位：Nordic Institute of Asian Studies & Sodertorns hogskola, Sweden 聯絡人：(1) Dr. Nicola Piper (2) Dr. Anders Uhlin 電子郵件：(1) nicola@nias.ku.dk (2) anders.uhlin@sh.se 相關網址：http://eurasia.nias.ku.dk/Activism/
十 月		
日期	會議名稱	相關訊息
12-14	NEAAS 2001 New England Conference of the Association for Asian Studies	地點：Williamstown, USA 主辦單位：Williams College 聯絡人：(1) Caroline Reeves (2) Carrie Waara 聯絡地址：c/o History Department Williams College Williamstown, MA 02167, USA 電子郵件：(1) creeves@williams.edu (2) cwaara@williams.edu 相關網址： http://www.williams.edu/Asian/neaas/
25-27	NYCAS 2001 New York Conference on Asian Studies “Knowing Asia”	地點：Ithaca, USA 主辦單位：Department of Asian Studies Cornell University 聯絡人：Keith Taylor 聯絡地址：Department of Asian Studies 380 Rockefeller Hall Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853, USA 電話：+1 607 255 3237 傳真：+1 607 255 1345 電子郵件：kwt3@cornell.edu 相關網址： http://www.newpaltz.edu/asianstudies/nycas.html
十 一 月		
日期	會議名稱	相關訊息
23-25	Feeling Asian modernities: TV drama consumption and the articulation of transnational/cultural connections, differences and asymmetries within East/Southeast Asia	地點：Tokyo, Japan 主辦單位：Institute of Asian Cultural Studies Center, International Christian University (ICU) 聯絡人：Koichi Iwabuchi, PhD 聯絡地址：International Studies Division International Christian University

		3-10-2 Osawa, Mitaka-shi Tokyo 181 Japan 電話：+81 422 33 3208 傳真：+81 422 33 3229 電子郵件：iwabuchi@icu.ac.jp 相關網址： http://subsite.icu.ac.jp/iacs/ja/sympoj.htm
十二月		
日期	會議名稱	相關訊息
12-15	Texts and Contexts in Southeast Asia	地點：Yangon, Myanmar 主辦單位：Universities Historical Research Centre, Myanmar 聯絡地址：Universities Historical Research Centre, Amara Hall Yangon University Campus Yangon 11041, Myanmar 電話：+95 1 532622 傳真：+95 1-530121 電子郵件：uhrc@mptmail.net.mm