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## 永續發展與公共行政 ——從山美與里佳經驗談社區自治與 「共享性資源」的管理\*

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本研究擬以山美與里佳兩社區的保育努力爲案例,來探討「以社區爲主體的自然資源管理」(community-based natural resource management)體系在台灣的施行,並探討此類資源管理對山地社區永續發展的重要功能。由於「共享性資源」(common-pool resources)往往是地方的永續發展的關鍵性因素,加上其易因遭到濫用而迅速耗竭的特性,國際間已發展出相當完整的理論架構,對此一議題進行有系統的實證研究,冀對開發中國家的經濟成長與環境保護有所幫助。鑑於國內在這方面研究尚未有突破性的進展,故擬以此案例研究,討論正式與非正式制度及發展策略,在山地社區管理當地自然資源所扮演的角色。要成功地改變貧窮、資源耗盡的現狀,需要社區民眾的集體行動,來遵守村中保育的協議(公約),並進一步對抗外來的「盜獵」者。此間,有些社區能成功地吸收外部資源,凝結內在力量,而獲致較佳之成果,而有些社區則面臨較大的困境,較不被外界認同。什麼因素解釋這樣的差異?本研究除將針對集體行動的邏輯、共享性自然資源的特性,以及制度性誘因等相關理論提出解釋外,並希望此案例分析將有助於社區重建、山地/原住民政策、自然資源管理、以及永續發展等政府政策,提供建議。

關鍵詞:以社區為主體的自然資源管理、資源使用者自治、共享性資源的悲劇、達娜伊谷、集體保育行動、制度誘因

## Public Administration for Sustainable Development —Self-Governance and Common-Pool Resources Management in Taiwan's Indigenous Communities

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## ABSTRACT

Many indigenous communities around the world have established their own long-enduring institutional arrangements for governing their common-pool (CPRs) resources such as local fisheries, forests, and water systems. Although such indigenous institutional arrangements may have been around for long and have functioned well, they are often challenged once these communities are open to the outside world, because newcomers to the community no longer share the same understanding and respect for the indigenous arrangements. Reckless use by these newcomers often result in rapid depletion of the local common-pool resources. A critical question is how new institutional arrangements can be developed such that sustainable use of the resources can be restored.

The efforts of Shan-Mei and Li-Chia Village in restoring their indigenous governance systems for natural resources via collective action have encountered similar challenges, but experienced different levels of success. One of them not only negotiated with outsiders to obtain autonomy in governing local CPRs but also to gain considerable capital for development, while the other failed to get either such empowerment or outsider resources. This paper discusses the causes of such differences, and concludes that governmental support to indigenous conservation programs by awarding sufficient autonomy and financial assistance would benefit both conservation and development. Such authority to govern local resources creates and sustains multiple incen-

tives for local residents to engage in effective management of local common pool resources.

Key Words: Community-Based Natural Resource Management,
Self-governance of Appropriators, the Tragedy of the
Commons, Tanayiku, Collective Conservation Action,
Institutional Incentives