1999 / September

我國工會組織參與政治過程之討論－ 以銀行員工會與勞動基準法擴大適用為例
The Participation of Labor Organizations in the Political Process: The Case of Taiwan's Bank Employee Unions and the Coverage Extension of the Labor Standards Law

研究論文 Research Article

許繼峰
Joseph Chi-feng Hsu

395-433

本文以我國銀行員工會影響勞動基準法擴大適用範圍爲例，分析工會組織參與政策制定過程的活動。銀行業原不適用勞基法，但工作條件遠高於已適用之行業，由於公營銀行行員擔心在民營化後工作受到威脅，因此積極要求納入該法之保障；銀行員工會一方面壓迫勞委會指定納入適用範圍，另一方面遊說立法委員修改勞基法第三條；工會持續運用政治的支持與撤出壓迫國民黨，並且在立委選舉中利用助選與反輔選以回報朋友丶懲罰敵人，此種策略極爲有效。硏究也發現，工會與業者的角力最後演變成勞委會與財政部間的對抗，兩個部會分別成爲勞資雙方的代理人。

The purpose of this research is to explore the involvement of Taiwan's labor organizations in state policy-making processes. The case of Bank Employees Unions' political activities as an influencing factor on the coverage extension of the Labor Standards Law (LSL) is investigated. Original data were primarily gathered from bankers' unions' documents and legislative reports, as well as supplemental data from in-depth interviews with union leaders and a key government official. In 1988, public bank employees who were unprotected by the LSL began to organize unions and struggle for its safeguards.  In addition, employees were concerned about their job security following the privati­zation of the banking sector. The paper's findings show that in facing resistance from bank owners, unions consistently employed two strate­gies. First, unions requested that the Council of Labor Affairs designate the banking sector to be covered by the LSL, and, second, lobbied a revision of the LSL through the Legislative Yuan. They used, or threat­ened to exert, political power through the support or withdrawal of sup­port of the ruling party (Nationalist Party) in political elections. During the legislative election in 1992, unions flexed their muscles by rewarding their supporters and punishing their adversaries. The most impressive tactic that unions have recently employed include "negative endorsements" which have placed some candidates, who had allegedly poor records regarding labor laws, in an unfavorable light to union members. This tactic has been quite effective as well as instrumental in aiding bankers' unions to achieve their stated goals. This paper also demon­strates that competition between unions and bank owners was, in fact, a rivalry between the Council of Labor Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, which represented the interests of the labor unions and bank owners respectively.

反輔選, 助選, 勞動基準法, 遊說, 銀行員工會, 團體理論
bank employees union, electioneering, group theory, Labor Standards Law, lobbying, negative endorsements

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