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2011 / March Volume 23 No.1
Institutional Choice of Local Governance and Transition Politics: An Analysis of Institutional Adaptation of Irrigation Associations in Taiwan

Number of Clicks:3392; Number of Abstract Downloads:0; Number of full PDF text Downloads:0;

發刊日期/Published Date
2011 / March
中英文篇名/Title
地方治理的制度選擇與轉型政治:台灣水利會制度變革的政治與經濟分析
Institutional Choice of Local Governance and Transition Politics: An Analysis of Institutional Adaptation of Irrigation Associations in Taiwan
論文屬性/Type
研究論文 Research Article
作者/Author
邱崇原, 湯京平, 黃建勳
Chung-yuan Chiu , Ching-ping Tang , Chien-hsun Huang
頁碼/Pagination
93-126
摘要/Abstract

走過殖民、威權統治,到民主時代,台灣的灌溉系統的治理,展現了難得一見的制度韌性。至少從日據時代開始,這個治理體系結合了制度經濟學中「最適治理疆域」以及「公私合產增效」兩大原則,並嵌入複雜的地方政治運作之中,執行著傲人的治理功能。然而,隨著民主改革而來的政治經濟情勢變化,大幅改變了地方政治的風貌。築基於地方政治的灌溉系統治理,也必須隨之調適。雖歷經衝擊 ,這套治理體系卻依然維持著基本的運作,展現奇特的制度調適能力,引發學術好奇。本研究採動態的觀點,除檢視這套「特別功能政府」的制度適應基層政治制度變革的情形,展示民主化下地方治理的真實風貌,並希望能增加學界對於制度調適與變革的認識。

The governing system of Taiwan's irrigation has survived colonial, authoritarian, and democratic eras, indicating impressive institutional robustness. A close examination indicates that the system has actually been practicing such economic principles as pursuing better economies of governing scale and of public-private synergy in public goods provision, which Elinor Ostrom and her followers have long, advocated. N evertheless, it is interesting to ask whether the efficiency of governance can be maintained when the political system start to transform,位lUS affecting the operation of the functional institutions standing on it. By examining Taiwan's case, this research points out the dynamics between changes of institutions in different tiers. It indicates that a functional institution with the principle of user-participation might help it survive the dramatic changes in the course of democratic reforms. 

關鍵字/Keyword
合產, 特別功能政府, 共享性資源, 制度調適
co-production, special-purpose government, common-pool resources, institutional adjustment
學科分類/Subject
政治學, 經濟學
Political Science, Economics
主題分類/Theme

DOI
檔案下載/Download
Abstract full PDF text
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