2015年9月

為何不需要一個世界政府？—霍布斯論國際關係與自然狀態的（不）完美類比
Why Not a World Government? Thomas Hobbes on a (Dis)qualified Analogy between State of Nature and International Relations

研究論文 Research Article

周家瑜
Chia-yu Chou

445-470

本文的問題意識在於：為何證成了國內主權者的霍布斯，未能繼續完成其世界政府的推論，以及這是否是一個邏輯上的不一致。一般論者的回答可分兩種：一、認為行為主體（國家與個人）的差異使得國際政治領域遠較原初自然狀態緩和，因此不需要一個作為超級利維坦的世界政府；二、差異存在於行為主體之間的關係。本文主要論證為：這兩種回答均有不足之處，若是深入檢視霍布斯對於原初自然狀態的論述，本文試圖指出：原初自然狀態中的「人人認為自己較他人優越」的心態平等為回答此一疑問的關鍵。

In order to answer the long-standing question of why Hobbes does not justify a world government as a super-Leviathan, this paper examines Hobbes’s accounts of international relations and the pre-civil state of nature. One common view tends to emphasize the differences between “the agents” in these two realms, namely states as artificial persons and individuals as natural persons; the other common view emphasizes the differences of “the relations between the agents”. By re-examining Hobbes’s account of the pre-civil state of nature, I argue that both of these common views are not sufficient. This essay intends to argue that if Hobbes’s assumption of equality about the original state of nature is re-examined, it can be seen that what actually causes a state of war is not so much the equal ability of men as men’s common tendency of considering themselves superior to others, namely vain-glory.

霍布斯, 平等, 虛榮之心, 世界政府, 國際關係
Hobbes, equality, vain-glory, world government, international relations

政治學
Political Science

摘要 全文下載