在訊息不對稱下，倘製造商在零售市場處於訊息劣勢，且零售階段存在固定成本。若製造商垂直控制之目的在誘使零售商透露訊息，則在不同市場需求與零售固定成本之組合下，製造商會以不同控制手段追求最大利潤。在固定成本遠小於市場需求時，「限制轉售價格」將獲得最高利潤；當固定成本大到一定程度時，製造商將放棄垂直控制，「放任價格競爭」乃製造商之最適選擇。倘若製造商採行「獨家專賣」將無法獲得最佳利潤。至於製造商之行爲是否會降低經濟福利，本文利用理論模型指出，當製造商實施「限制轉售價格」時，可同時極大經濟福利；然而「放任價格競爭」則可能會損及經濟福利。其次「獨家專賣」雖無法使製造商獲得最大利潤，卻有可能極大經濟福利。準此，公平法對「限制轉售價格」及「獨家專賣」之不公平對待，若以訊息不對稱的角度視之，恐怕仍有待商榷。

Under asymmetric information, when retailers are privately informed about demand conditions before contracting with the manufacturer, and there are fixed costs at the retail stage, and if the objectives of vertical controls are to induce retailers' information, exclusive territories (ET) will never be privately desirable, but under some conditions, ET will be socially desirable. When the manufacturer uses resale price maintenance (RPM) to maxize profits, it will also achieve the social welfare maximum. If flexible retail price is privately desirable, we show that such a privately desirable goal may or may not be socially desirable. The above result calls into question the current contrasting legal treatment of RPM and ET.