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2011 / September Volume 23 No.3
An Economic Analysis of Advertising —The Effects of Competitive Behavior, Cooperative Advertising and Market Maturity

Number of Clicks:1504; Number of Abstract Downloads:0; Number of full PDF text Downloads:0;

發刊日期/Published Date
2011 / September
中英文篇名/Title
競爭模式、聯合廣告以及市場成長性對廣告的影響
An Economic Analysis of Advertising —The Effects of Competitive Behavior, Cooperative Advertising and Market Maturity
論文屬性/Type
研究論文 Research Article
作者/Author
楊維娟, 周登陽, 黃宗煌
Wei-chuan Yang, Deng-yang Chou, Chung-huang Huang
頁碼/Pagination
285-310
摘要/Abstract

本文旨在探討廣告的經濟效果,並分析廠商間進行聯合廣告或非合作廣告、競爭模式(數量競爭或價格競爭)及不同的市場成長性等情況下,對廣告率及社會福利的影響。文中發現:需求為固定彈性下,若市場具高度成長性,則數量競爭下廠商間的廣告競爭形態為策略性互補,且相較於價格競爭下有較高的廣告率。若市場接近飽和,則兩種競爭形態下,廠商間的廣告競爭均為策略性替代,且價格競爭下有較高的廣告率。高成長性市場中,獨立廣告率低於最適廣告率,若廠商聯合廣告,則價格競爭下之廣告率將更偏離最適廣告率,而數量競爭下則可提高廣告率使其接近最適廣告率。反之,若市場已接近飽和,則非合作均衡之廣告量均過大,此時廠商聯合廣告,不論在何種競爭形態下,均可降低廣告率並接近最適水準。

This paper investigates how competitive behavior and market maturity affect the economic effects of advertising. We also compare the effects between the firms’ cooperative and independent advertising. Considering the case of constant elasticity demand function, this paper shows that if the market size can be expanded, the firms’ advertising expenditures in a Cournot model are strategic complements, and the advertising rate is higher than in a Bertrand model. If the industry is mature, no matter what the competition model is, the f irms’ advertising expenditures are strategic substitutes and the advertising rate is higher in Bertrand than in Cournot. In an emerging industry, the independent advertising rate is lower than the optimal advertising rate. If firms cooperate in advertising, the advertising rate will deviate from the optimal level in the Bertrand model but will be closer to optimal level in the Cournot Model. In a mature market, on the contrary, the independent advertising rate is higher than the optimal level. If firms cooperate in advertising, the equilibrium advertising rate decreases and will be closer to the optimal level in both competition models.

關鍵字/Keyword
說服性廣告, 合作均衡, 非合作均衡, 價格競爭, 數量競爭
persuasive advertising, cooperative equilibria, non-cooperative equilibria, Bertrand competition, Cournot competition
學科分類/Subject
經濟學
Economics
主題分類/Theme

DOI
檔案下載/Download
Abstract full PDF text
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