政府在制定政策的過程當中，往往受到利益團體所影響，尤其以來自廠商所組成之利益團體對於產業政策之制定的影響最為常見。本文以Grossman & Helpman   (1994)所建立之政冶獻金模型為架構，來分析利益團體如何藉由政治獻金的捐獻以達到影響政府制定自製率政策的目的。除此之外，我們也藉由此一模型來分析政府如何在考量政治獻金的收入下，來訂定其最適之自製率水準。由本研究的結果得知，廠商提供政治獻金的多寡以及最適自製率的高低，受到政府對全國福利水準（相對於政治獻金收入）重視的程度所影響。當政府對全國福利水準高度重視時，外國最終財廠商將不必支付政治獻金，而最適自製率水準為100%。當政府對全國福利水準中度重視時，本國中間財廠商將不必支付政治獻金，而最適自製率水準為0%。當政府對全國福利水準低度重視時，國內丶外廠商都將支付政治獻金，而最適自製率水準將介於0％與100％之間，且隨著政府對全國福利水準重視程度之提高而下降。

This paper develops an oligopoly model to analyze optimal local content requirement (LCR) in the presence of special-interest groups making political contributions. It shows that both the optimal extent of LCR and the amount of political contributions are affected by the weight that the domestic government puts on the social welfare. When the weight is large enough, the profits of the domestic intermediate firm dominate the sum of the profits of the foreign final firm and the domestic consumer surplus, and the government takes the highest possible value of 100% on LCR. In this case, the foreign intermediate firm makes no politi­cal contributions. However, if the weight is moderate, the latter one out­weighs the former one, the optimal LCR is 0%, and the domestic final firm makes no political contributions. Finally, if the weight is small enough, the optimal LCR is imposed between 0% and 100%, and both firms make political contributions. In this case, the optimal extent of LCR decreases as the weight increases.