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| 中英文篇名/Title | 自由家父長主義有否保存選擇自由？一個人觀的反思 Freedom of Choice Under Scrutiny: An Anthropological Critique of Libertarian Paternalism |
| 論文屬性/Type | 研究論文 Research Article |
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| 頁碼/Pagination | - |
| 摘要/Abstract | 自由家父長主義主張，因其能保存當事人的選擇自由，故與自由主義不但不對立甚至相容。本文透過梳理Mill、Dworkin、Feinberg與自由家父長主義正當性論述的相關討論，指出兩者在人觀上存在根本性的差異：前者認為，人整體來說人是理性及應被視為理性的，所以當事人的同意是家父長主義正當性的終極基礎；後者則透過行為科學的研究成果，指出人的系統性不理性，並據此論證家父長主義的必然性與正當性。但正是由於兩者相當不同的人觀預設，自由家父長主義，其對當事人選擇自由之保存的許諾，實質上很難存在，因此最終仍無法與自由主義相容。 Since its introduction, libertarian paternalism has significantly influenced political praxis, theory and public discourse. Proponents argue that it aligns with liberal democracies by enhancing individual well-being while preserving its freedom of choice. This article examines paternalism and libertarian paternalism, emphasizing a fundamental anthropological shift. Paternalism assumes individu-als are fundamentally rational, with informed consent as its legitimacy corner-stone, even if they occasionally act irrationally. In contrast, libertarian paternal-ism, drawing from behavioral science, posits that humans are systematically irrational and shaped by external factors, necessitating and legitimizing pater-nalistic interventions. |
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