1998 / September

政黨提名策略與派系輪政之競局理論分析
Party Nomination Strategy and Faction Alternation in Taiwan's Local Politics - A Game Theoretic Analysis

研究論文 Research Article

姚惠忠
Hui-chung Yao

451-475

本文以競局理論模型，透過連續均衡概念，發現唯有當決策者提供資源的成本位於適當區間的情況下，決策者的策略性表態，才具有完全的訊號作用。而且，當國民黨提名導致派系雙雙投入選戰之機率，大於國民黨開放導致派系雙雙投入選戰之機率時，國民黨反而會採提名的策略。顯示派系皆投入選戰，並非國民黨所不樂見的局面。因此，派系輪政只是國民黨維持兩派系均衡的工具而已。當挑戰慣例之派系力量越大，國民黨越可能扶持「應該輪到執政」的派系，而當挑戰慣例之派系力量不大時，國民黨反而會以開放之策略，讓「應該輪到執政」的派系倍感威脅。

In this manuscript, the author models the recent history of relations between the ruling Kuomintang (KMT, or the Nationalist Party) and its local factions as an example of a "three-persons, sequential, incomplete information game". By utilizing the solution concept of "sequential equilibrium", it is demonstrated that the KMT is constrained in the use of "signaling" as its strategy to dominate factions in local politics. However, strategic signaling can be most powerful when the "election cost" to the KMT is perceived to be within a certain range. In this case, the KMT has its best opportunity to manipulate local factions such that the KMT's political dominance can be preserved through the well­ known phenomenon of "faction alternation" in Taiwan's local politics.

競局（賽局）理論, 信號競局, 選舉, 政黨提名, 地方派系, 派系輪政
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