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| 發刊日期/Published Date |
2018 / June
|
|---|---|
| 中英文篇名/Title | 地方派系的資源配置策略：以嘉義縣社區營造資源為例的個案研究 Resource Allocation Strategy of Local Factions: A Case Study of Community Development Resources in Chiayi County |
| 論文屬性/Type | 研究論文 Research Article |
| 作者/Author | |
| 頁碼/Pagination | 163-205 |
| 摘要/Abstract | 分配政治文獻中常探討政治人物會將資源優先分配給誰，其實證研究的結果並不一致，可能影響因素如下：大選與黨內初選制度、資源的分配流程、選區人口特性，及政治人物的特性等。本文探討嘉義縣社區營造資源的分配，量化研究結果顯示在此資源的分配上，陳縣長的影響力較大，立委們的影響力較小；陳縣長、張花冠立委及立委落選人陳適庸的地盤獲得補助的機率較高。這顯示並不是所有的支持者與游離者都是相同的，擁有在地資訊的現任者會考慮肉桶收買的成本、風險與效益，而會優先分配給一些具有某些特性的小團體或地方派系。 Previous studies of distributive politics have focused on which types of voters are favored in the allocation of resources. Variations across these empirical studies can be attributed to factors such as the voting system and candidate selection rules, the type of and allocation procedures for resources, the nature of the district’s population, and the characteristics of politicians. This paper studies the grant allocation of the Townscape Renaissance Project in Chiayi County. The results show that the influence of Magistrate Ming-Wen Chen outweighed that of legislators. In addition, the villages which were the core-constituencies of Magistrate Chen, of the Legislator Hua-Kuan Chang, and of the legislative election loser Shi-Yong Chen, had higher probabilities to receive the grants. This implies that not all support voters and swing voters are the same. The politician who has local information considers the cost, risk and benefit of pork-barrel buying, and allocates in favor of some groups or local factions with certain characteristics. |
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