本文以「策略性分析法」探討「多元談判賽局」的均衡。研究結果顯示：如果以折現法反應談判者的時間偏好，則談判均衡在極限之下會趨近 Nash 談判解。但是當以固定成本法反應談判者的時間偏好時，均衡在極限下不會趨近於 Nash 談判解。因此 Nash 談判解不能無條件的使用在所有的多元談判賽局上。此外，本文並以「關稅協商」、「雙佔勾結」與「勞資談判」等課題爲例，簡介多元談判理論的應用方法。

The purpose of this paper is to develope a theortical framwork within which the outcomes of multi-issue bargaining can be described. The way to do this is to convert the multi-issue bargaining problem into a problem of bargaining about the division of utility between the bargainers, and then employing the method of iterated removal of dominated strategies to verify the existence of the unique perfect equilibrium of this game and char­acterizes that equilibrium. We find that, as long as the costs of prolonged negotiations are modeled as the discounting of future outcomes, the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution. However, if the central motive to reach an agreement is instead provided by the fixed per-period bargining costs, then the relations between the limit perfect equilibrium and the Nash solution would vanish.