本文討論自由的意志弱性行爲。所謂意志弱性行爲是指行爲者的行動違反了行爲者本身的價值（最佳）判斷。我認爲很多的意志弱性行爲同時也是自由的行爲。很明顯地我們有時會自由地選擇違反我們的最佳判斷而行—雖然判斷某一行爲選項就整體而言是較好的，我們仍依自己的自由意志採取另一行爲。然而，有一廣泛流傳的懷疑論卻認爲，人只有在非自由的情況下才會作出違反最佳判斷的行爲；也就是說，根本不可能有所謂的自由的意志弱性行爲。此懷疑論的主要代表人物是柏拉圖及當代的波格麥爾和華森等人。在這篇論文中，我將檢視有關此懷疑論的三個最重要論證。爲了辯護自由的意志弱性行爲之可能性，我將證明此三論證均爲無效。

There are free, weak-willed actions. It is an apparent fact that we sometimes act freely against our best judgments-we sometimes perform actions in our own free will, while judging that another possible action would have been, overall, a better one. However, a widely held skeptical view has it that one performs an action against one's own best judgment only if one does so unfreely; in other words, there can be no free weak­-willed action. In this paper, three main arguments for this form of skepticism are examined. In order to defend the possibility of free weak-­willed actions, I explain why all these arguments fail.