1997 / September

國際間委託代工下之最適貿易政策
Optimal Trade Policy On International Original Equipment Manufacturing Contracts

研究論文 Research Article

陳芳岳, 洪進朝
Fang-yueh Chen, Chin-chao Hung

31-44

本文以一雙占模型探討一國之最適貿易政策。在模型中國際間敵對廠商之間存在「委託代工」(OEM) 契約。我們研究在此情況下委託代工貿易型態的經濟理性與最適貿易政策。在OEM市場爲買者訂價的假設下，我們證明OEM貿易型態的發生與否不僅取決於貿易政策變數與貿易國家之比較利益，並且必須考慮敵對廠商間之策略性互動。我們發現就OEM受委託國而言，對其OEM產品之出口應予課稅，但對出口至第三國之產品則應予補貼。

We examine the optimal trade policy in a duopoly model where international rival firms compete in a final goods market. The domestic firm signs an OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) contract with and produces the final goods for the foreign firm. When the price in the OEM market is decided by the foreign firm, we prove that whether a trade pattern with the OEM contract exists depends on the comparative advantage of trading countries and on the strategic interaction between firms. We show that the domestic country should tax its exports of the OEM products, but subsidize the other exports of final goods.

委託代工契約, 最適貿易政策
Original Equipment Manufacturing Contracts, Optimal Trade Policy

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