本文闡明美國哲學家德我肯 (Ronald Dworkin) 的資源平等觀並檢討它的理論基礎。本文的要旨之一在於指出，德我肯的資源平等觀其實預設了一條原則，而對這條原則德我肯並沒有直接加以辯護。本文將這條原則稱之爲「泛公平原則」：人必須爲自己的眞正選擇負責，但不應該由於那些與自己眞正選擇無關的因素而處於較不利的處境。「泛公平原則」，乍看之下，有其吸引人之處，因此被許多具有平等主義傾向的自由主義者視爲理所當然，奉爲建構分配正義理論的基本前提。透過與合理契約論的對照，本文分析「泛公平原則」的缺點，並希望具有平等主義傾向的自由主義者能夠看到另一種辯護他們的政治信念之途徑。從第貳節至第肆節，我仔細分析資源平等觀的主要命題。第伍節則討論了凡裴律斯 (Philippe Van Parijs) 對德我肯的一項批評，並質疑假設性的保險市場是否是補償人身資源較差者的最佳方式。最後，我在第陸節裡嘗試形構出社會正義的一般性問題，並從合理契約論的角度來檢討「泛公平原則」的可接受性。

This essay critically reconstructs Ronald Dworkin's Equality of Resources and evaluates its foundations. It claims that Equality of Resources presupposes a principle of fairness, which has never been explicitly argued for in Dworkin's writings. The principle of fairness I attribute to Dworkin demands that everyone be responsible for the genuine choices he or she has made in pursuing a concept of goods, and that no one be disadvantaged simply by virtue of factors that have nothing to do with his genuine choices. Indeed, this principle is by and large taken for granted by many egalitarian liberals in thinking about distributive justice. By contrasting it with reasonable contractarianism, this essay points out some of its drawbacks, and hopes that egalitarian liberals come to appreciate that reasonable contractarianism could offer them an alternative approach to defending their political doctrines. In sections II, III and IV, I discuss in detail Dworkin's main ideas in Equality of Resources. Philippe Van Parijs's objection is then taken up in section V to illustrate that the hypothetical insurance market model might not be the best way to compensate for those who have inferior internal endowments. And in section VI, I put forward a general framework for thinking about social justice and evaluate the extent to which Dworkin's principle of fairness is acceptable in light of reasonable contractarianism.