琉球於明清時期為中國之屬國，然自1879年琉球遭日本所併吞後，中國社會對過去琉球之地位及與中國關係之本質逐漸模糊。時至抗戰爆發，「收復失地」議題引發討論，琉球遂再度受政治菁英與社會輿論所關注。
美日開戰後，因應未來戰後和平會議對領土與東亞秩序之討論，國府最高決策機構—國防最高委員會遂設立國際問題討論會。本文聚焦國際問題討論會對琉球戰後地位的討論、開羅會議前「琉球條款」之出爐，以及開羅會議期間「蔣羅會」就琉球歸屬處置的討論。
本研究發現，一、國府內部對琉球戰後地位處理意見紛呈，直至開羅會議前仍未能達成統一之見解；二、從史料檔案中也發現「琉球條款」存在兩組四種版本，提案涵蓋包括三類主要意見：「歸隸中國」、「歸日但需非軍事化」、「由國際機構託管」；三、美國國家檔案有關開羅會議涉及琉球問題的討論記錄為1956年中華民國政府所提供，且琉球部分經過四次內部修訂包括蔣本人的修改後才定案提交美國。
「蔣羅會」上羅斯福「再三」詢問戰後中國是否有意「收回琉球」，蔣介石提議「中美共管」。經本文分析，其背景包括一、蔣乃根據「定案」調整、非無中生有；二、蔣介石對琉球地位的理解，已由「中國之失地」轉變至「其地位與朝鮮一樣」；三、受「甲午時限」之影響；四、中國缺乏強大海軍；五、蔣揣測羅未必真心，避免因此損及合作互信。
The country once known as the Lewchew (Ryukyu) Kingdom was a tributary state of China during the Ming and Qing periods. However, ever since Japan’s annexation of the kingdom in 1879, the Chinese public opinion toward the question of the kingdom’s legal status and its relationship with China became ambivalent. By the time of the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Lewchew question regained attention from the Chinese political elite and public opinion as the issue regarding “reversion of lost territory” emerged.
Following the beginning of the Pacific War between the US and Japan, in anticipation of the eventual peace negotiations regarding post-war territories and the East Asian geopolitical order, the ROC government‘s top policy-making organ, the Supreme National Defense Council, set up the International Problems Discussion Sessions to determine post-war policy. This paper focuses on discussions regarding the post-war legal status of the Lewchew, and the “Chiang-Roosevelt” summit during the Cairo Conference regarding the post-war Lewchew arrangements.
This paper reveals from internal government archives that the ROC government had varying internal views and did not have a consistent position on the post-war legal status of Lewchew, and was unable to reach real agreement even prior to the Cairo Conference. The three varying views included: (1) reversion to China; (2) reversion to Japan, but demilitarization; (3) trusteeship under an international organization.
During the “Chiang-Roosevelt” summit, President Roosevelt referred to the question of post-war Lewchew and enquired “more than once” whether China “would want the Lewchew returned”. Chiang replied that China would be agreeable to “China-US joint occupation”. This paper analyzes the underlying background and circumstances behind Chiang’s response and concludes the following: (1) Chiang based his response on the earlier internal policy-making discussions, and improvised accordingly based on Roosevelt’s spontaneous inquiry. (2) Chiang’s understanding of the Lewchew’s status shifted from “China’s lost territory” to “a legal status equal to Korea”. (3) Acknowledging the “terminability of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)”, the Lewchews were not considered to be part of the territories to be returned to China. 4) China lacked a strong navy and thus faced challenges of extending its coverage the Lewchews. 5) Chiang felt compelled to “assure the United States” of China’s lack of territorial “ambitions” as he suspected that Roosevelt’s inquiry was to sound out Chiang’s intentions and accordingly encourage China’s resolve toward the war of resistance against the Japanese.
