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  • 《Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy》 Volume 08, Number 02
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1996 / September Volume 8 No.2
Comparison of Equilibrium Locations under One-stage and Two-stage Games in a Weberian Triangle Model with Duopolistic Market

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發刊日期/Published Date
1996 / September
中英文篇名/Title
Weber區位模型一階段與二階段分析之比較
Comparison of Equilibrium Locations under One-stage and Two-stage Games in a Weberian Triangle Model with Duopolistic Market
論文屬性/Type
研究論文 Research Article
作者/Author
麥朝成, 黃鴻
Chao-cheng Mai, Hong Hwang
頁碼/Pagination
153-179
摘要/Abstract

一階段分析法與二階段分析法在廠商區位理論文獻中均曾被廣泛地採用,不過就我們所知,尙不曾有人討論過這兩種分析法下廠商最適區位之異同。本文利用 Weber 三角形模型發現當市場是雙佔且產品屬策略性替代時,規模報酬遞增(遞減)廠商在二階段分析法下之最適區位必然較一階段分析法接近(遠離)產品市場;如果產品屬策略性互補,則其結果正好相反。但是當廠商之生產函數爲規模報酬不變時,不論兩產品爲策略性互補或替代,此二分析法下之最適廠商區位是一致的。

In the literature on industrial location, both one-stage and two­-stage games have been widely used to derive plant location. But to our knowledge, a comparison of the two games has never been explored. In this paper, we set up a Weberian triangle model with duopolistic market to examine this issue. It is shown that if both firms regard their products as strategic substitutes, each firm's optimal location under the two-stage game as relative to the one-stage game is closer to (away from) the output market when its production function exhibits IRS (DRS). This result is reversed if the two products are strategic complements. Moreover, the equilibrium location under the two games are identical if each firm has a CRS production function. This outcome holds true regardless of whether the two products are strategic substitutes or complements.

關鍵字/Keyword
韋氏區位, 雙佔均衡
Weberian location, Duopolistic equilibrium
學科分類/Subject

主題分類/Theme

DOI
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Abstract full PDF text
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