2002 / March

政治制度與經濟治理：台灣混合式總統制之政治經濟分析
Political Institutions and Economic Governance: The Political Economy of Hybrid Presidentialism in Postauthoritarian Taiwan

研究論文 Research Article

李佩珊
Pei-shan Lee

1-31

這篇論文對憲政體制設計的辯論提出一個不同的切入點。向來對於台灣混合式總統制所發的學術辯論，大多著眼於該體制對於政治穩定、行政立法關係與民主鞏固的影響。本文從政治經濟學的角度分析此政體類型與經濟治理的關係，認爲在既有的國會選舉制度之下，立法部門容易淪爲分歧與破碎的特殊利益競逐的場所，不管採行純粹的總統制或內閣制，都難以產生有效的經濟決策與管理。混合式總統制的制度設計，可以形成以總統爲中心的行政層級節制，制衡立法部門的特殊利益傾向，並避免步上日本決策癱瘓的政治困境，不失爲一個能保有行政優位與決策自主性的制度安排。本文並以日本與台灣在亞洲金融危機中的不同政策回應爲例，指出兩國政治制度的差異，是造成不同經濟治理型態的制度起源，以支持本文針對台灣混合式總統制所提出的另一種正面觀點。

My analysis of Taiwan's hybrid presidentialism offers a different perspective to regime type debates, in which academic attention has been concentrated on the impact of this kind of institution on political stabil­ity, party system configuration, and prospects for democratic consolida­tion. Instead of focusing on the potential negative consequences of hybrid presidentialism, I argue that this unique regime type may generate posi­tive outcomes as far as economic governance, a key issue faced by all transitional democracies, is concerned. Given the preexisting, Single Non-transferable Vote (SNTV), which has made the legislative branch an arena divided and captured by particularistic interests, the hybrid presidentialism could serve as a countervailing institution that facilitates command and coordination capability within the executive, sidesteps problems of decision-making paralysis evident in Japan, and provides institutional incentives for politicians to address more public-oriented issues. Crisis management during the Asian financial crisis is invoked to demonstrate the institutional sources of different policy responses in Taiwan and Japan.

混合式總統制, 複數選區單記非讓渡投票制, 結構性腐敗, 發展型國家, 亞洲金融危機
hybrid presidentialism, single non-transferable voting (SNTV), structural corruption, developmental state, Asian financial crisis

政治學
Political Science

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