根據新古典理論，如果勞資雙方在談判勞動契約時，沒有將勞動雇用量包括在談判議題之中，則談判結果將不會落在契約曲線之上；所以理性的談判團體，應該不會採用此種無效率的方式，進行勞資協商。針對這項傳統理論，本研究的第一項發現是：雖然聯合工資與雇用量的談判解，會落在契約曲線之上，但是相對於只談工資，不談雇用量的單獨談判而言，聯合談判不一定能同時增進談判雙方的利益；所以無法保證參與勞資協商的談判者，會一致同意採取聯合談判。其次，本研究也發現：一旦談判雙方對於談判方式存有歧見時，在次賽局完全均衡的狀態之下，理性的談判團體採取單獨談判的機率大於零；所以在勞資協商中，只談工資而將雇用量交由資方單獨決定的現象，是一種談判賽局的均衡，而不是矛盾。

As is well-known, a wage-only bargain is inefficient. However, empirical studies of English and American unions reveal that in most cases wages are the only point under negotiations. Thus there seems to be some discrepancy between theory and practice. In this paper we show that a negotiation over wages only is also an equilibrium of a union-management bargaining game. Since it is an equilibrium, the alledged "discrepancy" does not exist.