本文旨在探討黑格爾（G. W. F. Hegel），在其《法哲學原理》一書之中，對於盧梭（J.-J. Rousseau）《社會契約論》（The Social Contract）「普遍意志」（general will）概念的理解與批評。黑格爾認為盧梭透過社會契約所建立的普遍意志，無法實現公共利益，而僅是個人利益的結合。究其根源，盧梭的普遍意志概念，源自於他對人性與民主政治的樂觀看法，而黑格爾對盧梭的批判，則與盧梭作為康德（Immanuel Kant）內在自由思想的先驅密切相關。黑格爾的看法，可被視為是對民主政治正當性的根本質疑，而盧梭的普遍意志論述，則展現出民主政治無法迴避的困難與挑戰。

This article discusses G. W. F. Hegel’s critique of J.-J. Rousseau’s concept of “General Will” in The Social Contract. According to Hegel, Rousseau’s concept of “General Will” cannot represent the public interest and is an only aggregate of private interests, because it is constructed from the social contract and democratic process. Rousseau’s argument of “General Will” is based on his optimistic judgement on human nature and democracy. Hegel’s critique of Rousseau originates in Rousseau’s role as the pioneer of Immanuel Kant’s inner freedom, and can be understood as a fundamental mistrust of democracy. Yet Rousseau’s concept of “General Will” uncovers the difficulties and challenges of democracy, which cannot and should not be ignored.